This is a great thread looking at Super Canada by David, but I must respectfully disagree with one of the points.
This one specifically, in which the length of the CETA deal is used to determine how long a negotiation might take. It is also an example commonly used to argue the EU is slow at negotiating, and it was anything but common.
Although there is some irony in arguing a CETA deal can be done in 18 months, because in May 2009, at the start of the actual negotiation, the ambition was to deliver it in 18 months. Both sides actually hinted at a 2011 conclusion.
It’s possible to argue it was longer than 10 years. The Canada-EU Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement (TIEA) began in 2004 and was put on hold in 2006. Arguably, CETA was just a reboot of the TIEA.
international.gc.ca/trade-agreemen…
international.gc.ca/trade-agreemen…
One of the problems with TIEA was that Canadian provinces weren’t included, and this was because it was probably negotiated under something called C-Trade, which is part of the Canadian Trade Policy consultation process. 
Following this process meant that provinces were consulted and informed in a similar way that companies are in the US. As the TIEA started entering areas where the provinces were concerned, things became difficult, leaving both sides to blame each other for the problems.
When Jean Charest, the Premier of Quebec, approached the European Union at the World Economic Forum, in 2007, to resume the deal he was told in no uncertain terms the provinces must be included in any future negotiation.
With this agreed, the EU could negotiate a deeper and better deal that covered areas of competence that resided at the provincial level.
The problem is intergovernmental consulting in federal countries rarely follow processes conducive to negotiating a trade deal, and Canada was no different. CETA would be the first time provinces were involved in any trade deal negotiation.
Not only were the regional processes inadequate, being Canada’s first attempt at this, it had no formal procedure for the provinces to commit to the agreement. This omission obviously had consequences...
Due to the way competences are balanced in Canada, if the federal government signed a trade deal that a province simply refused to implement the public procurement parts, which was a main demand of the EU.
This meant that both the Canadian government and the European Union had to be absolutely sure there was full commitment to the deal from the provinces during the negotiation, or it would fail.
In the case of Canada this was particularly difficult because, as it turns out, sensitive sectors cut across different provinces. Cheese was based in Ontario, Automotive in South Ontario, while Beef was in Alberta.
There were often trade-offs. The provisions for pharmaceutical products would help the research facilities in Quebec but damage the producers in Ontario.
This led to the Canadian government trying to bilaterally negotiate between each province while simultaneously trying to negotiate with the EU. This situation was not conducive to a quick deal.
Threats actually went both ways too, with Labrador and Newfoundland being coerced into accepting a European request to export more unprocessed fish and a relaxation on local fish processing rules in the face of losing unrelated funding for a hydroelectric project.
The issues wasn’t just in products but in harmonisation. Things like the EU Fuel Quality Directive weren't just environmentally controversial, but prevented provinces discriminating between more or less carbon-intensive versions of the same product.
newint.org/blog/2010/12/0…
newint.org/blog/2010/12/0…
During the negotiation of CETA, the Canadian government had to deal with all of these issues at the same time as the intensive lobbying that usually goes with this type of negotiation.
At the time the deal was announced finalised in 2013 there was no text because there were still issues to be resolved at the regional level.
theglobeandmail.com/opinion/provin…
theglobeandmail.com/opinion/provin…
Added to the fact the deal had taken so long, the EU decided that it wanted to reopen the investment system to bring it into line with their more recent deals.
There was then an argument over the status of the deal. Was it a mixed deal or was it not? The Commission finally relented, seemingly under the principle of sincere 'doing what it was told'.
euractiv.com/section/trade-…
euractiv.com/section/trade-…
Finally there was the Wallonia regional issue which, while everyone remembers as a big deal, it was probably the least disruptive in terms of getting CETA to where it is today, and to be absolutely clear: CETA is not representative of how quickly the EU negotiate their deals.
Ironically, the worst example to determine how long a Canadian deal will take is the duration of the actual Canadian deal.
We’re not a federal state. We don’t have sensitive sectors. Our markets are fully integrated. We’re already harmonised. It will be a mixed deal, and there is no argument about that.
Scoping study? Econometric study? Both are probably unnecessary in the face of no deal.
Scoping study? Econometric study? Both are probably unnecessary in the face of no deal.
The work on the Withdrawal agreement and in the Context of the Canadian deal will go a long way in establishing overall objectives, which should further streamline the process.
Does this mean I think it will be done in less than 10 years? Not necessarily….there are other things in play.
Like Canada, the UK government are embarking on something they have never done before based on people who don’t understand trade telling people who don’t understand trade what box to tick to improve their trade.
(Warning: Video contains disturbing argument)
(Warning: Video contains disturbing argument)
Likewise, this is unprecedented for the European Union who are not experts in doing the opposite of what countries normally do. Does Article XXIV of GATT or Article V of GATS cover market disintegration?
(Clue: They don’t!)
(Clue: They don’t!)
We’ve also had the UK government listing things the European Union have agreed to in the past, to suggest those things should be on the table. It was a move which demonstrated a deeply disturbing lack of understanding of how this all works.
As do some of the remarks from people in the Department for International Trade (DIT)
And it does seem that the government are not adequately taking advice from the people in this country who are experts and have the necessary knowledge to help deliver this.
Neither do they, in their discussions of how they plan to go about doing trade deals, seem to realise the lobbying issues that they are going to face, nor appreciate the work they will need to do to sell future trade deals to the public.
So this does not look like a great environment for a quick negotiation, and what is more worrying is that the UK seems to me we are pursuing a trade policy which is based more around ideology than around the numbers.
This is probably the most concerning part, because a large push for Brexit came from people who saw the EU as being in the way of implementing their ideological policies.
It could, for example, lead the government to opt for a New Zealand or Singapore arrangement, but take a good look at how funds GP appointments in New Zealand, or how Singapore funds its health service, and ask yourself where our own system fits into that model.
It's a model that will only last until another government comes in who want to dismantle a position that is ideologically opposed to their own, and replace it with a system which will be equally short term for the same reasons.
Caught in the middle of politicians playing with our trade policy for their political ends will be the importers and the exporters. The people that trade policy is supposed to help.
There is a real danger that those businesses will be never experience the certainty that they need unless our politicians become fully aware that trade policy should be about the numbers and the stability, not about the whims of the electorate nor the beliefs of politicians.
This, in itself, is not a problem with Brexit, but a problem with the motivations of those who have pushed for it.
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