Thread by @Freakademic

Okay, here it goes.

You all can mute me temporarily if you're really not interested. Idk how long this will get or how often I'll be tweeting. It depends on how interesting the book gets.

Up front, the frame of the book is not what I was expecting (though it makes sense, from what I know of the author).

He starts with a brief discussion of "the so-called Arab Spring," which he sees as having been co-opted by Gulf Rulers to redirect it away from their countries.

Plausible.

He links this conceptually to Kharijism (the early forerunner of Ibadhi Islam) by stating that some scholars have labeled the Salafi Jihadists active in Syria "neo-kharijites."

So, he argues it is necessary to investigate how historical forces and current events are in dialog.

So (still in the first pages of the inroduction, still establishing the frame), he points to the first civil war in Islamic history, in which Uthman (in Sunni reckoning, the last of the Rightly Guided Khalifs) was killed, as his starting point.

And he (rightly) points out that the Kharijites are largely ignored in narratives of this conflict and its aftermath, despite the fact that they were one of the main groups involved.

Thus, presumably, he intends to give them some attention.

Specifically, he says he'll interpet "Sunni and Shi'i records in the context of Ibadhi materials," startig with the formative 7th century, concluding with the modern period, and focusing on "theoretical and applied dissent in Islamic societies."

He defines dissent as both legal dissent (which led to new schools of jurisprudence) and political dissent, which sometimes led to rebellions.

I should mention here that Dr. Souaiaia is a legal scholar, first and foremost. So, I expect that will inform his analysis.

He proceeds to let us know that each section will begin with a recounting of the historical events relevant to his conceptual analysis, as his understanding of events informs the reader as to what his point of view and potential biases might be.

The introduction concludes with what I see as a pretty conventional retelling of the life and prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad, from his childhood as an orphan, to his marriage to an omder merchant named Khadijah, to the beginning of his prophecy, migration to Yathrib, etc.

He attributes the first civil war in Islamic history, during the reign of Uthman, to "abuse, cronyism, marginalization, and classism" that emerged from decades of unprecedented success and accumulation of wealth under Prophet Muhammad's successors.

I think this is the first point where I can see where he's really going with this and it deserves some unpacking.

This will be my interpretation of what he means, but it's informed by what I know of his point of view, from having taken 4-5 classes with him as an undergraduate and MA student.

Cronyism: The Quraysh tribe had begun to disproportionately take positions of power by Umar's reign (Uthman's predecessor). Uthman's succession, to some, was seen as a pander to his cousin, who had been named governor of Syria, the wealthiest part of the new empire at the time.

(The Quraysh ruled Mecca in Prophet Muhammad's time. He was from a lesser branch of the tribe, but they were the status quo power in Mecca, persecuted the early Muslim community, went to war with them after they migrated to Yathrib and were generally Muslims' antagonists.)

Marginalization and classism: At this time, the Islamic Empire had very recently expanded to the Levant, Iraq, Iran and North Africa.

While administrators from conquered regions were often incorporated into the new administration, people from Arabia began to form an upper class.

Moreover, people in these conquered regions began to convert to Islam. People who'd been among Muhammad's followers in life, or who'd been born Muslims, began to look down on these converts. I think there was real discrimination.

There were also conflicts over what was the realm of culture and what was the realm of religion (this may not surprise converts to Islam or even just non-Arab Muslims).

There were new challenges in how to govern areas that were not majority Muslim.

Places that were heavily militarized (as Iraq was at this time). Basically, there was rapid stratification of a new society, a society in creation, after the death of a man who fought against the abuse of common people by the upper class, women by men, etc.

That had to have created dissatisfaction and I think that's what Souaiaia is referencing here.

I'm expecting this to be a through-line in the narrative (to the extent one exists) of this book.

And, sure enough, the next paragraph describes an emerging consensus that only a male from Quraysh could be Caliph.

Remember that Muhammad's teachings emphasized that one's status could really only come from one's piety. He was not a Qabilist.

We're probably about to talk about the Kharijis. This was the hill they died on (and I love them for it).

"The rebels argued that any righteous person who lives and governs according to the teachings and ethics of the Qur'an - even if such a person were a woman or a former black slave - would meet the requirements for being Caliph."

See what I mean? I love them.

My personal take on the early civil wars in Islam: They were not really about religious interpretation. They were about power.

And now he introduces Ibadhiyyah and Ibadhism as a movement emerging from the al-khawarij (Kharijites), a rebellion composed of a variety of groups with different ideological leanings.

He introduces here two key elements of Ibadhism: political opposition and concealment (kitman).

He doesn't fully explain here, but Ibadhis today and historically basically believe in rule by an elected Imam who should exemplify piety as they define it.

They believe all other rulers to be illegitimate. But, they also believe that there are times when it is not viable to be open in their beliefs and they go underground.

In this case, in the 7th century, the 1st Islamic century, they went underground after the civil war.

And they did not re-emerge until the 3rd Islamic century, when they established an independent state in N. Africa.

Here, towards the end of the introduction, is a bullet pointes list of his main conclusions from examining to Ibadhi movement in dialog with Sunni and Shi'i sources on the development of Islamic political ideology on dissent and sovereignty (roughly). (Extended quote to follow)

*Particularized belief, not conspicuous Islam, formed the national identity of the early community
*Sectarianism, as an institution, was established retroactively
*Legal and political consensus was slow to form

*Islamic revolutions succeeded only when economic disparity and ideological intelligibility entered into a state of resonance

*With time, Ibadhism transcended the Ibadhi community that embodied it during the first several Islamic centuries, to become the generic expression of radical dissent and armed rebellion in the Islamic Civilization

*In Arab society, while economic status and ethnic identity constitute a major force in creating and maintaining the social fabric of the community, it is life cycles of the person that dictate the social standing of the person, and hence, societal cohesions.

(I interpret that last bullet to reference things like being a child, sibling, spouse, parent, aunt/uncle, grandparent, etc. We'll see.)

Chapter layout:

1. Political dissent
2. Origins and development of Ibadhism
3. Fiqh cases that shaped Ibadhi legal legacy
4. Impact of territorial and institutional collapse on Islamic Societies

Interesting: "Specifically, social sciences scholars should not shy away from stating how religious and political views, ideas, and practices affect people in the real world.

In the presence of strong evidence that certain ideas and practices harm or injure human dignity (cont),

neutrality amounts to academic cowardice."

This is going to go really well, or really badly.

Fundamental concerns of Islamic political and legal expressions (per Souaiaia in intro to chapter 2): Preservation of moral imperatives and the dispensation of justice.

Basically, he sees Islam as a social movement first.

Here, he states outright that the first civil war in Islam was fought on that basis: "the public demand for just distribution of tax revenues and the end of ethnic privilege."

The next really interesting claim he makes has to do with the debate on whether religion and politics are separate in Islam.

Souaiaia: "The meaning and function of law and religion are conflated in the writings of many scholars of religious studies. (Cont)

Law and religion are poorly defined, making them appear to be the same."

This is a very good and true point in my personal and academic and muslim opinions, respectively.

He goes on to make the more common point that secularism itself and the debate about separation of church and state emerged from a specifically European context and that these debates can only be had in context-specific terms, not general ones. On that:

"Clearly, religion persists because it has a social function and, naturally, it should interface with politics. However, if religion is seen as the institution that preserves dogma and creed, first, then space is created between the two discourses."

He goes on to make the point that some of the 'ulama' in caliphal systems were appointed or patronized by the caliph, but there were others whose status was based on public reputation and who were often very pointedly separate from the rulers.

On caliphal religious authority: "religious erudition endures only when it is backed by piety and uprightness, but political acumen always endures." A ruler could lose his religious authority without losing political power.

"In the eyes of Ibadhi scholars, Uthman was an upright caliph who served as the religious and political leader until he lost his standing as a moral authority. The absence of a security apparatus and political structures at that time led to his removal from office."

"The threshold for political legitimacy is much lower than the threshold for religious scholarship. This logic governs the relationship between religion and politics in Islamic civilization."

Oh, this I love: "Any talk about "citizenship" and "state" in the context of Islamic civilization during the classical period is misleading*. First, in Islamic society, the individual is not a citizen; he or she is a legal person and the only legal entity, for that matter."

"There is no state as a legal entity (person). The individual enjoys certain rights and responsibilities, but the reaponsibilities can supercede the rights at any time, due to the place of the community in the larger scheme."

"The community, then...is the actual social unit that legitimizes the existence of the government."

He defines the shari'ah as the space between rulings.

A Muslim should not eat pork. A Muslim should not endanger one's own or others' lives. If a Muslim is stranded with no food but a dead pig, shari'ah dictates they eat it.

It is the sum of law and jurisprudence, not either alone. And this shari'ah is the goal of the Islamic community.

Basically, to translate that, Islam classically did not have codified laws. It had rules and guidelines and practices for determining right from wrong in *individual circumstances* that were not seen as precedent, per se.

Because the next circumstance would necessarily have a different context (what Souaiaia refers to as the space between rulings would be different).

A government is necessary to adjudicate those spaces, to apply shari'ah and defend the ummah. But it is not a legal entity.

Aside: In our system, crimes are committed against the state. There may or may not be actual human victims.

Not in classical Islamic law. Crimes are committed against people. The judge is an *arbitrator* between an accusing and accused party. In theory, there are no victimless crimes.

(Though we might scoff at their idea of who the wronged party might be.)

So, we're getting to the kernal of it all here. The leader is responsible for establishing justice (shari'ah), "enjoining good and forbidding evil."

When a leader is selected, the community gives them their allegiance, for life. But it is conditional.

What's not in dispute is that a leader loses their legitimacy and may be removed if they do not perform that function - enjoining good, but forbidding evil. But, what was never really established is a process by which a leader could be found to have so failed.

Because, the community in Muhammad's time was led by Muhammad - an amazing leader. And after that, was led by competent successors in Abu Bakr and 'Umar. The community overall seems to have been satisfied with their rule.

So there was no establishment of a process for removal in those formative years.

So, the difference between the groups that Sunnis see as their predecessors, versus the groups that Shi'is and Ibadhis see as their predecessors, is that the former never acted on the principle of removing a ruler who'd failed that duty. The latter two did.

(And the former did not feel that their claim of the ruler's failure was legitimate.)

So, the state did not exist as an entity. Therefore, protests and rebellions were directed at the person, not the institution. (All this per Souaiaia)

And then this last bit, rulers use the same arguments used to defend Umayyad rule - reality over merit or decree - to "sweep aside questions about legitimacy and preserve the status quo."

He uses the rulers of the Guld States as the most obvious example today of what he's talking about (waliyy al-amr) and he's not wrong.

What's interesting about that is that those states emerged *very* recently (like, 1970s) in places with very, very strong social norms for removing rulers who didn't uphold their (very high) social standards for good leadership.

My MA thesis touches on the culture of leadership there. And, oddly enough, I was writing it and taking a class from him that overlapped a ton with this book, while he was on my MA committe and was writing this book. Wild.

https://twitter.com/Freakademic/status/925183546779717632?s=19

To be continued (hopefully tomorrow).

(Note, I can't go back and fix it now, but 'Ali is considered by Sunnis as the last of the rightly guided caliphs, not Uthman, his predecessor. I got briefly mixed up. Uthman feels like a turning point for me, and [IIRC] Ali's time as ruler was tumultuous, due to the aftermath

of the Civil War that caused Uthman's death [with some accusing 'Ali of not pursuing the killers as he should have]. Anyway, it was a weirdly easy mistake to make for me, a lapse in concentration, but it's a hugely important one, so I apologize.)

Continuing this now.

The next turn in the book is to briefly discuss political institutions before, during, and after the Prophet Muhammad's time leading the Muslim community.

This ties back to his claim that Muhammad was primarily a social reformer.

So, we learn that the region was governed prior to Muhammad by a tribal council, made up of clan leaders of the Quraysh, that their power was limited by sanctuary provisions such as istijarah* and the haram*, and that these latter institutions were taken up by Islam.

*Istijarah - Basically, a clan could declare someone under their protection, regardless of guilt, regardless of whether they continued to live with the clan that sought them, and it was inviolable.

*Haram (noun) - Certain places and times were protected from violence.

For example, in Islam, Muslims are not to initiate violence in masaajid, during ramadan, during the hajj, etc.

Souaiaia then turns to look at Muhammad's time as political leader of the Muslim community after the hijra (emigration to Yathrib, now known as Medina), beginning with the Medina Charter.

Souaiaia makes the point that this charter is a good early example and precedent for what he sees as the relation of politics and religion in Islam. The former was a negotiated outcome, changeable, culturally and contextually specific. The latter was permanent and non-negotiable.

As evidence, the charter was not included in collections of hadith, parts of it were later changed, others parts were abrogated by revelation that occurred later, and in this treaty, Muhammad signed as Messenger of God, while he did not in a later treaty with Mecca*.

*In fact, earlier drafts of that treaty were signed as Messenger of God, and this appears to have been negotiated away, showing the distinction that much more clearly.

(All this is Souaiaia's analysis.)

On the charter, specifically, Souaiaia argues it represents a change in strategy from Muhammad's time in Mecca - from threatening divine retribution for abuse, to establishing immediate consequences in this world for abuses, (cont)

by granting families and tribes the right to seek redress or retributions for wrongs done to their kin.

Also of note: Christians, Jews and Muslims all seem to be acknowledged as believers in the document. (Not news to me, but may be to some reading.)

He also points out that the document primarily classifies people by belief and actions (talks about justice, kindness, redress and rights, refers to believers as the primary classification), setting a precedent for the later revolutionaries (discussed earlier in the boom).

(Aside from me: Note how often the extreme right wing [whether the Muslim right wing or Israel, or Western countries] have attacked Muslims during Ramadan, or while the hajj is taking place.)

"Muslim scholars have never established a way to distinguish the parts of the Sunnah that are said to be divinely inspired from those that are Muhammad's personal opinion."

"With time, the boundaries between the Prophet's personal opinion and revelations became less and less pronounced."

"Perhaps by not separating the infallible discourse from the fallible one, Muslims stressed their belief that the Prophet Muhammad's opinions, even when not divinely inspired, superceded the opinions of any other person."

He's making the case here for Muhammad's actions as a political leader, separate from prophecy, inspiring the religious beliefs of groups like the Ibadhis.

But he could very well be explaining why I roll my eyes at questionable hadith where Muhammad gets annoyed by music

(or whatever).

He goes on to argue that, even if the fallible opinion of a man who speaks with God is better than the opinion of other men, it may not be permanent or unchanging, the way divine revelation is.

It would relate to a specific context Muhammad experienced.

This is controversial (as he points out), with some Muslim thinkers arguing for malleable approached to politics, while groups like Salafis arguing that the politic system in the time of the prophet is what we should emulate.

(My aside: In practice, these groups shit all over the memory of that political system, as they set up courts with codified laws, using different evidentiary standards, cherry-picking weak ahadith to support whatever they want to do [mostly misogyny], etc.)