ExTrac Profile picture
Mar 15 7 tweets 7 min read
1. Recent pronouncements from #Moscow about its ‘concerns’ around the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (#CBRN) weapons systems in #Ukraine are having a direct and sustained impact on the pro-#Russia information landscape.
2. @Ex_Trac data shows that #Moscow’s comms re #CBRN have been normalising it as ‘reasonable’ justification for war among pro-#Kremlin communities.

To track this, we visualised the frequency with which #CBRN-related terms have been referenced by pro-#Kremlin voices over 2021/22.
3. The regularity of posts including the word ‘биолаборатория’ (‘biolaboratory’) increased by a factor of more than four hundred after the #Kremlin’s claim it was targeting bioweapons facilities at the end of February.
4. Similarly, the term ‘ядерный’ (‘nuclear’), which in the year up to 24 February had been posted around three times a day on average on pro-Kremlin feeds, was used between five and ten times more regularly after #Putin raised its spectre days after the invasion started.
5. As for the term ‘АЭС’ (‘nuclear plant’), references to it increased 50-fold in the week that followed #Russia’s initial incursion.

Given last week’s reports that #Russia was planning a false flag at #Chernobyl, this spike is particular cause for concern.
6. The surge in chatter around #Ukraine’s CBRN 'threat' comes amidst a realignment of #Moscow’s war narrative (prompted by its slow progress to date).

It simultaneously makes a case for the continuation of the war while—potentially—setting the scene for a #Kremlin false flag.
7. In the coming weeks, we’ll continue to closely monitor the #Kremlin-aligned comms space.

For more information, visit extrac.io.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with ExTrac

ExTrac Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @Ex_Trac

Mar 11
1. Yesterday #IS confirmed that Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was killed in February. He has been succeeded by Abul Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.

It also revealed that Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, his spox, has been killed.

#IS has warned of revenge attacks in weeks to come. Image
2. ExTrac data suggests that this warning of revenge attacks is not likely to be ‘just’ rhetoric.

Just over two weeks after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abul Hasan al-Muhajir were killed in November 2019, #IS launched a global revenge campaign. Image
3. This saw it surging attacks globally.

L: #Syria operations more than doubled in the course of a single week.

R: #Nigeria operations also more than doubled. ImageImage
Read 9 tweets
Nov 12, 2021
1. #IS has started reporting attacks from #CaboDelgado again.

This follows a three-month pause in its comms from #Mozambique.

Specifically, in the last three days alone, it’s claimed 16 operations. Image
2. After the recapture of Mocimboa da Praia three months ago by #Mozambique, #Rwanda & #SouthAfrica (among others), #IS’s comms went dark.

However, its network there was far from inactive, as these latest data, combined with what @ACLEDINFO has been reporting, indicate. Image
3. From a geographic perspective, #IS’s self-reported activities in recent months have been confined to the Mocimboa da Praia district of #CaboDelgado.

No attacks were reported from Palma, even though @ACLEDINFO data (displayed in yellow) suggests otherwise. Image
Read 6 tweets
Nov 12, 2021
1. The latest issue of #IS's newspaper contained another nine reports of attacks in #Syria.

This means that, across the last week alone, #IS has reported 17 ops in #Syria.

That’s more attacks in a single week than were reported across August, September and October combined. Image
2. #IS is framing the recent surge in attacks in #DeirEzzor governorate as 'a strong comeback.'

The question remains as to whether or not it will be sustained in the coming weeks. ImageImage
3. Significantly, and in stark contrast with recent weeks, #IS also reported ops across #Raqqa and #Hasaka as well as in #DeirEzzor.

Per its comms at least, #IS has been totally inactive in #Raqqa and #Hasaka since June. Image
Read 4 tweets
Nov 1, 2021
1. A quick thread on official #Taliban comms.

When the #Taliban took control of #Kabul, it also took control of #Afghanistan’s decades-old state media apparatus (the red line).

Simultaneously, it abandoned its own decades-old “Voice of Jihad” network (the yellow line).
2. This graph shows output from “Voice of Jihad” over the last five years. Note how it peaked in the summer months before collapsing, and staying collapsed, in August.

That was the point at which the #Taliban’s “Voice of Jihad” finally went silent.
3. This graph, on the other hand, shows output from #Afghanistan’s state media network, the Bakhtar News Agency. Note the pause in mid-August followed by a new, different pattern of activity.

That was the point at which the #Taliban took over.
Read 8 tweets
Sep 22, 2021
1. On 19 September, following weeks of inactivity, #ISKP once again started reporting attacks from #Afghanistan.

That day alone, it claimed seven operations—this is the largest number of attacks reported by #ISKP in a single day in years.
2. This spate of attacks has so far focused on what #IS is calling the ‘apostate #Taliban militia.’

It appears to signal the start of the new, reinvigorated #Afghanistan campaign that #IS first said was on the horizon back in August.
3. Notably, aside from #ISKP’s two attacks on #KIA at the end of August, it had been entirely inactive in #Afghanistan until this week.

The last time it went dark for that long was in June/July 2020.
Read 9 tweets
Sep 1, 2021
1. Here’s our detailed briefing note on #ISKP:

public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac…
2. Drawing on ExTrac analytics and on-the-ground sources inside #Afghanistan, it provides in-depth analysis on #ISKP’s:

i. Origins and relations with the #Taliban;
ii. Operational trajectory;
iii. Outreach strategy; and
iv. Significance within the broader global #IS movement.
3. The first section describes #ISKP’s roots in the #TTP, identifies the issues at the heart of its rift with the #Afghan #Taliban, and considers the strategic influence of its current leader, Dr. Shahab al-Muhajir.
Read 7 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(