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Jul 25 10 tweets 9 min read
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.

On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.

In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.
3. Responding to this, the #Taliban launched its own campaign, #AfghansSupportTaliban, on 22 July.

Within three days, it was shared more than twice as many times as the initial anti-#Taliban hashtag (200k+).

Here’s where it all started.
4. In the 48 hours that followed, #Taliban officials and supporters flooded Twitter with ‘evidence’ that #AfghansSupportTaliban.

During that period, the hashtag was tweeted more than 189,000 times by around 4,000 accounts.
5. The #Taliban has gone to town with this.

Yesterday, its Urdu WhatsApp feed shared a visual purporting that over a third of those who tweeted in its support were based in the #USA.

(Location data collected in this way is notoriously incomplete, but this is still surprising.)
(5a. We doubled-checked this data using the same software the #Taliban used, @Talkwalker, and got similar results: significantly more than a third of the accounts that tweeted #AfghansSupportTaliban in the last few days are 'located' in the #USA.)
6. Notably, most posts containing “#AfghansSupportTaliban” originated from a relatively small number of accounts.

There was a lot of behind-the-scenes coordination.

You can see that in how concentrated its distribution (pink) was compared to that of #BanTaliban (purple).
7. Moreover, the account that shared it most frequently is a fake, its profile pic pulled from a UChicago theatre website.

We can’t say for certain who's behind it, but the same pic was used by another fake ‘doctor’ pushing #Taliban comms around the takeover of #Kabul last year.
8. Whatever the case, it’s important to keep things in perspective.

This same network was more than twice as active when #Kabul fell to the #Taliban.

What we saw last week was significant hyperactivity, but nothing close to full capacity.
9. We’ll be continuing to track this in the coming weeks.

Sign up at extrac.io for more information.

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More from @Ex_Trac

Jul 7
1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.

The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk.
2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.

First, there’s denial.

That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.

Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.
3. Here’s how it panned out in #Kremenchuk.

News of the 27 June attack spread rapidly on Telegram.

Within minutes of the missile’s impact, a popular pro-#Kremlin channel reported that “something big” had been hit, sharing a photo of a smoke pile as evidence.
Read 12 tweets
May 3
1. #IS deployed 342 attacks globally during Ramadan, 219 of them since 17 April as part of its global revenge campaign.

This is ten attacks more than it reported during Ramadan last year.

Here’s what that surge looks like when charted out.
2. Most attacks (by far) were reported from #Iraq, followed by #Nigeria, #Syria and #Afghanistan.

These four states accounted for three quarters of all #IS’s attacks in Ramadan.
3. Besides the sole attack reported from #Uzbekistan at the beginning of the month, no major new fronts were opened anywhere outside of #Nigeria.
Read 8 tweets
May 2
1. Since last week, there have been a number of signs that #Russia may be planning to invade #Moldova.

In the last few days, there have been several likely false flag attacks in #Transnistria, events that have been amplified massively by a simultaneous influence campaign.
2. To track this, we analysed 169,000 posts shared across pro-war, #Kremlin-aligned communities on Telegram last week.

We sifted through this data for any mentions of #Transnistria, #Moldova, and #Tiraspol.

Here’s what it looks like.
3. The main claims are strikingly similar to those that emerged in the run-up to #Russia’s invasion of #Ukraine in February.

They revolve around pre-emptive justifications for war based on #Transnistria|n ‘insecurity’ and talk of #Ukraine’s ‘looming threat.’
Read 11 tweets
Apr 25
1. Here’s a new update on #IS’s global Ramadan campaign.

In the last week, #IS has deployed more attacks than at any other point since last Ramadan.
2. Since 17 April, #IS has carried out some 132 attacks as part of this campaign.

That's nearly three times more ops per day than usual.
3. #IS’s attacks have been spread far and wide, but with four clear front-runners: #Iraq, #Nigeria, #Syria, and #Afghanistan.

#Iraq: 43
#Nigeria: 34
#Syria: 19
#Afghanistan: 13
#Niger: 5
#DRC: 4
#Egypt: 5
#Somalia: 4
#Pakistan: 2
#India: 1
#Libya: 1
#Uzbekistan: 1
Read 8 tweets
Apr 4
1. Over the last 24 hours, we’ve been tracking pro-#Kremlin responses to #Bucha on #Telegram and #VK.

Pro-#Russia voices started by outright denying it, but by the end of the day, guided by strategic disinformation from the #Kremlin, they were blaming it on #Ukraine.
2. Initially, proponents of the invasion said it was all a lie, citing a clip of the mayor of #Bucha purportedly celebrating the liberation of the town days earlier but not mentioning any massacres.
3. Then, the preferred framing shifted to one that blamed the deaths on #Ukraine artillery fire.

The "supporting evidence" for this claim was a clip of a purported #UKR soldier talking about indiscriminate mortar fire against #RUS positions in the southeast a few weeks ago.
Read 9 tweets
Mar 18
1. This week’s issue of al-Naba’, which was published last night, took #IS's campaign to legitimise its new leader in a new, quite surprising direction.
2. It was very defensive in tone.

Directly comparing the legacy of #IS's 'caliphs' with that of the Rashidun caliphs, it pushed back on criticism—seemingly from within #IS's own circles—of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and played down the strategic significance of his loss.
3. #IS also pushed back on criticism about how long it had taken it to confirm that Abu Ibrahim had been killed and replaced by Abul Hasan.

Per al-Naba’, everyone who needed to had pledged allegiance within less than 48 hours of the #Atmeh raid.
Read 7 tweets

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