1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.
On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.
In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.
Yesterday, its Urdu WhatsApp feed shared a visual purporting that over a third of those who tweeted in its support were based in the #USA.
(Location data collected in this way is notoriously incomplete, but this is still surprising.)
(5a. We doubled-checked this data using the same software the #Taliban used, @Talkwalker, and got similar results: significantly more than a third of the accounts that tweeted #AfghansSupportTaliban in the last few days are 'located' in the #USA.)
6. Notably, most posts containing “#AfghansSupportTaliban” originated from a relatively small number of accounts.
There was a lot of behind-the-scenes coordination.
You can see that in how concentrated its distribution (pink) was compared to that of #BanTaliban (purple).
7. Moreover, the account that shared it most frequently is a fake, its profile pic pulled from a UChicago theatre website.
We can’t say for certain who's behind it, but the same pic was used by another fake ‘doctor’ pushing #Taliban comms around the takeover of #Kabul last year.
8. Whatever the case, it’s important to keep things in perspective.
This same network was more than twice as active when #Kabul fell to the #Taliban.
What we saw last week was significant hyperactivity, but nothing close to full capacity.
9. We’ll be continuing to track this in the coming weeks.
1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.
The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk.
2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.
First, there’s denial.
That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.
Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.
News of the 27 June attack spread rapidly on Telegram.
Within minutes of the missile’s impact, a popular pro-#Kremlin channel reported that “something big” had been hit, sharing a photo of a smoke pile as evidence.
1. Since last week, there have been a number of signs that #Russia may be planning to invade #Moldova.
In the last few days, there have been several likely false flag attacks in #Transnistria, events that have been amplified massively by a simultaneous influence campaign.
2. To track this, we analysed 169,000 posts shared across pro-war, #Kremlin-aligned communities on Telegram last week.
Pro-#Russia voices started by outright denying it, but by the end of the day, guided by strategic disinformation from the #Kremlin, they were blaming it on #Ukraine.
2. Initially, proponents of the invasion said it was all a lie, citing a clip of the mayor of #Bucha purportedly celebrating the liberation of the town days earlier but not mentioning any massacres.
3. Then, the preferred framing shifted to one that blamed the deaths on #Ukraine artillery fire.
The "supporting evidence" for this claim was a clip of a purported #UKR soldier talking about indiscriminate mortar fire against #RUS positions in the southeast a few weeks ago.
1. This week’s issue of al-Naba’, which was published last night, took #IS's campaign to legitimise its new leader in a new, quite surprising direction.
Directly comparing the legacy of #IS's 'caliphs' with that of the Rashidun caliphs, it pushed back on criticism—seemingly from within #IS's own circles—of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and played down the strategic significance of his loss.
3. #IS also pushed back on criticism about how long it had taken it to confirm that Abu Ibrahim had been killed and replaced by Abul Hasan.
Per al-Naba’, everyone who needed to had pledged allegiance within less than 48 hours of the #Atmeh raid.