In our latest #growth report for #Pakistan, we examined, among other themes, the role of #FDI in the country. How much #Pakistan attracts, how much it could attract, the impact on #productivity and on #jobs.
1) #FDI is a useful source of financing for #developing countries. It is stable, and typically associated w/ #export growth, #job creation and #productivity upgrading. Does that all of that apply to #FDI in #Pakistan? Let's see...
2) #Pakistan's #FDI inflows/GDP (in green below) have been historically low and declining.
3) #FDI has also been low as a share of #foreign financing sources - this matters because #FDI is a relatively stable financing source, bringing #macroeconomic stability.
a- #foreign firms in #Pakistan are 46% more productive than domestic. They bring better #management & #technology, they also 'cherry pick' productive firms to acquire. (see col 2).
6) a- Our finding of #vertical#FDI spillovers are in line with findings of @waqarwadho and Chaudhry suggesting #innovation is triggered by vertical linkages with #suppliers (eg FDI).
6) b- our finding of limited spillovers (think that a 10 percent increase in #FDI leads to a tiny 0.5% increase in #productivity) may be related to the composition of #FDI in #Pakistan - mostly in highly protected, domestic oriented sectors.
Today's my last day in #Pakistan. So I'll close with a thread on #trade trends. With @StateBank_Pak data recently released for 11 out of 12 months of FY23.
Here's a summary: 🧵👇
1) Exports declined in July-May FY23 by 9.4% relative to same period of FY22. Largest contraction for #goods. Services exports actually expanded by 3.4%.
Role of restrictions to import inputs may explain the difference.
2) By destination: #exports to the top 5 markets fell during July-May FY23 (vs FY24), including USA, China, UK, Germany and UAE.
#Pakistan is going thru a complex #macro situation. At its heart is one symptom: the #CAD. Because the CAD has been perennial, this long-standing symptom translated into large foreign liabilities. Short 🧵👇
a) The #CAD shows that #Pakistan has been consuming beyond what it produces. At its heart, there’s another perennial deficit: the fiscal deficit.
b) To fix the #CAD, compressing #imports is futile (e.g. with the flood levy). You need either to reduce the fiscal deficit, or increase private saving well beyond investment. 👇
We have now 3 months of disaggregated #trade data for FY23 in #Pakistan. Visible deceleration both on #exports and #imports. Some key elements in 🧵below:
#Exports grew in Jul-Sep 23 versus Jul-Sep 22 by 5.3%. Slightly faster growth in #goods than in #services.
This thread will show performance in #values. not #volumes. Keep in mind FY22 was extraordinary in terms of high #prices, both for #imports and #exports. 👇👇👇🧵
1\ #Exports reached record highs, both #goods and #services, increasing by 26.6 and 17.1% respectively w.r.t. FY21. Good export prices and a decent #export response played a role here.
2\ #Pakistan#export growth was generalized by main destination. Particularly noticeable are increases in shipments to #USA and to #China - the two largest destinations.
A month ago I wrote this 🧵 on why #import duties were not the answer to #Pakistan's Balance of Payments constraints. #ImportBans are certainly not the answer either. Rather, they exacerbate the underlying problem. Five thoughts. 🧵👇
1\ The usual: CAD results from a macro imbalance (Saving too low relative to investment, so foreign saving needed (borrowing) (CAD is the mirror image of borrowing from the rest of the world (financial account of BOP)). Fixing the CAD takes increasing saving (cool off demand).