1. Earlier this month, we reported that #IS comms activity had fallen off a cliff in recent weeks.
In the last few days, the reason for that has become clear: its media team was putting everything into prepping for a global campaign drumming up support for the new caliph.
2. The campaign started on 10 March, when #IS published a statement from new spox Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir declaring that Qurashi had died and been replaced by Qurashi 2.0.
This came after a week-on-week drop in comms that left #IS supporter activities at a historic low.
3. It wasn’t enough to just publish a statement. #IS needed to show that its new leader was credible.
Accordingly, in the days that followed, it published hundreds of photographs showing fighters from West Africa to Southeast Asia pledging allegiance to the new caliph.
4. This was as much a show of strength as it was an attempt to demonstrate that Qurashi 2.0—Abul Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi—is a ‘legitimate’ replacement.
Interestingly, #IS put a *lot* more effort into this comms campaign than it did for the last one.
5. Predictably, this campaign precipitated a surge in #IS supporter activity.
While #IS munasirin haven’t been quite as active as they were during the first few days of the #Ghwayran siege, they have shared more official media in the last few days than they have done in years
6. These dynamics show just how much #IS’s munasirin operate in lockstep with its Central Media Diwan.
There’ll likely be a similar surge in activity if #IS deploys a revenge and/or Ramadan campaign in the coming weeks.
1. This week’s issue of al-Naba’, which was published last night, took #IS's campaign to legitimise its new leader in a new, quite surprising direction.
Directly comparing the legacy of #IS's 'caliphs' with that of the Rashidun caliphs, it pushed back on criticism—seemingly from within #IS's own circles—of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and played down the strategic significance of his loss.
3. #IS also pushed back on criticism about how long it had taken it to confirm that Abu Ibrahim had been killed and replaced by Abul Hasan.
Per al-Naba’, everyone who needed to had pledged allegiance within less than 48 hours of the #Atmeh raid.
1. Recent pronouncements from #Moscow about its ‘concerns’ around the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (#CBRN) weapons systems in #Ukraine are having a direct and sustained impact on the pro-#Russia information landscape.
2. @Ex_Trac data shows that #Moscow’s comms re #CBRN have been normalising it as ‘reasonable’ justification for war among pro-#Kremlin communities.
To track this, we visualised the frequency with which #CBRN-related terms have been referenced by pro-#Kremlin voices over 2021/22.
3. The regularity of posts including the word ‘биолаборатория’ (‘biolaboratory’) increased by a factor of more than four hundred after the #Kremlin’s claim it was targeting bioweapons facilities at the end of February.
1. #IS has started reporting attacks from #CaboDelgado again.
This follows a three-month pause in its comms from #Mozambique.
Specifically, in the last three days alone, it’s claimed 16 operations.
2. After the recapture of Mocimboa da Praia three months ago by #Mozambique, #Rwanda & #SouthAfrica (among others), #IS’s comms went dark.
However, its network there was far from inactive, as these latest data, combined with what @ACLEDINFO has been reporting, indicate.
3. From a geographic perspective, #IS’s self-reported activities in recent months have been confined to the Mocimboa da Praia district of #CaboDelgado.
No attacks were reported from Palma, even though @ACLEDINFO data (displayed in yellow) suggests otherwise.
When the #Taliban took control of #Kabul, it also took control of #Afghanistan’s decades-old state media apparatus (the red line).
Simultaneously, it abandoned its own decades-old “Voice of Jihad” network (the yellow line).
2. This graph shows output from “Voice of Jihad” over the last five years. Note how it peaked in the summer months before collapsing, and staying collapsed, in August.
That was the point at which the #Taliban’s “Voice of Jihad” finally went silent.
3. This graph, on the other hand, shows output from #Afghanistan’s state media network, the Bakhtar News Agency. Note the pause in mid-August followed by a new, different pattern of activity.
That was the point at which the #Taliban took over.