After 5 days of fighting, a mammoth force -- 10,000 #SDF fighters + U.S. & UK special forces + U.S. air support -- has fought back, but still, 25% of al-Sina Prison remains in #ISIS hands & #ISIS cells continue to fight in x2 parallel neighborhoods.
Q -- how did 200 #ISIS fighters (many wearing suicide belts) & x2 car bombs get past ~12 #SDF checkpoints, into a heavily fortified city, home to the largest #ISIS detainee facility in the world?
It's almost certain now that #ISIS infiltrated/bribed #SDF-linked security forces.
Footage from inside the prison suggests #ISIS prisoners likely knew about the attack in advance -- it's an open secret that cell phone access (often via bribed #SDF guards) is commonplace inside al-Sina Prison.
A coalition investigation should look squarely into all of this.
The #SDF has been accusing #Turkey of complicity, yet:
- "The #SDF missed entirely a force of 200 jihadists & 2 car bombs entering a heavily guarded city under its control, so its claims to know precisely where they came from should be treated with a mightily big grain of salt."
It's been clear for yrs that holding 1,000s of #ISIS fighters in makeshift prisons (al-Sina is a former school complex, surrounded by walls) was a ticking time bomb -- and yet the detainee file "hasn't moved an inch" since 2014.
Not to mention the women/kids in internment camps.
Ultimately however, the biggest takeaway is that #ISIS has -- as some of us have warned -- been slowly & methodically rebuilding itself since 2019.
Rolling back territory was the easy part -- COIN + CT requires deeper resources, not troop/funding cuts & more pressure on #SDF.
A new #ISIS Amaq release shows fighters inside al-Sina Prison's northern wing, as of today, amid *heavy* fighting.
Worth asking the Q at this point -- whenever this is resolved, is the facility still going to be a viable prison for the ~1,000s of #ISIS detainees? If not, where?
I spoke with @ritula & @R4WorldTonight this evening about #ISIS's assault on the al-Sina Prison in #Hasakeh & the 5-day battle that's followed -- a clear indicator of #ISIS's recovery & strategic intent in #Syria/#Iraq.
Beyond images of Bradley’s from previous days, more of an indication here of U.S. SOF involvement in the #SDF operation to retake al-Sina Prison & nearby streets/buildings from #ISIS:
We're now entering Day 6 of fighting, since #ISIS's assault on al-Sina Prison in NE #Syria.
Per the #SDF, ~20% of the prison remains in #ISIS control amid a slow-grinding stand-off in the northern wing.
100s remain in that 20% -- #ISIS fighters, underage detainees & hostages.
The situation in the #ISIS-held "20%" of the prison is deteriorating fast -- *very* grisly video has emerged via #ISIS fighters, showing corpses & many wounded/dying men & unarmed boys.
That footage is being widely shared across #ISIS's channels -- eerily reminiscent of Baghouz.
Meanwhile, #ISIS fighters remain active in x2 parallel neighborhoods (al-Ghweiran & al-Zuhour), periodically engaging the #SDF.
We now also know that #ISIS escapees have fanned out -- dispersing along the river SW of Hasakeh & to Jabal Abdulaziz, swelling long-term capabilities.
BREAKING -- #SDF claim to have fully secured al-Sina Prison, after nearly 7 days of fighting.
Huge #ISIS surrender just now, as the northern wing (a) ran out of ammunition & (b) buckled after no food for a week.
The #SDF & @CJTFOIR now face an extraordinary challenge -- of re-housing & re-securing 1,000s of #ISIS prisoners.
Al-Sina Prison has sustained heavy damage & it's unclear how much of its "extension" is ready to replace the original facility.
Big short-term security risks now.
@CJTFOIR According to the #SDF, 'approximately' 250 #ISIS fighters have been killed in/around al-Sina Prison over the last 6 days -- but around 200 were involved in the initial attack.
So if there's a headcount done of previous/current detainees, we'll soon know how many got away alive.
@CJTFOIR Perhaps "the safety of the children" would have been better achieved had they not been placed in a makeshift prison, alongside 1,000s of battle-hardened #ISIS jihadists, *by the #SDF,* which previously judged them to be security risks, for the past 3-4yrs??
- This is a global problem requiring a multinational, long-term solution;
- Makeshift prisons are a breeding ground for #ISIS;
- A thorough investigation is needed into how this attack was allowed to happen.
BREAKING -- reports of an attack on the al-Sina prison in al-Hasakeh, NE #Syria, possibly involving an IED/VBIED.
The prison holds 5,000 #ISIS militants, mostly foreign fighters.
Local sources say prisoners conducted some form of incident in coordination with the bombing.
An #ISIS plot to attack al-Sina Prison was foiled in November 2021 -- involving an SVBIED & assault team equipped with a pick-up truck of rifles to provide to #ISIS prisoners inside.
Very concerning to see prisons coming under #ISIS's attention again, in January 2022.
This video reportedly shows the aftermath of a suspected car bomb outside al-Sina Prison's exterior walls:
What's strange about this paper though, is that the conclusion rules that [in the context of the #Afghanistan withdrawal], drone campaigns *are* a viable alternative to large-scale deployments, though are insufficient to eliminate a terror group outright.
The @TXNatSecReview paper's focus is on a drone campaign that benefited from an enormous U.S. & allied deployment in #Afghanistan & an accompanying extensive intelligence network that fed strikes.
With all of that on-side, the campaign was judged good, but far from a success.
@TXNatSecReview So with troops now out of #Afghanistan, the #Taliban in control, and no basing rights for near-proximity drone ops, how can the #FATA drone campaign be used to defend the viability of what's being proposed today -- a [distant] "over horizon" effort with little/no intel network?
As I wrote several weeks ago, the path towards #Assad's normalization may have been partially paved, but the ambiguity of the #Biden admin's #Syria policy & its inaction has provided an opening.
Green or orange light is irrelevant -- the effect is clear.
I'm seeing some credible claims that al-Juburi was captured *by* #Turkey in NW #Syria, brought north onto Turkish soil & then handed over to ISF for deportation to #Iraq.
Not confirmed, but would shake things up if true... and raise Qs about whether #HTS played a role too?
#ISIS leader "Jasim was in northwestern #Syria when he was caught with help from local security forces", per @Reuters.
That can only realistically mean #HTS &/or its Salvation Government's General Security Service (GSS).
The idea that the CIA's T-50 program with the #FSA "failed" & the DOD's Train, Advise, Assist & Equip program with the #YPG-#SDF "succeeded" -- one key point made here -- is a bit of a simplification.
There can't be a direct comparison, given the operational differences.
The CIA's T50 program was covert & limited strictly to weapons supply & [very] limited intel support/external advice to groups (a) active in a highly complex environment, amid hostile jihadists & (b) against governments, with airforce/s, artillery etc.
The DOD's #YPG-#SDF program was initiated amid a direct U.S military intervention, in which U.S. SOF were deployed on the ground & close air support & later artillery support was provided -- to strengthen the #SDF, incentivize its unity, and protect it from *all* rivals/enemies.
"I absolutely reject that somehow, what's about to happen to women because of the #Taliban taking over the government is simply something we have to tolerate as the prince of doing business in South & Central Asia."
@BrookingsInst@MiddleEastInst "Where this really began to unravel was then when U.S. chose to make a separate deal with the #Taliban, to exclude the #Afghan govt & to set a certain date for when we'd depart... only then did we begin to see the real problem unfold."
@BrookingsInst@MiddleEastInst "When we departed, there was a very real signal: 'you are on your own'... The advisors left... When we pulled out, we took out about 18,000 contractors... the way we equipped them, they relied wholly on those contractors."