Thread by @ProfPaulPoast

@rosellacappella & I are indeed writing a book with a lesson for how governments can & will respond to #COVID19

The Lesson: Don't look to 1918. Look at 1916. It took 2 years of war for the European allies to finally, & reluctantly, jointly address their supply issues

[THREAD]

https://twitter.com/rosellacappella/status/1244270938314674182

By early 1915, it was clear that the war was resource intensive. The European allies -- 🇫🇷🇬🇧🇮🇹 -- were going to need a host of resources: munitions, raw materials, and food. Lot's of food.

And "food" mostly meant wheat, which was important for soldiers & civilians.

Though they were "allies", each wanted to make sure they fed their *own* soldiers and own civilians.

Each ally was scared of bread lines in THEIR OWN country!

Talk about a cooperation problem!

So each ally was competing with the other to secure wheat. And the best source to buy wheat? 🇺🇸

Make no mistake, the allies had created "coordinating bodies", such as

-- the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement (which had been created in August 1914)

-- The Grain Purchasing Committee (Dec 1915)

-- The Joint Committee on Grain Purchasing (Jan 1916)

But these weren't working. Why?

Because they were essentially "talk shops"

Each ally would simply INFORM the others, "hey, we're purchasing wheat in Chicago, okay? Good!"

By and large, this arrangement was okay for 🇬🇧

But 🇫🇷 was feeling more pressure to do something (maybe because the fighting was on their soil)

Along came Etienne Clementel, who became French Minister of Commerce in December 1915.

His "right hand man" and representative in London was Jean Monnet. Yes, THAT Jean Monnet

Monnet worked behind the scenes in London.

He was VERY behind the scenes. For example, consider his attendance at the June 1916 Allied Economic Conference (organized by Clementel)

https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1228650687963258880

But being behind the scenes was fine for Monnet, as he was in constant communication with Clementel and could collaborate with his British counterpart Arthur Salter

As Monnet explains in his memoir

"Salter and I thought that the first test case for Allied co-operation should be wheat, where there had already been a very unsatisfactory attempt at joint organization"

Why unsatisfactory? The existing arrangements encouraged competition b/w the allies:

"For a whole year this divided purchasing system had been operating in a spirit of competition that encouraged international speculation. To put an end to this situation had become vital."

What was his solution? A strong IO!

"To use the opportunity to try out a new method of co-operation had become possible. I persuaded Clementel that with so good an opportunity he should play for high stakes. The British wanted rapid results: we wanted a lasting organization"

But something needed to happen to bring 🇬🇧 on board to the idea of seeking "tighter allied machinery".

What happened? A shock 👇

https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1231201127959605248

This opened space for Salter to convince his superior, Walter Runciman, that the time was now to try a new approach

Runciman was already hearing the same message directly from Clementel, as Rosella and I found in this letter from the Runciman archives at @UniofNewcastle

So 🇬🇧🇫🇷&🇮🇹 officials met in late November 1916, negotiated, and signed the Wheat Executive agreement.

The Wheat Executive was an organization based in London with three 1 British, 1 French, 1 Italian.

Critically, the agreement specified the following:

“[The Wheat Executive has] full authority to meet Allied needs regarding the purchase and sharing of those grains subject to inventory, and to arrange for their shipment.”

In other words, it was an ALLIED organization. It made all wheat purchasing decisions for the ALLIES as a whole.

As Salter described it in his memoir

Reflecting on it later, Monnet fully recognized the significance:

A year latter, the Europeans and Americans would use the Wheat Executive as the model from creating the Allied Maritime Transport Council (AMTC), which would facilitate ALL supply purchases and transport for the allies.

Of course, how did 🇬🇧🇫🇷🇮🇹 pay for all the stuff purchased and transported via the AMTC? 🇺🇸-loans, which were useful to the US for another reason 👇

https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1138413073679769601

Moreover, Rosella and I go on to show how the Wheat Executive (and AMTC) served as the template for the WWII allied economic institutions and even the post-WWII institutions.

In other words, the "template" for the IOs that make up the "Liberal International Order" came from WWI!

The lesson for policy makers facing #covid19 is this: even in the midst of war and crisis, it took nearly two years for the 🇬🇧🇫🇷🇮🇹 to forge "machinery" effective at pooling and sharing resources needed to stop a threat.

Cooperation is hard, even in crisis!

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