Thanks to Sam - here's the full text of the draft EU27 guidelines for the future EU/UK relationship. Some thoughts. 1/
2 First, remember these guidelines concern the future relationship after the planned transition/implementation period. This will entail a treaty (probably multiple treaties) which will be separate from the withdrawal agreement (though there may be some links).
3 Secondly, this is a draft which the EU leaders still have to sign off on. Expect some changes in the final text, but not profound ones. After that there is a second stage of more detailed negotiation directives, proposed by Commission, adopted by EU27 ministers (the Council).
4 Desires close relationship but UK red lines limit how close it can be. The text version of the Barnier "Steps of Doom" slide. Negative economic consequences - but the PM sort of admitted that already. 
5 An important procedural point: these are negotiations on the "framework" that will appear in a "political declaration" linked to the withdrawal agreement. So not negotiations on a treaty as such but on the main outline of one.
6 EU27 position is that treaty talks as such can't start before Brexit day. Davis in particular keeps claiming that a treaty as such can be agreed in principle by October. That was never going to happen.
7 It's not simply a question of intransigence, but of legal and practical feasibility. The legal point could be challenged (are talks necessarily impossible before Brexit day?), the practical one hard to avoid - complex trade deals are rarely negotiated with that speed.
8 Remember Davis once thought he would be negotiating with individual EU countries, thinks there are tariffs on services, and reportedly claimed yesterday that the US/Canada border is "open" except at Windsor/Detroit.
9 No cherry-picking the single market etc. Yeah, we know.
Legally unavoidable that UK out of EU institutions; but the statement on EU agencies is misleading, if not false. Several EU agencies have non-EU countries associated with them.
Legally unavoidable that UK out of EU institutions; but the statement on EU agencies is misleading, if not false. Several EU agencies have non-EU countries associated with them.
10 The EU *confirms* willingness to work on a free trade deal with the UK. They have been saying that since April 2017. Yet it's a constant ERG talking point that "the EU doesn't want a free trade deal".
11 Remember the rule of thumb on assessing claims by ERG/UKIP folks - modelled here by @SebDance
12 A lot of the points I would make on the FTA part of the guidelines were made already, rather better, in this nerdgasm thread from @SamuelMarcLowe
13 I'll add a couple of points though. On investment, this is legally tricky on EU side - ECJ rulings last year and yesterday require national ratification of investment court/arbitration rules, suggest they might even be in breach of EU law (another case pending on that).
14 Data protection - even if Commission signs off on adequacy decision for UK, it can (and almost certainly will) be legally challenged - and hard to be flexible here since CJEU case law linked to EU Charter. Background: theconversation.com/how-would-brex…
15 On the level playing field point, UK could well argue that an EU demand for more commitments than usual in FTAs, but without corresponding extra market access, is... cherry picking
16 The security points. Some tension between being butch about UK being "outside Schengen" (though UK is *in* the Schengen police and criminal law rules) and also wanting close links.
17 Anyway, here's some more detailed thoughts from me about the internal and external security aspects of the future relationship, in light of May's Munich speech on the same topics - eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2018/02/lions-…
18 Open to some form of dispute settlement. The reference to the ECJ recalls its case law: arbitration etc can't result in the EU/ECJ being told how to interpret EU law. But otherwise no constraints on using a non-ECJ dispute settlement system.
19 Willing to sign an aviation agreement; but not clear about whether this should be in the current pan-European ECAA framework (which includes non-EU countries, but also the ECJ 😨) or not.
20 Ok with education (ie Erasmus) and science cooperation etc if usual rules on non-EU countries apply. As I have pointed out before, currently full Erasmus access is for States with free movement or accession plans with the EU. Funding laws to be renegotiated soon though.
21 The "Corbyn clause". A useful reply to the "look what the EU is doing to us" line.
Nah: look what you chose to do to yourself.
Nah: look what you chose to do to yourself.
22 Overall - the "let's leave the EU because it's mean to countries that leave" line is self-evidently absurd - unless you're an actual masochist.
But *is* it being "mean" here?
But *is* it being "mean" here?
23 Broadly, the framework is similar to that applying to other EU FTAs; and remember, it's the UK position since the Lancaster house speech that it *wants* an FTA.
More control = less market access, and vice versa. Deal with it.
More control = less market access, and vice versa. Deal with it.
24 On some points though it's more demanding than usual: linking fisheries catches to trade; more level playing field clauses; extra access for goods (benefits EU), but not services (UK trade interest).
25 But that's life. It'll be a negotiation, and the UK can make counter arguments. And the UK will not find non-EU countries are dying to do it favours by comparison. After this last week, only Farage and Fox could imagine Trump is an altruist on trade. /ends
