[Thread on Khālid b. al-Walīd] @shahanSean opened up a very interesting discussion on Khālid b. al-Walīd as military commander (thank you!). Here are some of my thoughts. Sorry, but it will be very long!
I begin by stating the obvious: anyone hoping to discover an extensive overview of the Futuḥāt in a twitter thread will be sadly disappointed. At best, only a few examples can be looked at.
It’s true that the information available to us is not extensive. However, having little information on aspects of early Islam will not come as a surprise! There is, however, bits of information, which IS valuable. But first, what of the tone of the Futuḥāt?
I've thought about this quite a bit. Futuḥāt works not only look to the past, but also have an eye on the [then] present and future. They were intended to be read and shared; to help later soldiers find new courage based on the victories, against the odds, of their forefathers.
While I don’t doubt that the Futuḥāt contain real historical facts about people, places, battles, etc., I do also expect them to portray THEIR OWN victories as grand, majestic and miraculous.
Now, to the point. Do the Futuḥāt offer us military information? Yes. To illustrate, I’ll stick to al-Azdi’s Kitāb futūḥ al-Shām because it’s the earliest extant Futūḥ work. It offers us SOME information about troop numbers, locations, stratagem, terrain, etc.
The Battle of Ajnādayn is a prime example. Khālid and Abū ʿUbayda, in the suburbs of Damascus, learn that a Byzantine force has taken up position in Ajnādayn and two Byzantine units were dispatched to intercept Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana (headed by Wardān) and Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān.
Abū ʿUbayda suggests that Khālid march his troops to Shuraḥbīl and that Abu ʿUbayda assemble the remaining troops (his and those of Yazīd and ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ). It seems Khālid is treating Abu ʿUbayda as head of the Muslim forces (out of respect?), when in fact Khālid was.
Concerned the Byzantine camp at Ajnādayn will pursue Abū ʿUbayda, leaving the Shuraḥbīl assembly outflanked, Khālid suggests they instead issue dispatches to warn Shuraḥbīl (in Buṣra), Yazīd (in al-Balqāʾ) about the Byzantine units pursuing them and instruct them --->
and ʿAmr (in Palestine) to immediately march to Ajnādayn, where they will attack the main Byzantine force head on (perhaps short of two units?). Abu ʿUbayda prefers this strategy and tells Khālid that he should proceed (though Khālid is the boss!)
Khālid then addresses the troops in which the rhetoric/tone switches from military strategy to religious invocations. This seems reasonable. Why would one divulge strategy? Why would one not focus people’s minds on the righteousness of their cause?
It’s interesting. al-Azdī then breaks to remind the reader of Abū Bakr’s letter-despite ʿUmar’s objection-appointing Khālid over Abū ʿUbayda. It reminds us that while Abū ʿUbayda was better than Khālid in righteousness, the latter’s mind was more astute in matters of war.
Thus far, Khālid’s preeminence in war was clearly conveyed, yet not overstated. It is in al-Azdī’s text, as narrator, that we discover statements of grandeur and hyperbole (perhaps al-Azdī’s audience needed that extra charge?). For al-Azdī, Khālid was the Muslim destiny (Qadr).
Khālid sends an identical letter to each of the three commanders as he leaves the suburbs of Damascus for Ajnādayn. The instructions are the same as mentioned above, though he adds that they should arm themselves with the best equipment (what can we assume from this?).
The letters were dispatched through the Nabateans of Syria (anbāṭ al-Shām), who acted as look-outs (ʿuyūn) for the Muslims, and their foot messengers (fiyūj). In return they received gifts and other unknown incentive.
Knowing Wardān was pursuing Shuraḥbīl, Khālid summons the messenger chosen to meet Shuraḥbīl, receives assurances from him that he knows the tracks to/from Buṣra and instructs him to guide Shuraḥbīl back to Ajnādayn, off the beaten track (avoid Wardān!).
Khālid and Abū ʿUbayda depart together or within close proximity of one another. Abū ʿUbayda marched out to the rear, with a unit comprising roughly 200 men and Khālid headed up the vanguard with the infantry and cavalry.
As they leave the suburbs of Damascus, Byzantine forces flank Abū ʿUbayda and his unit. Khālid hears of this and so circles back with his cavalry and strongest men (ahl al-shidda) at a gallop. He fought them at a distance of three miles until they retreated back to Damascus.
The messenger reaches Shuraḥbīl. Wardān, travelling from Ḥimṣ, is just a day’s march away. They immediately depart. Wardān finds out and pursues them, to no avail. A message from the Byzantines (Ajnādayn) to Wardān is intercepted, requesting him to return and command the army.
Everyone reaches Ajnādayn and battle is upon them. Khālid orders Abū ʿUbayda to dismount and command the infantry; Muʿādh b. Jabal the right flank; Saʿīd b. ʿĀmir b. Ḥudhaym al-Qurashī the left flank; and Saʿīd b. Zayd b. ʿAmr b. Nufayl the cavalry.
Khalīd assembles the soldiers in their lines and instructs the women, situated to the rear, to galvanise and encourage the men by holding up their children in the air as they passed by, imploring the soldiers to defend their women and children (dūna).
Khālid then spends some time speaking to and encouraging each tribe and group. He informs them that his charge would signal the start of the battle. He unsuccessfully tries to delay fighting until Ẓuhr time, when the winds blow; the preferred time of the Prophet Muḥammad.
The Byzantines ready their forces, raise their crosses, unroll their scriptures and seek the assistance of the Divine. The date was Saturday 28th Jumādā I 3 A.H / 30 July 634 C.E. and just 24 days prior to Abū Bakr’s passing.
The Byzantines attack Muʿādh’s unit to the right and Saʿīd b.ʿĀmir’s to the left. Both stand their ground, so Byzantine archers are instructed to release their arrows. Saʿīd b. Zayd made Khālid aware of this, so he went to the cavalry and gave the order for them to attack.
The sustained attack by the cavalry proves too much for the Byzantines and they are overrun. They lasted, according to Muʿādh b. Jabal, no longer than the interval between the milking of a she-camel.
3,000 Byzantine soldiers were killed and more were pursued, captured or killed. Whatever was left of the army (falal al-Rūm), fled to the sanctuary of Jerusalem, Caesarea, Damascus, and Ḥimṣ (perhaps an indicator of where some of them came from?).
