1. This would be an interesting test for eg university applicants to see how many sleights of hand can be found in one short thread.
2. Let me smooth their task by pointing out a few.
3. First, though the writer promises that he will show that @DmitryOpines has presented a skewed account of WTO rules, he doesn’t actually do that at all.
4. Dmitry’s point was that WTO rules don’t do much to help the U.K. in a no deal scenario. The writer here doesn’t actually say that they do.
5. The closest he gets is (9), where he rather limply says that WTO rules would “encourage” an EU/UK MRA. But that really concedes Dmitry’s point: WTO rules don’t help much
6. Second, the writer is silent on the fact that (on no deal) France/NL etc would be required by EU law to impose tariffs on U.K. goods (agri/car parts etc), as well as import VAT at the border, without having any adequate infrastructure at the relevant ro-ro facilities.
7. The writer fails to enlighten us as to how he thinks this is going to work without long queues and immense disruption (clue: it won’t).
8. Regulatory checks on CE marked goods (to which the writer devotes nearly half his thread) are only part of this problem. It may well be manageable. But they are only a small part of the problem.
9. As to SPS, spot the sleight of hand. The writer completely ignores the effect on UK agri *exports* (which would be huge, as he more or less admits at (10)).
10. There is a suggestion that the EU would reach a deal here (the reference to the 3:1 imbalance in food exports).
11. But that suggestion is another sleight of hand for 2 reasons.
12. First, it falls into the familiar error of ignoring scale. The EU is 10 times bigger. Our exports to the EU are far more important to us than theirs to us are to them, even where they export 3 times as much to us as vice versa
13. Second, it quietly moves away from the hypothesis it is supposed to be considering: no deal as a result of failure to agree a withdrawal agreement.
14. It suggests that the EU would in fact reach an agreement with us despite our failure (on this hypothesis) to agree to honour our own commitments on the Irish border and on money the EU reasonably says we owe.
15. But in those circumstances why would it be the EU that backs down, when the damage they face from no deal is so much less?
16. The same point applies to his comments on aviation.
17. But in addition, (15) is quite comical, because the quote he produces refutes the proposition it’s supposed to support. Read the part after the semi colon: yes, the EP thinks a deal on aviation would be good, but *only on the basis of the acquis*.
18. (The writer’s reference to access to U.K. airspace/“Atlantic Gateway” is puzzling because the U.K. has no power in international law to stop overflights of its territory by civil aircraft. Many pointed this out when the Taoiseach seemed to make a similar threat.)
19. As to (16), the writer will doubtless volunteer to be the first in line to explain that point to U.K. haulage firms and their drivers.
20. As to (19), the key question is whether no deal is a rational course for the U.K. It isn’t. That puts us in a weak bargaining position. That point should have been considered before A50 was triggered so early.
21. As the writer was one of those urging on that misconceived decision, when he looks for those responsible for our weak position, rather than denounce those who would have avoided this course had they been listened to, I’d suggest he start by looking in the mirror. /ends
PS also worth reading this thread in response to the Collins article and @paulrey99’s effort.
This is also excellent.
