4. Given we are just three weeks from Ramadan—an occasion #IS usually commemorates with a global surge in attacks—#IS may well postpone its revenge campaign until then.
5. The downward trend in its attacks in places like #Iraq and #Afghanistan could be further evidence that something is on the horizon.
See how such a trend precipitated a steep, sustained operational surge in #Iraq last year.
6. All this being said, #IS is still at a low ebb.
On that basis, it may opt to push back a revenge campaign to a later date when it feels bolder.
(It launched its 2017 campaign honouring Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani more than a year after his death in the #Aleppo countryside.)
7. Whatever the case, #IS supporters online appear to be having no trouble accepting the news that their caliph was indeed killed.
8. And we’re already seeing a comms campaign showing bay’at from the provinces.
Preparation for that would explain the lull in media output we observed throughout the month of February.
1. Recent pronouncements from #Moscow about its ‘concerns’ around the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (#CBRN) weapons systems in #Ukraine are having a direct and sustained impact on the pro-#Russia information landscape.
2. @Ex_Trac data shows that #Moscow’s comms re #CBRN have been normalising it as ‘reasonable’ justification for war among pro-#Kremlin communities.
To track this, we visualised the frequency with which #CBRN-related terms have been referenced by pro-#Kremlin voices over 2021/22.
3. The regularity of posts including the word ‘биолаборатория’ (‘biolaboratory’) increased by a factor of more than four hundred after the #Kremlin’s claim it was targeting bioweapons facilities at the end of February.
1. #IS has started reporting attacks from #CaboDelgado again.
This follows a three-month pause in its comms from #Mozambique.
Specifically, in the last three days alone, it’s claimed 16 operations.
2. After the recapture of Mocimboa da Praia three months ago by #Mozambique, #Rwanda & #SouthAfrica (among others), #IS’s comms went dark.
However, its network there was far from inactive, as these latest data, combined with what @ACLEDINFO has been reporting, indicate.
3. From a geographic perspective, #IS’s self-reported activities in recent months have been confined to the Mocimboa da Praia district of #CaboDelgado.
No attacks were reported from Palma, even though @ACLEDINFO data (displayed in yellow) suggests otherwise.
When the #Taliban took control of #Kabul, it also took control of #Afghanistan’s decades-old state media apparatus (the red line).
Simultaneously, it abandoned its own decades-old “Voice of Jihad” network (the yellow line).
2. This graph shows output from “Voice of Jihad” over the last five years. Note how it peaked in the summer months before collapsing, and staying collapsed, in August.
That was the point at which the #Taliban’s “Voice of Jihad” finally went silent.
3. This graph, on the other hand, shows output from #Afghanistan’s state media network, the Bakhtar News Agency. Note the pause in mid-August followed by a new, different pattern of activity.
That was the point at which the #Taliban took over.
2. Drawing on ExTrac analytics and on-the-ground sources inside #Afghanistan, it provides in-depth analysis on #ISKP’s:
i. Origins and relations with the #Taliban;
ii. Operational trajectory;
iii. Outreach strategy; and
iv. Significance within the broader global #IS movement.
3. The first section describes #ISKP’s roots in the #TTP, identifies the issues at the heart of its rift with the #Afghan#Taliban, and considers the strategic influence of its current leader, Dr. Shahab al-Muhajir.