Thread by @umar8528

Yahya wanted to transfer powers to Mujib but due to Bhutto's refusal to attend inaugural NA session & failing to reach a political settlement between Bhutto & Mujib, Yahya decided to cancel the NA session because of hawks&elites of West Pak bureaucracy, military(few Gens)

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,industrialists, feudal aristocracy & politicians like Bhutto were skeptical about Mujib intentions.

At this moment Gen Yaqub tried to convince Gen Yahya not to cancel NA session, reproducing what he advised to Gen Yahya:

"I can not comment upon..

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the political wisdom of such a decision, As commander Eastern Command I shall, however, point out the military consequences of the postponement of the NA session. In the situation prevailing in East Pak, every assessment must perforce be intermingled with politics

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After holding of elections and generating the hopes of a newly elected government to take over from the military regime the aspirations of the Bengalis in East Pak had changed drastically. Those holding key positions were looking forward to exercising authority.

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If that was denied to them there'd b frustration and bitterness.

Martial law is exercised through civil agencies. With a shortage of troops that would be more so in East Pak. The civil administration had changed their loyalties and were now looking towards the rising sun

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If their ambitions were suppressed there would certainly be trouble even if there were more forced available to Eastern Command."

Gen Yakub emphasized that in the event of a stricter martial the loyalties of the East Bengal Regiments and the East Pak Rifles would be put

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under severe strain. One ugly incident could lead to very serious results.

Referring to the reaction from across the border Gen Yaqub pointed out that the Indian would exploit the situation to the full having already penetrated into the area.

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An Indian threat in such a situation would be disastrous as Eastern Command would be torn between inward deployment to deal with internal security and outward defense to meet the external threat. With draconian measures and reinforcements from West Pak we might

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in the short term, retain a degree of control but not be in the position to do so for long.

The main point, however, was what was the effect desired? If the aim was the integrity of Pak then it could hardly be achieved by such measures

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as a strict application of martial law would mean casualties which in turn would spread hatred& resentment agnst the armed forces. This we would be achieving results quite the opposite of the political aim intended.

Even if we succeed in bringing back law&order by force

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of arms, we would have failed in the ultimate objective. Our success would be our failure. The naked sword of martial law against the 60 million people of East Pak, who had given their verdict in favor of a particular political party, would be suicidal.

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It would only be taken as an imperial act of revenge against a colony.

The decision, therefore, to reverse the direction would be unsound, it would fail and bring about the disintegration of Pak under the most unfavorable circumstances.

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Gen Yaqub ended his assessment by recommending that the CMLA should:

1/ Continue to seek a political solution

2/ Should make political leaders, especially in West Pak, realize the consequences of the postponement of the NA session

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3/ Place the blame on their shoulders and not on the army

4/ and create pressure on them to get together.

**END**