Thread by @ZeroZhvk

🧵English translation of an extremely important and interesting article written by Gen. #Zaluzhny (Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of #Ukraine) and Lt. Gen. Zabrodskyi "Prospects for securing the military campaign of 2023: the Ukrainian view": ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/356…

HOW LONG CAN THIS WAR LAST & HOW CAN WE WIN IT: Today the absolute majority of military experts & analysts agree that
the full-scale war unleashed by the russian federation against Ukraine on 02-24-2022,
has long exceeded the concept of a local conflict of medium intensity. ⬇️

This applies to the spatial indicators, the number of involved military forces, and the impressive list of weapons and other
high-tech equipment whose usage is characteristic of this military confrontation.⬇️

HOW LONG WILL THE WAR LAST?⬇️

The question of the aforementioned conflict's duration stands separate. After all, in no way does it fit either into the framework of the announced Russian "blitzkrieg" nor into duration of the active phases of hostilities in any of the wars of the beginning of 21st century⬇️

In any case, the duration of the war is already measured in months.
And there is every reason to believe that this time count will cross the calendar boundaries of 2022⬇️

In this regard, it is natural to consider the prospects for the next year. And not only do so in the format of predictions and assumptions. ⬇️

Such a consideration should have a completely practical expression as its purpose.
Namely, how far should the military ambitions of the Ukrainian side extend?⬇️

And a logical derivative of this question: what exactly does the Armed Forces of Ukraine need as help from partners for the coming year 2023?⬇️

It is quite logical that the search for answers to these questions, in addition to fascinating theoretical discussions, also has a completely utilitarian side.⬇️

For a limited # of military and civilian officials, such research is a leading part of their professional duties. It is worth adding that for most of them, such issues are essentially a clearly expressed responsibility for the defense of the country, and, ultimately, its fate⬇️

It can be assumed that these studies have already been reflected in a number of state-level guiding and doctrinal documents. For obvious reasons, their research is not within the scope of this article.⬇️

It is proposed only to consider the basic evaluative judgments in relation to the mentioned questions and
to propose one's own ways to answer them.⬇️

Given the fact of aggressor's strategic initiative,
it is quite logical to begin with a description of the situation in which the Russian side is likely to find itself⬇️

Delineation of the conflict lines already today makes it possible to predict the limits of the
Russian Federation's ambitions for further advancement into the territory of Ukraine⬇️

HOW DOES THE AGGRESSOR SEE HIS FURTHER GOAL?⬇️

Certain operational prospects for the enemy can be seen in the Izyum and Bakhmut directions.
Access to the administrative border of #Donetsk region can be considered the probable ultimate goal of such actions. ⬇️

The prospect of advancing in the #Zaporizhzhia direction may look even more attractive to the enemy⬇️

It safeguards further actions to the north and the creation of a direct threat of taking over #Zaporizhzhia & #Dnipro city, which in turn will lead to the Ukrainian side losing control over a large part of Left Bank #Ukraine.⬇️

A return to the plan to seize #Kyiv and the threat of renewed military operations from the territory of the Republic of Belarus are not excluded from the agenda.⬇️

But further advancement in the South Buh direction from the operational bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro River opens up the most opportunities.
Success in the South, provided it is used quickly & correctly, can have a double effect:⬇️

On one hand, it's quite real prospect of capturing #Mykolaiv and #Odesa.
On the other hand, the creation of a threatening direction towards #KryvyiRih and in the future -
threats to the central and western regions of Ukraine.⬇️

We will deliberately not refer to the conditions under which the russian federation will be forced to
implement such an alleged plan. At the same time, we will not ignore the entire range of related strategic
and even global problems for the russian federation.⬇️

We can mention international isolation and partial economic pressure in the form of international #sanctions, difficulties with general mobilization and the lack of modern weapons and equipment, which will only become more acute with time.⬇️

In addition to the purely military, this nature of strategic actions in the East and South of #Ukraine
will bring the russian federation additional political and economic dividends. Among them are ensuring the security of the self-proclaimed republics and...⬇️

the logical, albeit belated completion of the so-called "special operation", preventing #Ukraine's access to the #BlackSea, control over the key element of the country's energy system - the South Ukrainian #NuclearPowerPlant , etc.⬇️

WHY IS CRIMEA A KEY FACTOR, BUT NOT THE ONLY ONE? ⬇️

It's easy to come to the conclusion that the basis of such promising (in a territorial sense) success in the South and, to some extent, in the East, is reliable defense and preservation of control over
the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of #Crimea.⬇️

Indeed, #Crimea was and remains the basis for lines of communication on the southern strategic flank of russian aggression. The territory of the peninsula allows for the deployment of significant groups of troops and supplies of material resources.⬇️

Finally, Crimea is home to the main base of the Black Sea Fleet and a network of airfields for conducting airstrikes on almost the entire depth of the territory of Ukraine.⬇️

Some analysts are inclined to believe that it is control over the territory of the Crimean peninsula that is the center of gravity for Russian forces in this war.⬇️

However, regarding the situation in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine will probably find themselves in 2023, everything doesn't appear as definite.⬇️

Essentially, for the Armed Forces of #Ukraine, the situation will represent a complex combination of the actual position of the contact line, the available resources and the set of combat-ready troops, and, obviously, enemy possession of the strategic initiative⬇️

At the same time, continuing this logic, we will express serious concerns regarding the drawing of the contact line from the point of view of the Ukrainian side.
Its contours have an extremely unfavorable configuration in the Izyum and Bakhmut directions.⬇️

The enemy's significant incursions constrain any operational maneuver for the Ukrainian troops and require, in fact, a double set of forces to contain them.
This is especially acutely felt due to the lack of means of fire damage and anti-aircraft defense.⬇️

The situation in the South and East does not look better either.
The threat of enemy advance in the direction of Zaporizhzhia has already been mentioned.⬇️

In addition, the threat of the enemy developing a partial success from the Huliai Pole direction does not disappear, which, under certain conditions, could create a threat of encircling the entire group of Ukrainian troops in the East.⬇️

The enemy's presence of an operational bridgehead on the right bank of the #Dnipro River requires additional efforts to prevent its expansion.⬇️

#UAF #COUNTEROFFENSIVE: WHAT IS REQUIRED?⬇️

The only way to radically change the strategic situation is, without a doubt, to launch several consecutive, and ideally simultaneous counterattacks by the #ArmedForcesOfUkraine Armed Forces of #Ukraine during the 2023 campaign.⬇️

No need to emphasize separately on their purely military, as well as political and informational significance.
At the same time, the issue of their organization and implementation needs more attention.

So, what forces and means are required for this? ⬇️

If we consider 2023 campaign as a turning point, then we need to return to the definition of the center of gravity for russian federation in this war. After all, only an effective influence on the enemy's center of gravity can lead to changes in the course of the war.⬇️

Provided that such a center of gravity is defined as control over the Crimean peninsula,
it is logical to assume plans for an operation or a series of operations to seize the peninsula within 2023 timeframe.⬇️

Such planning should provide, first of all, the availability of the necessary set of troops.
Here we definitely cannot be talking about military units & formations of the Armed Forces of #Ukraine, which are already operating on the 2500 km front from #Kherson to #Kovel.⬇️

The preparation of an offensive campaign requires the creation of one or more operational (operational-strategic) groups consisting of ten to twenty combined military brigades - depending on the plan and ambitions of the Ukrainian command.⬇️

In the current situation, this can be done exclusively by replacing the main types of weapons of already existing brigades with modern ones provided by Ukraine's partners.⬇️

Separately we should highlight the necessity to obtain from partners an additional number of missiles and ammunition, artillery systems, missile systems, EW means.⬇️

All of this will require the consolidation of efforts of all partner countries of Ukraine, will require a significant amount of time and significant financial expenses.

Strictly speaking, all of the above directly depends only on the available resources and only them.⬇️

And if the situation with the number of personnel will probably look quite good for the Armed Forces of #Ukraine, the same cannot be said about heavy weapons and ammunition.⬇️

But, in any case, in the presence of political will, advanced and well-thought-out planning,
using the production base and reserves of the leading countries of the world, procuring appropriate supplies for such a group within the Armed Forces of #Ukraine is absolutely real.⬇️

But the outlined approach to defining the tasks of the 2023 military campaign for the Armed Forces of Ukraine seems too one-sided.⬇️

EVEN IF THE INVADER LOSES #CRIMEA⬇️

So, we are once again forced to return to the determination of the enemy's center of gravity (Schwerpunkt) by the Ukrainian side.⬇️

Let's leave aside the legality of linking the concept of "center of gravity" to a certain area or region at the strategic level...⬇️

We will only note that it is the source of moral and physical power, strength & resistance -
what #Clausewitz called "the concentration of all power and movement on which everything depends...,
the point to which all our energy should be directed"⬇️

Let's assume that the #UAF achieved complete success in the 2023 campaign and took control
of the #Crimean peninsula.
It is difficult to overestimate the extremely positive political & media significance of such a strategic success...⬇️

However, the military significance of such victory can be assessed differently:
#russia federation loses a base for the #BlackSea Fleet, an airfield network, significant amount of stockpiles of material resources and, most likely,
a significant amount of personnel & equipment⬇️

At the same time, nothing can significantly disrupt the painful, but a quite real transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the $Novorossiysk naval base on the eastern coast of the Black Sea...⬇️

the military presence of the aggressor in the region
will be maintained along with the threat of missile strikes.
The same can be assumed for use by russian aviation, for example, Primorsko-Akhtarsk and Yeisk airfields.⬇️

The loss of a significant amount of supplies for the armed forces of the russian federation will have only a temporary effect.

Summarizing what has been said and discussing further prospects, after 2023, we can only talk about a new stage of confrontation. ⬇️

Of course, with different initial data and perspectives, but again - an ongoing conflict, loss of lives, consumption of resources and a completely uncertain end result.⬇️

Instead we propose a somewhat different approach to determining the center of gravity of Russian forces and the very essence of this war.⬇️

DISPROPORTION IN CAPABILITIES OF #UKRAINE AND #RUSSIA: HOW TO MITIGATE THEM?⬇️

The defining feature of the military confrontation with the #russia armed forces is not even a significant advantage in the number of forces and means of the parties in russians' favor and not even significant spatial indicators of the strategic operation against #Ukraine⬇️

It is the decisive disproportion in the *capabilities* that defines the nature of this confrontation.
Its most revealing embodiment is the difference in the ultimate reach of the means of destruction.⬇️

If for 🇷🇺 [the weapon system] reach is up to 2,000 km, taking into account the flight range of air-based cruise missiles, for #Ukraine it's actually limited to only 100 km by the flight range of the missiles & the depth of the starting positions for outdated missile systems*⬇️

[*In the original it's "for outdated Operational-Tactical Missile Systems, had to trim to fit into Twitter limit]⬇️

Thus, since the beginning of the large-scale aggression, Ukrainian Armed Forces' armament has a range almost 20 times smaller than that of the enemy.⬇️

In the language of military practice, this means that the Armed Forces of #Ukraine, in the best case, can strike with outdated means of attack only at the depth of the enemy's operational rear.⬇️

At the same time, the enemy is capable of inflicting pinpoint strikes on targets in the entire depth of the country's territory *with impunity*⬇️

*This* should be considered the center of gravity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from a military point of view.

As long as this situation persists, this war can drag on for years.

How to solve this?⬇️

Of course, it is impossible to deprive the enemy of such a significant advantage within a single moment.⬇️

Considering the number and availability of resources at the disposal of the armed forces of the russian federation, the very possibility of eliminating it completely is doubtful. But it is quite possible to oppose the enemy's ability to act in a such way and at such a range.⬇️

We are talking, ofc, about the supply of weapons systems or certain types of ammunition with the appropriate range by #Ukraine's partners to the Armed Forces. But not only & not so much about particular names as, for example the MGM-140B ATACMS Block 1A missile for #Himars MLRS⬇️

A comprehensive approach to the re-equipment of artillery, missile forces, tactical aviation and the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of their power must be applied.⬇️

The discussion should be about building or growing *the capabilities*
not just about the number of weapons and equipment for the brigades scheduled for re-equipment.⬇️

Only in this case, it's possible to talk about influencing the real center of gravity of the russian Federation in this war. ⬇️

Russian center of gravity in the war lies in its "remote" - (as most russians perceive it) nature. Thanks to this "remoteness" the citizens of the russian federation dont experience losses and failures as painfully and most importantly - the cost of this war in all its meanings⬇️

A convincing example of the correctness of this approach in the current year is the successful efforts of the Armed Forces of #Ukraine to physically transfer hostilities to the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of #Crimea.⬇️

We are talking about a series of successful missile strikes on the enemy's Crimean air bases, first of all, on the Saki airfield.⬇️

The task of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2023 is to make these feelings [of loss, failure, cost of war] sharper, more natural and tangible for the russians and in other occupied territories, despite the significant distance from the targets.⬇️

It's worth asking the question even more broadly: what is the source of confidence, readiness and most importantly, the need for the leadership of the russian federation & russian society to support the war against #Ukraine & sincerely believe in righeousness of its conclusion?⬇️

In addition to the well-known reasons like the desire for at least regional leadership, various kinds of "getting up from the knees" and frankly imperial encroachments, which are so acceptable to the average Russian, there's also a purely practical one.⬇️

It refers precisely to the russia's principles of the use of military force.
It's expressed in an aggressive style of war for destruction against a state which, given the level of equipment of its armed forces, won't be able to adequately act against Russian troops in response⬇️

Simply put, it is precisely the *impunity* that is provided by the physical distance that drives russian desire for war.
This is the true center of gravity (Schwerpunkt) for the enemy.
And we have no right to leave it without proper attention.⬇️

The situation can change drastically with appropriate planning & proper work with #Ukraine's partner countries. A comprehensive, w/ proper long-term vision, equipping and re-equipping the #UAF w/ weapon systems of the appropriate range must become the sought/dreamt game-changer⬇️

Only if the balance is equalized in terms of the reach of the means of destruction and, thus, the defined enemy's center of gravity is shaken, it is possible to talk about a turning point in the course of the war.⬇️

It is obvious that the operational and strategic prospects for 2023 for #Ukraine in the case of obtaining the appropriate funds will look completely different than today.⬇️

The presence of even the very threat of the #Ukrainian Armed Forces using means of destruction of the appropriate range will force the russian federation to consider the nature, course, and outcome of our confrontation in a completely different way.⬇️

However, #Ukraine can consider the acquisition of relevant weapons systems from partners only as a solution for the transition period⬇️

From the first days of the large-scale aggression of the russian federation, the Ukrainian side has faced the acute problem of restoring and establishing its *own design and production* of high-tech weapons samples.⬇️

And the tactical and technical requirements for such samples already include the necessary parameters, in particular, regarding the range of application.⬇️

There is no doubt that Ukraine's national efforts in this direction open up unlimited opportunities for international military-technical cooperation with partner countries.⬇️

THE BASIS OF UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE - SIGNIFICANT MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM PARTNERS⬇️

When considering the prospects of cooperation with partners in the supply of arms to Ukraine, it is advisable to consider 2 significant factors, which from the very beginning of the aggression have a considerable influence on the relevant decision-making, supply terms & volume⬇️

The 1st of them is a misconception about the scale of the Russian-Ukrainian war: despite a sufficient amount of widely available information, it is difficult for the modern generation, the world, Europeans 1st of all, to imagine World War II style combat operations in reality. ⬇️

The line of contact is thousands of kilometers long, tens of thousands of units of military equipment, more than a million people who are directly or indirectly participating in this war with weapons in their hands.⬇️

Air raid sirens and rocket/bomb attacks on civilians, cities, refugees and prisoners of war, river crossings and tank breakthrough attempts - all this for the absolute majority of people in the world remains only a ghostly reality of the world wars of the last century.⬇️

At the same time, for the people and the Armed Forces of #Ukraine, all of the above has already become an integral part of everyday life.⬇️

In terms of the involvement of personnel and equipment, #Ukraine's resistance to russian aggression has already exceeded certain indicators of combat operations on its territory during #WW2. ⬇️

The deployment of effective resistance to more than
300,000-strong group of the #russian armed forces required the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of people to the Armed Forces of #Ukraine and providing them with tens of thousands units of various military equipment⬇️

And the daily expenditure of ammunition of the Armed Forces of #Ukraine, for example, artillery shells per gun, on average, exceeds three times the indicators of the Royal Artillery of the #British Army during the #WW1 #FirstWorldWar⬇️

Taking into account the duration of the war and the prospects for the 2023 campaign,
it is unlikely that these indicators will decrease.⬇️

For #Ukraine to repel the aggression waged by a superpower it requires and will require significant material resources and financial costs for a long time to come.⬇️

In 2023, the material basis of the Ukrainian resistance should remain significant in terms
of military and technical assistance from partner countries. ⬇️

After all, despite its own losses from economic sanctions, dependence on russian fuels
and individual attempts to "appease" the russian federation, world history will not forgive any country in the world for conniving with a bloody predator that only gets higher on fresh blood⬇️

The 2nd factor is the direct threat of the use, under certain circumstances, of tactical nuclear weapons by the Russian Armed Forces. ⬇️

Combat actions on the territory of Ukraine have already demonstrated how much the
Russian Federation neglects the issues of global nuclear security even in a war with the use of
conventional means⬇️

In particular, since July 2022, Russian troops have set up a military base on the territory of the #ZaporizhzhyaNPP placing there heavy artillery, in particular, BM-30 "Smerch" multiple rocket
launcher systems ⬇️

It is hard to imagine that even nuclear strikes will allow the #russianFederation to break
#Ukraine's will to resist. But the threat that will appear for the whole of #Europe cannot be ignored.⬇️

It is also impossible to completely rule out the possibility of direct involvement of the world's
leading countries in a "limited" nuclear conflict, in which the prospect of the #ThirdWorldWar
is already clearly visible.⬇️

Once again it is extremely necessary to return to the source of Russian confidence, namely - *impunity*. Any attempts at practical steps towards the use of tactical nuclear weapons must be stopped using the entire arsenal of means at the disposal of the countries of the world⬇️

After all, starting from this moment, the russian federation will become not only a threat to
the peaceful coexistence of #Ukraine, its other neighbors and a number of European countries,
but also a truly global terrorist state.⬇️

In our opinion, the prospects of the 2023 military campaign should be considered precisely with such a complex and ambiguous combination of factors in mind.⬇️

Only their full and complex consideration will create the prerequisites for #Ukraine's task of defeating the armed forces of the aggressor country and ending the destructive war within #Europe.⬇️

Valery Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, member of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, General
Mykhailo Zabrodskyi, 1st Deputy Chairman Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, Lt. General

🧵END OF THREAD🧵
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Please share this article as much as possible it's what ppl should be talking about if they believe they support Ukraine, more than laughing at funny vids of drones dropping grenades at orcs (such use of drones is hack, workaround and shows lack of weapons)

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