A quick trip to Brussels leaves me worried by big gap between EU27 and UK for phase 2 (short thread)
In particular, no appetite for May’s three buckets/baskets of regulations, or for IFG/IPPR versions of the concept of regulatory divergence. All seen as cherry-picking. Brussels sticking to line that single market indivisible, you cannot have benefits without all the obligations
Macron’s supposed offer of something between Canada and Norway not seen as meaning what UK press claimed. In Brussels they think he and others just repeating familiar mantra on what models the UK can have according to willingness to sacrifice sovereignty
EU 27 unity still impressive. Yes, harder in phase two as some more interested in trade with UK than others. But sticking together played well for EU in first phase, and protecting integrity of single market matters to all
One Eurocrat says flatly that the Irish border deal from December “unimplementable” against UK red lines. So far others fully behind Dublin, even if that might change in an October crunch
Concern over level playing-field also intense. Even if UK only gets a Canada-type deal, it will come with obligations to observe rules on state aid, social and environmental dumping etc
Worries also about other countries who are watching Brexit like hawks. Not just Canada et al hoping to piggyback on any services deal given to UK, but also EEA countries and Swiss ready to demand equal treatment. Will constrain any chances of flexibility
Great interest in cabinet splits and possible Westminster rebellion. Some see possibility of parliament rejecting a phase two deal. UK and EU may say that means Brexit without a deal, but any constitutional crisis/fresh election would actually lead to extension of A50 and rethink
Finally, expectations of some statement/speech by May on future trade relationship may also be disappointed. She will speak on security and defence at Munich, but I am told no current plan for Florence-style speech
And that means March guidelines will be pretty tough and it may be hard for Barnier to deviate from them in any way.
On the plus side, transition should be OK, save for some concern about whether extendable. Third country deals might be tricky, though. And some worry that not all in UK understand implications of being a “colony”: told what to do without any say at all, worse than EEA
The other plus is that having done an A50 deal, the appetite is there to do a Brexit deal, including transition. But concern about whether May is strong enough to reconcile her red lines with reality. This summer could be interesting.
just in case interested, thread was longer, but technical incompetence broke it. whole thread at:
