Some quick thoughts after chats with dips, pols and industry. 1/Thread
telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/…
As usual, chronically over-estimating Berlin's ability and willingness to go agains the EU27...BUT there was/is element of truth /2
Berlin fears cost of strategic rupture more than Paris, believes a 'no deal' would take longer to heal.
Recall Germany (with Dutch) fought France over April extension/3
With @BorisJohnson in Number 10 and 'no deal' risk rising, will Merkel try to bounce fellow leaders into giving @MichelBarnier a new #Brexit mandate as @SteveBarclay demands? No, she won't.
But.../4
On that basis, it's clear Berlin won't make first move.
But.../5
So talks begin with both sides clinging to opening positions - viz the EU wants to keep the WA, the UK wants to bin the backstop - and we see where we get to. /6
A50 Extension for a GE etc) /8
The history of the Cameron/May negotiations is a good guide. /9
"If that's what the Brits really want, there is a limit to what we can do to stop them."
"If it happens, we'll deal with it"/11
Germany's economy is facing mixture headwinds, from Brexit risk, from US-China trade war and Iran uncertainty... some warning lights are blinking. /13
The bad numbers are still fairly sectoral and Ger Govt still sees growth of 0.5% this year, 1.5% in 2020...hardly the kinds of numbers that bring governments to heel /14
The UK Government is accepting the economic damage of a 'no deal' #brexit, so why wouldn't Germany accept the (far smaller) damage of defending its own political constructs? /15
Industry groups tell me UK politicians and businessmen were sent to pressure them to tell Merkel to be pragmatic. They always failed. /16
"The idea that business was going to demand such a deal; it is just not on the table politically and it never was." /17
But don't mistake that for weakness, or a willingness to fold on key issues of principle.
Recent history says, when forced to choose, Germany choses the EU. 18/ENDS