#ISIS's choice of NW #Idlib as a hiding point for leaders raises complex analytical Qs.
What it does not suggest, is that #Idlib's de facto governing actor, #HTS, is in some way complicit in harboring #ISIS. That's simply factually illogical, given years of open hostility.
#HTS has conducted 100+ deadly raids targeting #ISIS cells in #Idlib since mid-2017 -- & is similarly hostile to #AlQaeda too, having wiped out AQ's operational presence in #Idlib 18 months ago.
Like all non-state actors, #HTS's capacity to know everything is distinctly limited.
Just like the #SDF missed 200-300 #ISIS militants & x2 SVBIEDs crossing 12 of their own checkpoints into #Hasakeh city & al-Sina Prison, #HTS missed a man & his family living in one level of a 3-storey building near #Atmeh -- an area flooded with transitory IDPs communities.
So as the dust settles following last night's SOF raid against #ISIS, let's ask & assess the many important analytical questions -- about #ISIS, its leadership, command/control, operational capabilities etc.
This was a U.S. SOF op -- nothing more.
On those important Qs, one issue springs to my mind today:
For 1-2yrs, USG messaging has presented #ISIS as a weak terror group in decline, but today, we've heard a different story; a leader in consistent communication locally & globally, coordinating ops & more.
Which is it?
Some Qs about the raid itself:
- The U.S. claims casualties were sustained when (1) Haji Abdullah detonated the 3rd floor & (2) in a gun battle with his deputy & his wife on the 2nd floor.
- The U.S. acknowledges 4 deaths, but we know there were 14, including 6 kids & 4 women.
From multiple videos last night, we also heard crystal clear audio of U.S. helicopters firing heavy weapons at the house -- long, sustained bursts over a prolonged period of time.
It seems almost guaranteed that that killed more than a man & his wife (armed with AKs), right?
Over the past 24hrs, I've heard from several reliable sources in #Atmeh & NW #Idlib that #HTS:
- Totally locked down all roads around #Atmeh & prevented some people living close to #HTS positions from leaving their homes during & after the U.S SOF raid on #ISIS's leader nearby.
As the raid was ongoing, I was told by someone in #Atmeh that #HTS checkpoints had been significantly bolstered that evening -- but it was unclear then whether those reinforcements had arrived before the U.S. raid began, or during it.
It now seems they were deployed beforehand.
I've also heard from reliable sources that #HTS issued a district-wide security alert in #Harem (within which Atmeh is located) early on Feb 2, ~12hrs before the U.S. raid began.
That *could've* been related to an #HTS arrest campaign launched against #AlQaeda figures that day.
Or, that district-wide security alert may have been in response to a tip-off given to #HTS -- but personally, that'd be *highly* unusual, so count me skeptical on that one.
Nevertheless, there are some intriguing details emerging here about #HTS's response to the U.S. raid.
The other #HTS angle here is that U.S. SOF fired on x2 #HTS fighters - one of whom is now dead & the other injured.
I have it on good authority they did not fire on anyone, but they approached the location (they lived in a nearby building); were deemed a threat & were fired on.
#HTS & its dynamics vis-a-vis #ISIS & #AlQaeda in NW #Syria are *very* complex, and few have actually dug into the details & evolution over time.
I did -- with a ~15,000 word deep dive, for @CTCWP. I don't think there's anything more detailed out there:
Something big is going down in NW #Syria -- (a) U.S. helicopter gunships firing on a target in the #Jinderes area of #Afrin & (b) a possible SOF raid targeting Tauqir Sharif, a [former] #UK citizen in the Atmeh area of #Idlib.
Personally, I'd be amazed if such an operation was launched at Tauqir Sharif (Abu Hossam al-Britani) -- while his #UK citizenship was revoked, the cause for doing so never seemed more than tenuous.
The house in the #Atmeh area has reportedly been surrounded by [alleged U.S.] SOF -- a loudspeaker just ordered the building to be emptied.
My guess: it's a senior #AlQaeda (Huras al-Din) figure -- HaD seniors are known to hide in the Atmeh area.
The U.S. considers the #PKK a designated terrorist organization and *does* share intelligence & coordinate with #Turkey on countering the #PKK -- in #Syria, #Iraq & #Turkey.
As a member of the #PKK network, that places the #SDF in a very awkward place -- and @CJTFOIR too.
@CJTFOIR The #SDF's decision to shell from NE #Syria cross-border into #Turkey today -- targeting #Cizre was a serious escalation.
One #TSK soldier was killed in that attack -- and #Ankara has long determined cross-border attacks to be a thick red line.
In providing cover for a regional energy deal via #Assad's #Syria, the #Biden admin has provided no "legal rationale" for avoiding #CaesarAct sanctions.
@SFRCdems & @HouseForeign should call the admin to testify & explain, or otherwise intervene.
"I tell the US Ambassador she's my best friend; she could kill this deal.'
['Sure, sure,' in reply.]
'I say this laughing [to you] but I want to cry.'
@SFRCdems@HouseForeign What #Lebanon's Energy Minister was saying, was he's played U.S. Amb. Shea along, but in truth, his true allegiance is with #Assad's regime & its interests.
Even when faced with such bold [& embarassing] reality, some still appear totally blinkered:
After 5 days of fighting, a mammoth force -- 10,000 #SDF fighters + U.S. & UK special forces + U.S. air support -- has fought back, but still, 25% of al-Sina Prison remains in #ISIS hands & #ISIS cells continue to fight in x2 parallel neighborhoods.
Q -- how did 200 #ISIS fighters (many wearing suicide belts) & x2 car bombs get past ~12 #SDF checkpoints, into a heavily fortified city, home to the largest #ISIS detainee facility in the world?
It's almost certain now that #ISIS infiltrated/bribed #SDF-linked security forces.
BREAKING -- reports of an attack on the al-Sina prison in al-Hasakeh, NE #Syria, possibly involving an IED/VBIED.
The prison holds 5,000 #ISIS militants, mostly foreign fighters.
Local sources say prisoners conducted some form of incident in coordination with the bombing.
An #ISIS plot to attack al-Sina Prison was foiled in November 2021 -- involving an SVBIED & assault team equipped with a pick-up truck of rifles to provide to #ISIS prisoners inside.
Very concerning to see prisons coming under #ISIS's attention again, in January 2022.
This video reportedly shows the aftermath of a suspected car bomb outside al-Sina Prison's exterior walls:
What's strange about this paper though, is that the conclusion rules that [in the context of the #Afghanistan withdrawal], drone campaigns *are* a viable alternative to large-scale deployments, though are insufficient to eliminate a terror group outright.
The @TXNatSecReview paper's focus is on a drone campaign that benefited from an enormous U.S. & allied deployment in #Afghanistan & an accompanying extensive intelligence network that fed strikes.
With all of that on-side, the campaign was judged good, but far from a success.
@TXNatSecReview So with troops now out of #Afghanistan, the #Taliban in control, and no basing rights for near-proximity drone ops, how can the #FATA drone campaign be used to defend the viability of what's being proposed today -- a [distant] "over horizon" effort with little/no intel network?