Thread by @DanielHegedus82

Long THREAD on the potential #Hungarian #veto of the #SixthSanctionPackage @gmfus
1.
As I highlighted in this previous piece of mine, it is not a surprise that #Orbán is tying the question of #RussiaSanctions to the #RuleOfLaw conditionality regulation ...
tol.org/client/article…

2.
and the suspended #RecoveryFunds.
#Orbán just repeats his strategy he pursued with success in case of the 2020 EU budget blockade.
He is aware of the fact that due to his rampage in EU politics he has lost nearly all of his persuasive and negotiation power,

3.
hence he has to operate with coercion. This is not the first time #Hungary is taking EU decision making as hostage, and not even the last one if #Orbán once again is allowed to succeed with his #blackmailing.

4.
If Member States & the @EU_Commission give in, make once again foul compromises & release the recovery funds just to please #Orbán that will not only kill the EU's #democratic credentials, but also its strategic gravity.

5.
This is a make or break moment. The real stake is not necessarily the short-term fate of the 6th #SanctionPackage, but the question whether one destructive Member State can blackmail and take the whole EU as hostage in middle of Europe's once in a lifetime security crisis

6.
After 12 years of constant #autocratization, blockade and blackmailing, it is the time to exclude the government of PM #Orbán from EU decision making.
@Europe2022FR has to schedule an immediate motion for a vote under #Article7.1 in the @EUCouncil .

7.
If the vote is successful and Member States determine the risk of serious breach of EU values, the @EUCouncil should swiftly proceed with #Article7.2 and aim at the suspension of the voting rights of the #Hungarian government.

8.
This is also a make or break moment for #Poland. #RuleOfLaw concerns against 🇭🇺&🇵🇱 are now largely decoupled from each other & #Warsaw is not in need of a mutual protection with Budapest against potential #Article7 based sanctions anymore.

9.
Concerning #Poland's recent role at the international stage, no Central European or Baltic EU Member State would be ready even to consider #Article7 sanctions against 🇵🇱. Warsaw does not have one bodyguard in 🇪🇺, but at least ten of them.
@MorawieckiM @RauZbigniew @PolandMFA

10.
Sharing a threat perception in face of #Russia's aggression that is completely different from those of 🇭🇺, #Hungary's #Visegrad partners 🇨🇿🇵🇱🇸🇰 have to approach @Europe2022FR with a request to schedule an #Article7 voting against the HUN GOV as well
@JanLipavsky @IvanKorcok

11.
Key partners, like the US or #Ukraine should also raise in bilateral talks with EU partners that the Hungarian government should be striped from its voting right in the @EUCouncil.
@SecBlinken @KDonfried @DmytroKuleba

12.
#Hungary should get the proposed longer transition/phasing out period of Russian oil even if the country's voting rights will be suspended and the 6th #SanctionPackage ultimately approved (...)

13.
to signalize for the #Hungarian society that the move is only against the government of PM #Orbán but not against the country.

14.
In nutshell, the rampant behaviour of 🇭🇺PM #Orbán, his blockades and blackmailing became a strategic challenge for the EU, which it cannot tolerate in the recent security context.

15.
Especially #Hungary's Central European neighbours are threatened by Orbán taking EU decision making and the 6th #SanctionPackage as hostage.

16.
If the voting rights of the #Hungarian Government won't be suspended, the EU won't be able to give appropriate responses to the war in its immediate neighbourhood and guarantee the security of its Central European members.

17.
Based on the track record of his #autocratization, the 🇭🇺GOV facing sanctions under #Article7.2 and the suspension of its voting rights would have been due around 2013-2014 at latest. #Orbán's assault on 🇭🇺democracy justifies this move for a while.

@POLITICOEurope @liliebayer @MattTempest @JenniferMerode @fromTGA @Mij_Europe @wprzybylski