Ahh - here they go again on “sanctions do not work….” Below a thread outlining my disagreement.
ft.com/content/c51ecf…
ft.com/content/c51ecf…
1. The 2014 sanctions were not meant to 'isolate' Russia, but to squeeze it in order to send a message. Had the intention been to isolate Russia and bring down its economy, one could have used harsher measures that were available.
2. Do not confuse the 2014 sanctions with the Trump-era US sanctions the aim of which is unclear and the effects of which are chaotic.
3. It was always naïve to expect quick and straightforward results. Sanctions are inherently a long-term instrument that works in combination with other policies and developments.
4. But sanctions DO affect policy debates in Russia. Look at how in late 2017, early 2018 prominent technocrats started speaking up in favour of improving relations with the West; and the Kremlin suggested UN peacekeepers in Donbas.
5. An example. “If we want our economy to grow, and grow smartly, then we need to improve relations with the West, and for that, also Russia has to take steps,” proclaimed Alexei Kudrin in June 2017.
6. Whatever you think of Kudrin as a policy-maker – admittedly, he might not the most influential in Russia – it is a telling sign that people like him make such statements in public without fearing for their political future.
7. In the tense days of 2014, the Russian elites had no choice but to rally to the flag. But by 2017, in a (perceived) more relaxed atmosphere of the Trump era, they felt safe to speak out in favor of the West.
8. And herein lies a paradox: the Trump presidency made the sanctions more workable by easing the ideological tension and making it easier for Russia to seek a face-saving way out of Donbas.
9. But then, by imposing new sanctions, the US moved the goalpost into an unattainable distance. Today, talk of Donbas peacekeeping has died: Russia knows that in the conditions of the new sanctions, Donbas is not a game-changer.
10. As said by someone who advises the Kremlin: “A year ago we thought that regulation in Donbas would be a breakthrough in our relations with the West. Today we see that this would have no effect, be a drop in the ocean, hence pointless.”
11. The new US sanctions offer Russia no exit strategy, hence no progress on the ground. But the US can change that, if it so decides. It probably will, once the internal turbulence fades.
12. And regardless of how these messy sanctions ultimately end, it is reasonable to assume that the experience of them will inform Russia’s calculations at dramatic decision making moments in the future. /ENDS/
