Thread by @APHClarkson

Since 2017, perhaps even since the 2014 Scottish indyref, there is a strong argument that it is in the EU's strategic interests for an increasingly unstable UK to be parked outside full membership so that instability overwhelming the British state does not affect EU governance

A long transitional arrangement that removes the UK from EU governance structures without affecting everyday life on both sides allows the British to work through political chaos opened up through their internal constitutional crisis while limiting the economic and social damage

The problem No Deal Brexit variants presents with the EU is that the economic and social disruption caused increases pressure on the UK's constitutional order potentially beyond the point of no return and could accelerate the disorderly break up of Britain

The collapse of the UK's Union will affect Ireland on a fundamental level, but it will also hit the EU and every EU state bordering the UK with extremely difficult decision when faced with the economic and political fallout, which would be vast

Take EU accession. How are the EU aspirations of Scotland or Wales as well as accession of NI to be handled? Think of Gibraltar or Cyprus. What stops Spain or Cyprus from seizing UK territory? Think of NATO. How does the alliance handle the implosion of UK military?

Crucially for NATO, UK military infrastructure plays an essential role in air defence cordons and ASW operations shielding European and North American NATO partners. Does Scotland take that over? Or England? Who exactly?

And then there is the nuclear deterrent

When Union states fragment into successor nation states it affects the economy and security of all neighbouring states. This isn't and won't be merely a domestic issue of that Union state. It will attract existential concerns and intervention from all the states around it.

There is a naivety about what secession of a Union state leads to both among various nationalists as well as Unionists in the UK. It will attract intervention from the EU and EU member states to contain the fallout because it will affect their own fundamental strategic interests.

The hegemonic position of the EU system in Europe was asserted in 2017. Ever since all UK choices have been defined by what the EU is willing to give it. Brexit has no longer been an existential issue for the EU for quite some time

The challenge for the EU with Brexit is now to developing structures through which to contain the fallout from the accelerating instability of the British state.

The core dilemma for the EU is how to wield its power over the UK in ways that do not accelerate the end of Britain

If the UK proves in the next months to be socio-structurally and constitutionally able to cope with the demands of full EU membership after all these dilemmas swiftly become manageable, even if Scotland becomes independent.

If, however, UK state paralysis and political instability accelerates it is in the EU's strategic interest to shove Britain as gently as possible into a long transition that leaves everyday life largely unaffected but also protects EU governance from British chaos