2) We did not find information in FBI or Department ECs, emails, or other documents, or through witness testimony, indicating that any information other than the information was relied upon to predicate the opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.
3) FFG = Foreign Friendly Government
Indicates that Nunes was correct. There was no official foreign intelligence used in the Electronic Communication to open the FBI Investigation.
Indicates that Nunes was correct. There was no official foreign intelligence used in the Electronic Communication to open the FBI Investigation.
4) "The Crossfire Hurricane team opened individual cases in August 2016 on four U.S. persons - Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and Michael Flynn- all of whom were affiliated with the Trump campaign at the time the cases were opened."
5) "We were concerned to find that neither the AG Guidelines nor the DIOG contain a provision requiring Department consultation before opening an investigation such as the one here involving the alleged conduct of individuals associated with a major party presidential campaign."
6) "We concluded that the quantum of information articulated by the FBI to open the individual investigations on Papadopoulos, Page, Flynn, and Manafort in August 2016 was sufficient to satisfy the low threshold established by the Department and the FBI."
7) "We were concerned, however, that Department and FBI policies do not require that a senior Department official be notified prior to the opening of a particularly sensitive case such as this one."
8) "The AG Guidelines and the DIOG require that the "least intrusive" means or method be "considered" when selecting investigative techniques."
9) "The Crossfire Hurricane team used more intrusive techniques, including CHSs to interact and consensually record multiple conversations with Page and Papadopoulos, both before and after they were working for the Trump campaign."
10) "We found it concerning that Department and FBI policy did not require the FBI to consult with any Department official in advance of conducting CHS operations involving advisors to a major party candidate's presidential campaign."
11) "We found no evidence that the FBI consulted with any Department officials before conducting these CHS operations. As we describe in Chapter Two, consultation , at a minimum, is required by Department and FBI policies in numerous other sensitive circumstances."
12) "Immediately after the Crossfire Hurricane team received Steele's election reporting on September 19, the team re-initiated their discussions with OI and their efforts to obtain FISA surveillance authority for Page, which they received from the FISC on October 21."
13) A significant detail:
"The Crossfire Hurricane team failed to inform Department officials of significant information that was available to the team at the time that the FISA applications were drafted and filed."
"The Crossfire Hurricane team failed to inform Department officials of significant information that was available to the team at the time that the FISA applications were drafted and filed."
14) Cont:
"Much of that information was inconsistent with, or undercut, the assertions contained in the FISA applications that were used to support probable cause and, in some instances, resulted in inaccurate information being included in the applications."
"Much of that information was inconsistent with, or undercut, the assertions contained in the FISA applications that were used to support probable cause and, in some instances, resulted in inaccurate information being included in the applications."
15) "It was clearly the responsibility of Crossfire Hurricane team members to advise them [Department officials] of such critical information so that they could make a fully informed decision."
16) "We found that the FBI and Steele held significantly differing views about the nature of their relationship. Steele's handling agent viewed Steele as a former intelligence officer colleague and FBI CHS, with obligations to the FBI."
17) "Steele, on the other hand, told us that he was a businessperson whose firm (not Steele) had a contractual agreement with the FBI and whose obligations were to his paying clients [Fusion GPS, Simpson - and ultimately the DNC...], not the FBI."
18) "Steele himself was not the originating source of any of the factual information in his reporting. Steele instead relied on a Primary Sub-source for information, who used his/her network of sub-sources to gather information that was then passed to Steele."
Who was Primary???
Who was Primary???
19) "Steele's handling agent told us that when Steele provided him with the first election reports in July 2016 and described his engagement with Fusion GPS, it was obvious to him that the request for the research was politically motivated."
20) Significant:
"The FBI obtained additional information raising significant questions about the reliability of the Steele election reporting, the FBI failed to reassess the Steele reporting relied upon in the FISA applications, and did not fully advise NSD or OI officials."
"The FBI obtained additional information raising significant questions about the reliability of the Steele election reporting, the FBI failed to reassess the Steele reporting relied upon in the FISA applications, and did not fully advise NSD or OI officials."
21) "We also found that the FBI did not aggressively seek to obtain certain potentially important information from Steele. For example, the FBI did not press Steele for information about the actual funding source for his election reporting work."
22) "The FBI assessed [falsely - my word] in the Carter Page FISA applications, without any support, that Steele had not "directly provided" the information to Yahoo News.
23) Blows hole in Dems narrative:
"The Crossfire Hurricane team's receipt of Steele's election reporting on September 19, 2016 played a central and essential role in the FBI's and Department's decision to seek the FISA order."
"The Crossfire Hurricane team's receipt of Steele's election reporting on September 19, 2016 played a central and essential role in the FBI's and Department's decision to seek the FISA order."
24) "On September 19, 2016, the same day that the Crossfire Hurricane team first received Steele's election reporting, the team contacted FBI OGC again about seeking a FISA order for Page and specifically focused on Steele's reporting in drafting the FISA request."
25) PapaD was wrong
"Although the team also was interested in seeking FISA surveillance targeting Papadopoulos, the FBI OGC attorneys were not supportive. FBI and NSD officials told us that the Crossfire Hurricane team ultimately did not seek FISA surveillance of Papadopoulos."
"Although the team also was interested in seeking FISA surveillance targeting Papadopoulos, the FBI OGC attorneys were not supportive. FBI and NSD officials told us that the Crossfire Hurricane team ultimately did not seek FISA surveillance of Papadopoulos."
26) "We are aware of no information indicating that the team requested or seriously considered FISA surveillance of Manafort or Flynn."
27) "The Department decision makers who supported and approved the [Page FISA] application were not given all relevant information."
28) "FBI leadership supported relying on Steele's reporting to seek a FISA order on Page after being advised of, and giving consideration to, concerns expressed by Stuart Evans, then NSD's Deputy Assistant Attorney General with oversight responsibility over OI..."
29) "...that Steele may have been hired by someone associated with presidential candidate Clinton or the DNC, and that the foreign intelligence to be collected through the FISA order would probably not be worth the "risk"..."
30) Significant:
"We found that the FBI did not have information corroborating the specific allegations against Carter Page in Steele's reporting when it relied upon his reports in the first FISA application or subsequent renewal applications."
"We found that the FBI did not have information corroborating the specific allegations against Carter Page in Steele's reporting when it relied upon his reports in the first FISA application or subsequent renewal applications."
31) "Due to Evans's persistent inquiries, the FISA application also included a footnote, developed by OI based on information provided by the Crossfire Hurricane team, to address Evans's concern about the potential political bias of Steele's research."
32) In other words, without the pushback from Stu Evans, the FBI would not have even included a footnote in the Page FISA regarding Steele's political bias and his paid position.
33) "Our review found that FBI personnel fell far short of the requirement in FBI policy that they ensure that all factual statements in a FISA application are "scrupulously accurate.""
34) "We identified multiple instances in which factual assertions relied upon in the first FISA application were inaccurate, incomplete, or unsupported by appropriate documentation, based upon information the FBI had in its possession at the time the application was filed."
35) "The problems we identified were primarily caused by the Crossfire Hurricane team failing to share all relevant information with OI and, consequently, the information was not considered by the Department decision makers who ultimately decided to support the applications."
