Thread by @ploughshares_ca

#SpaceThreatsOEWG Day 3, Session 2, exchange among Member States.

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#France draws attention to FALSE perception that some irresponsible practices might provide more advantages than disadvantages. Must deconstruct through transparency, cooperation, and commitments such as that regarding destructive DA #ASAT tests.

#France commends U.S. and others who have commitment NOT to conduct destructive DA ASAT tests. Wishes to make progress to universalizing that. Welcome draft resolution at #UNGA.

#Brazil considers irresponsible:
-Maneuvers and proximity operations without previous warning
- RPO raise suspicions about espionage and data collection creating enviro of mistrust and possible response measures
- Failure to register satellites/absence info
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#Brazil irresponsible cont:
- Use of spatial objects that are no visible/stealth
- Taking control of space objects or putting others at risks
- Cyber operations that pose a threat to critical infrastructure for military/civil users

#Brazil responsible behaviours include:
- Registering space objects
- Prior/timely communication of space objects
- Maximizing use of de-orbiting devices
- Reducing space debris
- Sharing info on monitoring of objects in space
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#Brazil responsible behaviour cont:
- International notification on possibility of collisions uncontrolled objects
- International commitment aimed at banning tests of ASAT weapons
- Observing principles of the OST and other space treaties
- Observing 21 LTS guidelines COPUOS

#Brazil also notes as irresponsible:
- Developing DA and co-orbital ASATs
- Developing satellites with armaments
- Using ASAT capabilities to carry out any destruction of satellites in orbit

#Australia sees U.S. commitment related to destructive DA ASAT missiles as important. relates to one of the 10 principles of responsible behaviour previously outlined by Australia.

*Will have more to say on this in the future.

#Philippines: #ASEAN called for action to mitigate threats from space debris. Aligns with this.
Any deliberate or intentional debris creating actions = security threat. Concerned about testing of DA ASAT missiles. Note commitments not to do so by several states

#Philippines: Irreversible damage to satellites is also a national security concern. Includes #cyber/electromagnetic.

#Philippines Threats not from capabilities, which are value neutral. Most important threats stem from behaviour.

Consider principles of #DueRegard as fundamental to responsible behaviour. Need to further unpack this. See paper from Session 1.

#Switzerland Commend the statements made with regard to renouncing any destructive #ASAT tests. Call on states – in particular countries that have tested ASATs or have capacity - to join in on moratorium. Should be prohibited.

#Switzerland We should closely look at the limits imposed on use of force in space by international law and IHL when it comes to the principles of proportionality and distinction.

#Switzerland DA ASATs not only threat from earth. Electronic and cyber capabilities also important to consider. Also lasers.

#China: OEWG cannot turn blind eye to policy threats from doctrines and strategies pursued by a certain space faring superpower aimed at dominance and hegemony.

If identify space as warfighting domain and conduct military exercises, then risk that will deploy weapons/force.

#China Direct threat to security and safety of space objects through activities on the ground, such as ASAT tests using electromagnetic and cyber attacks to interfere with other countries launch activities/control of space objects

#China draws attention to missile defence capabilities. Has been used as ASAT. U.S. working with allies to develop capabilities.

#China Re U.S. commitment and draft resolution #UNGA: Welcomes all arms control initiatives that contribute to PAROS but against efforts to expand military superiority in names of arms control. U.S. = most numerous and comprehensive #ASAT testing.

60 years too late.

#China: OEWG should include following 3 point:
- Confirm that war in outer space can never be won and must never be fought
- Make commitment not to use/threaten force against outer space objects
- Commit to legally binding instrument.

#China argues that states did not reach agreement on existing international law during first session. Argues OEWG should continue to examine legal issue, gaps, and applicability of various legal concepts including #DueRegard

#Netherlands: Threats from ground to space such as DA ASAT systems continue to be of great concern. Current proposals for legal measures do not sufficiently address, TF Netherlands cannot currently support them.

#Netherlands: Ground-based threats included in #UNGA res on further practical measures for #PAROS. Welcomes commitment by US not to conduct destructive DA ASAT missile tests. An example of practical measures on PAROS and responsible behaviour. Potential multilateralization.

#Israel commends presentations this week. Prioritizes developing space domain awareness and common understanding of concepts.

#SouthKorea: Destructive DA ASAT tests one of most pressing threats.

Draws attention to test November 2021. Threat to astronauts

Welcomes commitments to conduct such tests and draft resolution at UNGA

#SouthKorea draws attention to other earth based threats including #lasers and uplink jammers. Should fall under category of irresponsible behaviour.

#Iran: claims chair's summary did not reflects views and positions of states that have substantive difficulty with concept of responsible behaviour rather than legal agreement under PAROS/CD

Against notion of responsible/irresponsible rater than legal/illegal.

#Iran: Must negotiate legal instrument in CD.

"responsible behaviour" is oversimplified political agenda. Downgrades agenda of CD on PAROS. Deviation from long lasting mandate of CD on PAROS based on sovereign equality of states. Cannot judge others' behaviours.

See paper.

#Iran not convinced that behavioural approach is the right way forward toward a legal instrument. Characterization of behaviour through norms rather than legal agreements will become tool for some states to evade responsibility and put blame on others.

#Iran claims root cause of arms race is a powerful state that seeks to dominate. Points to alliances/blocs.

Commercial activities attached to military operations is increasing hostile acts against other countries. They will have to take countermeasures.

Need a legal framework.

#Russia has presented a slide:

Per #Russia slide, the point is that the dividing line b/w responsible/irresponsible behaviour is the "first" placement of a weapon in outer space. A point of no return would make peaceful use of outer space impossible and create a new reality of arms race/conflict/spiral.

#Russia presents another slide:

Norms proposed by #Russia and others with like views:
-Prohibition placement weapons space
-Prohibition use/threat of force against space objects or using space objects

#Russia irresponsible behaviour includes:
- Creating, testing, deploying, using space weapons for missile defence or as ASAT weapons or uses on the land/air
- Destruction, damage, or disrupt normal functioning/trajectory of space objects of other states

#Russia irresponsible behavior cont:
- Showing assistance or encouraging others to take part in such activities

#Russia sees U.S. moratorium to be a step in the right direction however it is not a completely sufficient step to resolve an arms race in outer space. Discriminatory in nature if not bolstered by other universal measures aimed at PAROS.

#Russia on destructive ASAT moratorium cont: Would create certain advantages for a certain group of countries that have already tested this type of weapon. Have means to conduct tests without causing destruction.

#Russia: those pursuing destructive ASAT moratorium should take obligations not to use space objects to damage or strike any object on the ground, earth, or air. To not create, test, deploy weapons in space including for ABM defence or ASAT purposes. Destroy existing systems.

#Russia argues that voluntary moratorium on destructive ASAT missile tests lacks definitions and verification and is just declaratory.

#Portugal: Irresponsible to perform destructive ASAT tests that would destroy future of next gen

Welcomes statements from member states to not perform such tests

#Portugal Strongly support #UNSG Our Common Agenda that includes multi-stakeholder dialogue on outer space. Will actively contribute and promote international conference for Summit of the Future.

Switching to topic 3 space to space threats!

#UnitedStates: Serious challenges to regulating behaviours include:
-Technical
-Definitional
-Verification

Technical: most pressing ASAT threat is ground to space. Easier to develop, test and maintain. Cheaper. 4 countries have conducted them. Risk of normalizing them.

#UnitedStates provides overview of the extensive challenges of operating in space, including the need to be able to maneuver relatively close to target for mission.

#UnitedStates on definitions: Cannot develop definition of space-based weapons that can constrain novel capabilities, merely because they have dual-purpose potential i.e. robotic arms, which could be used for on-orbit servicing.

#UnitedStates: definitions and dual-purpose challenges make verification even more difficult. Difficult to discern capabilities and intent. Example of NASA DART for planetary defence. Behaviour is benign and beneficial.

#France: Note diff points of view re what RPO means. Better understanding of this would be easy achievement for group. Two types of activities have diff consequences (rendezvous and proximity). Can be irresponsible or responsible. This is why we need norms that differentiate them

#Cuba: Not possible to regulate war in space because war in space is prohibited. Absolute prohibition in legal terms exists. Would be like creating rules for war using biological weapons.

#Cuba: danger of reinterpreting scope of concept of responsibility. OST concept of responsibility is about the absolute responsibility of the state. How could placing a weapon in space be peaceful?

#Cuba not concerned about dual-use because any object can be considered as potentially having a dual-use. However the problem is not the possible use of an object but INTENTION that violates norm of international law.

#Cuba however does believe should regulate things that fall into a grey area. But should be legally binding.

Any use of space that is not for peaceful use is automatically a violation of international law.

#Cuba argues need to also focus on enforcement (and verification). And strengthen existing mechanisms.

#Japan: Necessary to distinguish b/w beneficial and harmful uses of RPO capabilities.

Threats = types of #RPO that might result in collision. Enhancing transparency will contribute to confidence building measures.

#Japan: Interference by malign #cyber attacks: could be used to cause a collision/debris. Should be regarded as a threat.

Interference with early warning or nuke command/control/communication also regarded as threat

#Switzerland makes 3 points:
1. Possible use of co-orbital ASATs is also as disturbing as DA ASATs. Also create debris. Should likewise prohibit and ban use.

#Switzerland cont:
2. RPO if hostile/uncoordinated are a threat. Deliberate approach without knowledge/consent might be interpreted as hostile. Might encourage use of defensive mechanisms on sats, which harms security. Supports suggestions by #Germany/#Phillpines

#Switzerland:
3. Prohibiting weapons placed in space is essential even if not sufficient requirement.

#Philippines: Security of space assets is crucial for national security. Nascent sparefaring nations most vulnerable to space-to-space threats:
- Modest SSA capabilities
- Lack propulsion system/maneuverability to evade debris/other sats. Echoes #ASEAN call to mitigate debris

#Philippines: Lack of channels of communication and clear norms of behaviour = security risk. Need to develop channels of communication and mechanisms for consultations under ART 9 of OST.

#Philppines: Prohibition on weapons and use of force in space. BUT: should take into account inherent right to peaceful use of space and not hamper innovation.
Capabilities are value neutral. Behaviour is most important. Need conversation to develop common understanding of norms

#UK on proximity operations: If don’t follow particular pattern or capabilities are unknown, it may be perceived as a threat.

#UK: Rendezvous: integral to active debris removal and satellite servicing. But could be repurposes. Trust requires develop and testing in a transparent way and clear procedures of conduct. Those with capabilities must lead the way.

Should consider commercial sector efforts.

#UK: Heard that some states are developing/deploying on orbit counterspace capabilities both destructive and non-destructive. Would be standard practice to test them, but how do we tell a test from an intent to use?

#UK need to start with focus on how states behave when develop, test, use such capabilities. They can be observed, verified, and more effectively regulated.

#Canada re Cuba and the deadly icicle:

Hard to define all things that should be prohibited. Either so broad that useless or so specific that leave things out. Also risk banning things that are beneficial.

#Canada: international law related to international security does not simply end with UN Charter article 2(4).

#Germany: Concept of a space weapon has severe difficulties. Not a logical continuation of Art. 4 of OST because examples of RPO etc. show that notion of a weapon in ill defined in space. As a first step TCBMs about these activities are helpful. Discuss kind of info needed.

#Germany re "peaceful use": Our job is to analyse what kind of risky behavior exists in space and what we can do to make it less risky. Peaceful use is non-aggressive use. German military activities are reconcilable to peaceful use. Non-escalatory.

#Germany: Re CAPABILITIES for problematic behaviour. Believe limited value in exploring just the capabilities because depends how they are used. Should focus on behaviours.

#Germany: Behaviours that lead to threat perception = approach and follow another satellite and hold it at risk with a highly maneuverable satellite or robotic capabilities. But still need to further explore this.

#Germany: Re RPO presentation/industry: clear notion that beneficial to avoid contact with another spacecraft. Agree.

#Germany: We already have concept of due regard OST. But for the concept to be effective we need to develop state practice that operationalizes it. Discussion of responsible behaviour can help. Can strengthen existing international law, which may also lead to new law.

#Egypt: One big message: gap in the legal regime that deals with the issue. Cannot be dealt with using concepts that do not have clear definitions like “responsible.” Subjective. What is responsible to some may not be at a different time.

#Egypt: Should reconsider available literature including draft PPWT. Why don’t we discuss what is in there and how it can be used.

Definition of responsible behaviour is not a goal in itself. The goal is PAROS and bridging legal gap.

#Egypt: Need to ensure fairness for all re example of nuclear capabilities and right to peaceful use.

END OF DAY/🧵