Thread by @JessicaWestPhD

AFTERNOON MEETING, DAY 2, SESSION 3

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The meeting is suspended to hear from the High Rep for Disarmament Affairs @INakamitsu on "Our Common Agenda" and how it relates to the #SpaceThreatsOEWG

Read the "Our Common Agenda" report by the UNSG here: un.org/en/content/com…

A key message from the report is that governance and regulatory regimes require updating in line with this new era of space activity to preserve outer space as a global common.

Preparations underway for Summit of the Future on 22-23 Sept. 2024 in NYC. Prep meeting on 18 Sept. 2023. Outcome document based on consensus to be titled A Pact For the Future

Germany and Namibia = co-facilitators for open, transparent and inclusive intergovt consultations.

Envisage important role for existing intergovt bodies and processes to prepare for outcome of the summit. Regarding security, bodies include OEWG, upcoming GGE PAROS, Disarmament Commission and CD. Successful outcomes in these bodies can form basis for Pact for the Future.

A key message from the #UNSG is to be BOLD and AMBITIOUS 🚀♥️

Outcome could include process to consolidate, reinforce and enhance effectiveness of legal regime applicable to outer space to prevent and arms race.

MEETING RESUMES to wrap up Topic 1: norms derived from existing international legal and normative regimes.

#Ukraine welcomes efforts to expand understanding of legal principles and to realize them more effectively in today’s geopolitical challenges.

Notes that space tech widely used for military purposes by aggressor state i.e. to direct missiles at civilian targets in Ukraine.

#Ukraine cont Space must be free from sovereignization and privatization, free from weapons, and protected from impact on space objects.

#France takes a pragmatic approach to norms. Two key questions: 1) identification and definition of norms; 2) the nature of such norms, some of which may become binding

#France adopted commitment not to conduct destructive DA #ASAT missile tests. Calls on other states to join this movement

#France on the threat of the use of force. France considers that Article 2 UN Charter applies fully to space. Must abstain from all aggressive rhetoric about use of force against space objects other than justifiable defence.

#France on applicability of international law: Deplores analysis that claims that IHL does not apply to outer space and that application cannot be discussed here. Eroneous and legally incorrect. Deeply worrying. Nothing in space law excludes application of IHL in this area.

#Philippines one state implies divergence on the otherwise consensus agreement that international law applies in outer space. Regarding IHL, this can still be overcome. A factual assessment can accommodate the concerns of some states.

#China re US statement about use of Chinese commercial imagery in conflict: reject such groundless blackmail nor will China sit by and let the US harm the lawful rights and interests of Chinese companies.

#China on IHL: Some claim that military objects should be protected. This is contrary to the purpose of the meeting.

Doesn't have an issue with humanitarian concerns but has an issue with the topic of armed conflict, but the focus of this meeting is peace and security.

#ICRC has requested the floor followed by point of order by #Russia. Objects to non-state participation during a session that is developing recommendations for the report.

"Beyond just a procedural point of order!" Much bigger! Member states must resolve this, not the Chair.

#Russia calls on the Chair to abstain to attempt to adopt an understanding or decision that circumvents consensus on the issue of giving the floor to NGOs during the formal meeting.

Russia will challenge this to the full.

The Chair notes that he is simply implementing the UNGA mandate for the OEWG, which allows for participation by non-state actors. The ruling on this was very clear yesterday. The ruling was appealed but the appeal did not receive consensus. Thus it is upheld.

#UK insists that the #ICRC must be allowed to take the floor without interruption.

#Russia insists that this is not about the meeting, but the mandate. Consensus!

I'm a bit lost now. Sorry.

#Russia feels ignored.

The ruling is upheld.

Russia feels ignored.

The ruling is upheld.

Russia will continue to speak out about statements by non-govt entities at formal intergovt meetings.

Russia feels ignored.

The ruling is upheld.

Russia will continue to protest statements by non govt orgs during a formal inter govt meeting.

Round and round we go.

#ICRC: Affirming IHL neither encourages the weaponization nor legitimizes hostilities in outer space.

ICRC concerned primarily about cost of the use of weapons and other military operations. Urge placement of humanitarian considerations at the centre of norms.

#ICRC 5 recommendations to minimize risk of civilian harm, which should also apply to peacetime activities:

See paper for details: docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Wor…

@almuazcarate @UNIDIR takes the floor to present her paper that clarifies the context and meaning of "norms" "principles" and "rules."

Find the paper here: docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Wor…

⬆️⬆️⬆️ Almu is the best at providing clarity to complex and sometimes messy concepts.

Her paper on this is a must read for anyone interested in norms as a mode of governance.

Moving on to Topic 2 a) norms related to earth to space, and earth to earth threats.

#UAE: acknowledges right of states to develop space capabilities in a peaceful manner.

#Turkey: paper by #Germany and #Philippines helpful here.

Find it here: docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Wor…

#Philippines: national capabilities being developed in context of sustainable development. Therefore any harmful effects on modest space based assets, sustainability of enviro, public services = threats.

Limited space awareness makes some states more vulnerable than others.

#Philippines concerned about testing of DA ASAT missiles. Welcome commitments. Some might see them in terms of strategic equilibrium. But for developing countries any deliberate debris action is a security threat and can disrupt crucial services.

#Philippines recommendations:
1.should not conduct destructive DA ASAT tests
2.not conduct cyber/electromagnetic activities that cause loss of control of another state’s satellite
3.undertake efforts to limit destructive actions causing debris

#SouthKorea prioritizes behaviour focus.

Has committed not to conduct destructive DA #ASAT tests. And example of partaking in responsible behaviours to avoid one of most pressing threats. Call on others to join,

#Japan = focus on consequences, impacts and effects of behaviours rather than capabilities.
2 recommendations:
-states should make efforts to limit destructive actions causing debris
-states should not conduct destructive DA ASAT missile tests

#Japan: Has been mentioned that missile systems can be used for DA ASAT. Agree. But how capabilities are used is key to determining threat.

#US: most urgent threat = DA or earth to space ASAT missiles. These have created significant debris.

Debris = long concern. What has changed is increasing global reliance on fragile satellites and number of satellites in orbit.

US has committed NOT to conduct such tests.

#US UNGA resolution asks all states not to conduct destructive DA ASAT test. Meets 3 objectives:
- meaningfully limits debris
- easily understandable
- addresses greatest near-term threat to space security

#US: UNGA res on DA ASAT testing demonstrates progress on #PAROS is possible. Hopes that OEWG final report will contain this.

Proposal d) in working paper = should limit creation of new space debris by developing and implementing new measures that complement existing guidelines

#US: Proposal e) states should avoid intentional harmful interference, which can raise tensions and inadvertent conflict.

Avoiding this in peacetime can avoid misperceptions about intentions. Important re dual-purpose capabilities.

#India: supports PAROS and negotiation of legally binding instrument

Comprehensive view needed re threats to outer space operations. Counterspace systems are not the only challenge to safety, sustainability and security of outer space. Selective focus should be avoided.

#India Maintains concerns about subjectivity of threats and responsible behaviour as well as verification and access to data.

#Austria: creation of large long lasting debris = most urgent and deserves attention. Should include strong norms against activities that create but also measures at the level of system design.

#Austria:
Norms should be broad enough to apply to future activities/capabilities such as lasers, and co-orbital kinetic activities such as RPO, projectiles, robotic arms etc.

States with space launch have responsibilities under HCOC

#Austria consider impact on ground-based structures

Concern about cyber threats on space infrastructure and consequences for disruption of key services and loss of control.

#Swizerland tests of DA ASAT missiles = particular and acute problem in terms of responsible behaviour because of destructive effects. But this applies to ALL destructive ASAT systems and not only DA.

#Switzerland: should establish norm that bans all use of ASAT capabilities with such consequences regardless of where they are based. The impact/effect is key.

Use of ASAT capabilities that interrupt long term access to essential space services/resources cannot be a responsible

#Switzerland: any possible placement of space of weapons systems that can target earth or intercept missiles = highly problematic. Would be hard priority targets and trigger an arms race in space.

Such placement is something to be banned.

#Iran: focus should be on space weapons not counterspace capabilities.

Most critical threat is co-orbiting anti-satellites. Maneuvers are delayed and can lead to mistrust.

Space-to-space threats requires SSA, thus should share space data through the UN.

#France: -remains favourable to developing norms against activities that create long-lasting debris and should be part of objectives of the OEWG.

But must think beyond debris. Can also make progress towards norm to regulate behaviour of high risk of misunderstanding.

#France cont: Also want to identify other destabilizing behaviors that create threats and may or may not create debris. i.e. threat of the use of force are equally irresponsible.

#Mexico: -activities in outer space must respect principles of UN charter banning threat/use of force and also mutual assistance and cooperation.
Recommendations
1. not conducting DA ASAT missile tests
2. not testing or use of or deployment of any kind of weapon in space

#Mexico cont:
3. no interference with space systems or critical systems.

#China: should not just focus on weapons but should overhaul policies, strategies, and doctrine of a certain super power in attempt to dominate outer space. Root cause of deterioration of security in outer space and driving more states to develop counterspace capabilities

#China cont: Regarding ground to ground threats: position made clear previously. Same with ground to space.

Regarding debris, China is engaged in cooperation to mitigate. Against politicization of the issue of debris and effort to seek unilateral military superiority.

#China cont: US ASAT commitment failed to mention development, production, deployment, and use of ASAT weapons and no restrictions on the space force development. No arms control value.

#China: Ground to ground: has mentioned that this falls under existing rules of international law that governs it.

#China calls for following guidelines:
-space war cannot be won and cannot be fought
-commit not to seek hegemony/dominate outer space
-refrain from aggressive space policy/strategy
-do not see outer space as warfighting domain. Exclusively peaceful

#Germany: states should reaffirm commitments not to conduct destructive DA ASAT tests. UNGA resolution highlights broad international support. Germany = unilateral commitment.

#Germany cont:

states should not test or use or threaten to use co-orbital kinetic counterspace capabilities against space objects. Includes but not limited to deliberate collisions or physical activities with other satellites

#Germany: propose to build on the UNGA resolution DA ASAT tests and take commitment to refrain from any testing of counterspace capabilities that may cause breakups of space objects. Would 1) prevent intentional creation of debris; 2) would address destabilizing behaviour

#Germany: should not conduct or support activities through cyber/electronic/laser that create irreversible damage or permanent loss of control.

#Russia: re alleged use by Russia of commercial satellite images in war in Ukraine: Irresponsible use of civil satellite systems by US and EU is much broader context in terms of consequences that such activities could have. Supporting an army on the battlefield in real time

#Russia: Most info to Ukraine comes mostly from commercial satellites. Are using 200 such remote sensing satellites. 24 hours/day. Use private low orbit satellites that provide intelligence. US companies are suppliers of satellite data for NGA.

#Russia names numerous commercial companies from the US, Europe, Canada, and Israel that are providing imagery/other data to Ukraine to monitor the movements of the Russian army. Also Copernicus.

#Russia accusing commercial operators of providing geospatial locational data and guiding high precision missiles used against civilian targets. Guiding drones and artillery.

"Using commercial satellites is not even hidden by the US."

#Russia: In Ukraine battlefield, new methods of using satellite groupings are being used. Commercial systems have global coverage allowing pentagon to act around the world. Creates mutual suspicion and mistrust.

#Russia: Not just images: protected communications, guiding drones, amending trajectory of artillery shells using geopositioning systems managed by private commercial companies but jurisdiction of US.

More details in subsequent statements to come.

#US response to statement about use of commercial satellites to defend Ukraine: this is not denied, unlike by Russia/China.

Russia did not mention that NGA is also monitoring for potential war crimes. And to restore critical infrastructure.

#France: everything that Russia has found through open source is the result of transparency that is lacking in other countries.

We would like to see similar transparency from other states, and their commercial actor.

Closed for the day.

TOMORROW begins discussion of topic 2 b) norms related to space-to-earth and space-to space threats