Day #3 of #TheWall3for30 -- marking the 30th Anniversary of the Berlin Wall's collapse.
Day 2 addressed how the collapse impacted @NATO. But the wall's collapse had an even more profound impact on another organization -- The EU -- and on a currency -- the euro.
[THREAD]
Day 2 addressed how the collapse impacted @NATO. But the wall's collapse had an even more profound impact on another organization -- The EU -- and on a currency -- the euro.
[THREAD]
Following the wall's collapse, many in Europe were concerned about the implications of German unification.
The 🇫🇷 Foreign Minister Roland Dumas was very concerned 
🇫🇷 President François Mitterrand thought the best way to address these concerns was to accelerate the process of European Integration
He wrote to the West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher: “But I’m asking you, will Germany continue the process of European unification?”
When asked if he anticipated economic and monetary union between East & West Germany to slow integration of the European Community, Dumas replied:
“Your question reinforces my view that we should accelerate the process of integration in the EC."
“Your question reinforces my view that we should accelerate the process of integration in the EC."
As Mitterrand wrote to George H. W. Bush in November 1989:
With respect to the German view, Genscher reassured Mitterand that European Integration and German unification went hand-in-hand
A similar view was expressed by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In a 1990 New Year's Address, he said, "German unity and European unification have to be pursued together. Germany is our fatherland, Europe
our future!”
our future!”
But not everyone agreed. Most skeptical was Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pohl
Why? Because he knew, based on the 1986 Single European Act, that "accelerating integration" meant "economic integration" and even monetary union.
As head of the German Central Bank, his skepticism was understandable.
As head of the German Central Bank, his skepticism was understandable.
But Kohl pushed past these concerns. Of course, it might seem surprising that a time of diminishing Soviet threat would lead to *tighter* alignment with France and the other Western European states.
The answer, is in the Two-plus-Four talks
The answer, is in the Two-plus-Four talks
Specifically, Kohl wished to also allay Soviet concerns over a reunified Germany, not *only* French concerns. This makes sense because, well 👇
With all the parties on board and the two-plus-four treaty signed, Germany and France led the negotiation and signing of the Maastricht Treaty in early 1992
The Treaty -- officially the Treaty on European Union -- changed the European Community to the European Union. It set forth creating stronger institutions for European Political Unification AND European Monetary Unification.
In other words, it established the euro
In other words, it established the euro
So the next time you have a Euro in your hand or your pocket, just realize that you can trace it's existence directly back to November 9, 1989!
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Addendum: For more details of this account, including sources and how it fits in the broader IR literature, please see my Journal of European Integration piece (on which I based this thread)
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
Addendum 2: When I write that Kohl "pushed past" Pohl's concerns, this is shorthand for, "Pohl was able to leverage his position to have the European Central Bank modeled off of the Bundesbank."
