In providing cover for a regional energy deal via #Assad's #Syria, the #Biden admin has provided no "legal rationale" for avoiding #CaesarAct sanctions.
@SFRCdems & @HouseForeign should call the admin to testify & explain, or otherwise intervene.
"I tell the US Ambassador she's my best friend; she could kill this deal.'
['Sure, sure,' in reply.]
'I say this laughing [to you] but I want to cry.'
@SFRCdems@HouseForeign What #Lebanon's Energy Minister was saying, was he's played U.S. Amb. Shea along, but in truth, his true allegiance is with #Assad's regime & its interests.
Even when faced with such bold [& embarassing] reality, some still appear totally blinkered:
@SFRCdems@HouseForeign For now, there's zero sign of any congressional testimony on this issue -- in part because Democrat-controlled SFRC & HFAC won't put the #Biden admin in an awkward corner.
But, plans are afoot to refine the #CaesarAct wording post-midterms (assuming/IF the GOP reverses control).
@SFRCdems@HouseForeign At the end of the day, the U.S.-facilitated #Lebanon energy deal promises 1.5-2hrs of electricity per day -- i.e., it's FAR from game-changing.
It's not going to 'save' #Lebanon or hurt #Hezbollah, let alone #Iran -- it relieves some pressure off both of them, in fact.
@SFRCdems@HouseForeign What *is* significant about the energy deal, is its inclusion of #Assad's war criminal regime as a lead signatory -- granting it credibility & "in-kind" payment in the form of gas & electricity.
And that "in-kind" power...? It'll serve lines powering prisons & military bases.
@SFRCdems@HouseForeign For months, the #Biden admin has been wary to speak at all about the deal -- occasionally [privately] accusing its critics of being "neocons" determined to "destroy" #Lebanon.
But facts tell a markedly different picture -- so Congress deserves a chance to publicly query it.
Something big is going down in NW #Syria -- (a) U.S. helicopter gunships firing on a target in the #Jinderes area of #Afrin & (b) a possible SOF raid targeting Tauqir Sharif, a [former] #UK citizen in the Atmeh area of #Idlib.
Personally, I'd be amazed if such an operation was launched at Tauqir Sharif (Abu Hossam al-Britani) -- while his #UK citizenship was revoked, the cause for doing so never seemed more than tenuous.
The house in the #Atmeh area has reportedly been surrounded by [alleged U.S.] SOF -- a loudspeaker just ordered the building to be emptied.
My guess: it's a senior #AlQaeda (Huras al-Din) figure -- HaD seniors are known to hide in the Atmeh area.
The U.S. considers the #PKK a designated terrorist organization and *does* share intelligence & coordinate with #Turkey on countering the #PKK -- in #Syria, #Iraq & #Turkey.
As a member of the #PKK network, that places the #SDF in a very awkward place -- and @CJTFOIR too.
@CJTFOIR The #SDF's decision to shell from NE #Syria cross-border into #Turkey today -- targeting #Cizre was a serious escalation.
One #TSK soldier was killed in that attack -- and #Ankara has long determined cross-border attacks to be a thick red line.
After 5 days of fighting, a mammoth force -- 10,000 #SDF fighters + U.S. & UK special forces + U.S. air support -- has fought back, but still, 25% of al-Sina Prison remains in #ISIS hands & #ISIS cells continue to fight in x2 parallel neighborhoods.
Q -- how did 200 #ISIS fighters (many wearing suicide belts) & x2 car bombs get past ~12 #SDF checkpoints, into a heavily fortified city, home to the largest #ISIS detainee facility in the world?
It's almost certain now that #ISIS infiltrated/bribed #SDF-linked security forces.
BREAKING -- reports of an attack on the al-Sina prison in al-Hasakeh, NE #Syria, possibly involving an IED/VBIED.
The prison holds 5,000 #ISIS militants, mostly foreign fighters.
Local sources say prisoners conducted some form of incident in coordination with the bombing.
An #ISIS plot to attack al-Sina Prison was foiled in November 2021 -- involving an SVBIED & assault team equipped with a pick-up truck of rifles to provide to #ISIS prisoners inside.
Very concerning to see prisons coming under #ISIS's attention again, in January 2022.
This video reportedly shows the aftermath of a suspected car bomb outside al-Sina Prison's exterior walls:
What's strange about this paper though, is that the conclusion rules that [in the context of the #Afghanistan withdrawal], drone campaigns *are* a viable alternative to large-scale deployments, though are insufficient to eliminate a terror group outright.
The @TXNatSecReview paper's focus is on a drone campaign that benefited from an enormous U.S. & allied deployment in #Afghanistan & an accompanying extensive intelligence network that fed strikes.
With all of that on-side, the campaign was judged good, but far from a success.
@TXNatSecReview So with troops now out of #Afghanistan, the #Taliban in control, and no basing rights for near-proximity drone ops, how can the #FATA drone campaign be used to defend the viability of what's being proposed today -- a [distant] "over horizon" effort with little/no intel network?
As I wrote several weeks ago, the path towards #Assad's normalization may have been partially paved, but the ambiguity of the #Biden admin's #Syria policy & its inaction has provided an opening.
Green or orange light is irrelevant -- the effect is clear.