Thread by @hxhassan

The killing of Suleimani is an extraordinary moment even by Middle Eastern standards. His death came amid real & unprecedented challenges to Iran, and he died still trying to deal with them.

Which makes it doubly significant. My new piece in @guardian:

theguardian.com/commentisfree/…

Suleimani’s death won’t affect the regime in Tehran, nor will it reverse its gains in the region.

What it does is it’ll blunt its ability to do what Suleimani has been doing for over 2 decades, and his presence is needed at this juncture more than ever.

theguardian.com/commentisfree/…

Take Syria. Suleimani died at a time when Assad “won” the war. Assad won’t need Iran as before. Yes this ally of Iran is safe, but that’s precisely why Suleimani’s work is needed now:

In Syria, Iran needs Suleimani if it wanted to entrench itself & build autonomous militias in the same way it did in Iraq. Assad isn’t as dependent on Iran, and either way not interested in Iran *dominating* Syria, so he now can strengthen his regime.

A shrewd operative, with 17 years of experience in Iraq doing exactly that, would have been able to do it with or without Assad’s consent. I can’t emphasize how this is a game changer. Even in places where Iran already built well-oiled machines of influence, like Iraq & Lebanon.

New from me:

In all of the countries where Iran built deep influence, its allies are left exposed and vulnerable to grassroots trends and local rivals. The one man with a proved record of dealing with such crises died trying.

theguardian.com/commentisfree/…

The 8th most read article on the @guardian website could do with some TLC, folks.

theguardian.com/commentisfree/…