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I wrote a short piece summarizing the main findings of our @EdamOrg report. I think the study as a whole gives a good idea on what Russia does in info ops beyond the usual suspects in the West. [Thread] foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/21/rus…
First of all, the op-ed isn't a substitute for the report. Our research group worked VERY hard on the actual report, and it has a ton of new findings that can't be summarized in a short space, so please do read it.
The data extracted from the sample we work with shows that the excessive over-centralization of the media landscape in the last few years has sapped Turkey's immunity against ALL foreign info manipulation attempts; not just from Russia.
In 2017, I studied the KSA-UAE-QTR crisis to see if excessively over-centralized media systems make diplomatic escalations, crises and information constraints more problematic. The answer was a resounding YES. warontherocks.com/2017/06/can-fa…
When alternative voices disappear from the information ecosystem and if the overwhelming majority of the news consumed by the population is heavily controlled by governments, those systems become more vulnerable to foreign info manipulation compared to freer media systems. See: 
To understand what any foreign actor can do in Turkey (or other over-centralized media system), we need a new term other than disinformation. I think a more accurate and better-fitting term would be 'forced perspective' information.
Forced-perspective information is a term I plagiarized from @stephenfry in his criticism of how Brexiteers manipulated information on refugees and EU integration. Watch the full video here:
There seems to be a correlation between how centralized a media environment is and how prevalent fake news and disinfo are in that same ecosystem. Centralization and control, paradoxically (maybe not?) and generally fuel both disinfo and forced-perspective opinion manipulation.
In this general context, talking about 'Russian disinfo operations in Turkey', our study has 3 findings:
a) Russian disinfo operations don't matter
b) External actors can manipulate through factually correct information as well
c) Disinfo resistance is a national security issue.
a) Russian disinfo operations don't matter
b) External actors can manipulate through factually correct information as well
c) Disinfo resistance is a national security issue.
What matters in Turkey isn't whether or how Russia uses disinformation. The question is how it shapes and shifts mainstream media sentiment. The answer is: by influencing both the pro-gov and opposition frames and narratives.
This validates the PolComm theory that you do disinformation in systems you CANNOT influence. In systems you CAN influence, you don't really need disinformation as you have nothing to gain by destabilizing a system you can control. Disinfo emerges when there is an actual fight.
Turkey and Russia fought only once in digital space and it was right after the SU24 incident. Turkey won in Round-1, but lost in the more important Round-2. The first part of our report dissects this info battle in detail.
Every other benchmark we study after the SU24, demonstrates a gradual realignment of the media narrative which ultimately becomes overwhelmingly pro-Russian within both the pro-gov and the opposition networks; both overwhelmingly corrupted by indigenous fake news.
Turkey has a long-standing, trans-partisan fake news problem, which is a bit more problematic than most other countries. In this excessively corrupted media system, Russia isn't even an antagonist. Rather, it has found a way to navigate this corrupt system better than others.
Turkey's foreign policy realignment has less to do with its regime type than changing power balance around its environment. But to fix its deep-rooted disinformation problem and remain less vulnerable to foreign manipulation, it has to radically free its media environment.
Our study demonstrates how media freedom and liberalization is no longer one of those 'cute' ideals you see in EU accession documents. It has fast become a national security problem and excessive media restrictions hurt Turkey's infosec and opsec capabilities. [end of thread]
