Thread by @EBKania

I had the opportunity, just about two years ago, to testify to @USCC_GOV on China's advances in unmanned systems and military applications of artificial intelligence. I wanted to share a few reflections on my assessments at the time and my research since. uscc.gov/Hearings/heari…

(I was so nervous at the time that I think I was shaking! For those who are interested, the video of the hearing is available here: senate.gov/isvp/?type=liv…)

At the time, I argued China's advances in artificial intelligence contribute to the PLA’s ambitions to progress beyond informatization (信息化) towards “intelligentization” (智能化) in its force development, thus increasing its war-fighting capabilities. uscc.gov/sites/default/…

I also highlighted the extent to which the PLA has seemingly embraced unmanned systems for a range of applications, across services and all domains of warfare, which I've since written about for @CASI_Research as well: airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CAS…

Some of my assessments at the time could have been criticized as speculative, but I'd argue the PLA's interest and ambitions were evident much early, starting from at least 2014, when Xi Jinping convened a study session on the topic of the RMA and issues of military innovation.

In my testimony at the time, one of the gaps was that I included relatively limited discussion of AUVs and UUVs, talking only about those known to be in service with the PLA Navy at that time, but clearly there has been very active research and development in that domain.

As I've since discussed for @DefenseOne, the relevant efforts have included a focus on decision support systems for submarine commanders, as well as greater autonomy for various underwater systems and submarines. defenseone.com/ideas/2018/02/…

In my testimony, I highlighted, but wish in retrospect I'd devoted more attention to, some of the technological uncertainties and shortcomings in China's development of unmanned systems.

I'd also add that the potential implications of advances in unmanned systems and military applications for anti-submarine warfare has only become more apparent since then, given recent PLA developments.

I discussed the precursors to the AI plan that would be released that summer, but it wasn't clear to me just how massive the scope and scale of China's efforts in AI would become. Honestly, I've been surprised by that and how rapidly this has progressed. newamerica.org/cybersecurity-…

I discussed at some length PLA thinking on and concepts of intelligentization, and the notion of AI revolutionizing warfare, topics I later addressed in greater detail in my report "Battlefield Singularity" via @CNAStech. Of course, there's a lot I missed. cnas.org/publications/r…

I'd highlight in particular that I had not realized the extent to which the Chinese military and defense industry were integrating neural networks into hypersonics development, which Lora Saalman has evaluated authoritatively since then. nsiteam.com/social/wp-cont…

My own thinking and research on the relevance of AI to China's concepts of command decision-making has also evolved since then, as I discussed in this @IncNSI assessment. nsiteam.com/social/wp-cont…

In conclusion, certain of my assessments may have seemed forward-leaning at the time, but I think developments since have supported this argument: "China evidently possesses the potential to compete with – or even leapfrog – the U.S. in artificial intelligence."

I've written a lot on these issues over the past couple of years, and I try to be honest and transparent when I see gaps or inadequacies in my own analysis. There is always more work to be done, so I'm looking forward to continuing my research. battlefieldsingularity.com/publications

Looking forward, I have a couple of papers at various stages of research, drafting and revision that I'm excited to release, including through @CNAStech, @HooverInst, @RUSI_org, @Nautilus_Inst, and @CASI_Research, over the course of this spring/summer. So now I'll get back to it!