Five 5️⃣ simple facts 🧵 (below) help explain why the 🇦🇿🇮🇷 Azeri-Iranian relationship has deteriorated and what’s really behind the recent attack against 🇦🇿 Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran ⤵️ . . .
1️⃣ #Sociologically: Azerbaijan 🇦🇿 & Iran 🇮🇷 are very different societies. Iran’s regime has a hardline, old and extreme interpretation of Shia-religion, while Azerbaijan has a more modern interpretation (gender parity, customs etc). It lay at the root of many differences . . .
2️⃣ #Historically: Iran (& Russia) colonised Azeri and South Caucasian people, while today large Azeri communities continue to live inside of Iran, many of which have strong linguistic and cultural bonds to Azerbaijan and do not accept Tehran’s radical governance-style . . .
3️⃣ #Geographically: Azerbaijan is the central player in the Middle Corridor, which circumvents Iran & instead connects East-West without Tehran. Iran traditionally tries to sabotage all attempts at a “Turan alliance” between Türkiye, Azerbaijan and other geo-Turkic nations . . .
However, the concept of a Turan alliance (or Middle Corridor) wasn’t seen as credible throughout recent history. That changed in 2022, when maritime freight prices increased and the Russian North Corridor became inoperable (physically & economically) due to Ukraine🇺🇦 war . . .
Today, TEU diverted trade to #Central#Asia#Caucasus#Türkiye#Balkans is substantial (EC figures) and Baku has become a major EU energy provider. Moreover, the 2023 @EBRD impact assessment is laying the grounds for major 🇪🇺 Global Gateway investments in Caspian/Türkiye+. . .
#Iran 🇮🇷 is not part of this plan, because Tehran:
❌ decided to support Russia’s invasion
❌ send drones against Ukraine
❌ integrate Moscow into its energy market
❌ go against UN 🇺🇳 JCPOA
“Iran 🇮🇷 chose its path, and now tries to sabotage all of us”: ret. 🇹🇷 diplomat . . .
4️⃣ 🇦🇲#Armenia/#Türkiye: traditionally #Iran supports Armenia, due to Iran’s fears of not being able to access the North-South corridor to Russia. Aggressive Iranian military exercises on the border (Oct) led to a joint 🇹🇷🇦🇿 Türkiye-Azerbaijan response in November.
5️⃣ #Military/#Israel: Since 2016, Israel has become the leading exporter to Azerbaijan of high-grade weapons systems and arms technology, while also upgrading 🇦🇿🇮🇱 intelligence and diplomatic/defence relations, since Azerbaijan is squeezed between aggressive neighbours 🇮🇷🇷🇺 . . .
The recent attacks by an extremist in Tehran against the Azeri embassy is likely to be the regime’s way of telling Baku not to be too “independent” or adventurous. Iran has a track record of using such indirect & violent methods.
1️⃣ Crimean Khans are “. . . descendants of the Golden Horde (Mongols of Lake Baykal) and vassals of the Ottoman sultans from 1475 until 1774, when that tie was (temporarily) severed as a prelude to their annexation and occupation by 🇷🇺 Czarist state in 1783” . . .
2️⃣ The maternal grandfather of Sultan Süleyman I (Magnificent) is believed to have been Chrimean Mengili I Giray. This helps explain why 16th Century Ottomans allowed for the Khan of Crimean Tatars to potentially succeed an Ottoman dynasty in case of no male heir . . .
#UK 🇬🇧 has decided to lift restrictions on arms exports to #Turkey 🇹🇷. This is closely aligned with the on-going 🇬🇧🇹🇷🇮🇹 development of the #Eurofighter by BAE Systems for #Turkey 🇹🇷. #Italy 🇮🇹 #Spain 🇪🇸 #Germany 🇩🇪 may do the same soon, due to the 🇹🇷 Eurofighter production-links.
Some friends/colleagues and Twitter users texted questions on restrictions & wider problems, so here I clarify (I also speak on @trtworld next week):
1️⃣ UK 🇬🇧 has lifted its limited arms restrictions on Turkey 🇹🇷, but it’s not the first one to do so (others may follow) . . .
2️⃣ Why do arms restrictions exist in the first place? Some #EU 🇪🇺 members imposed limited restrictions on arms export licences to 🇹🇷, due to:
- #Eastmed tensions with 🇩🇪🇫🇷🇬🇷🇨🇾
- 🇹🇷 unilateral action in Syria, which could create more migration & positively impact Daesh . . .
1️⃣📚To better understand the strategic difficulties and inherent competition between Turkey and Russia, please read: warontherocks.com/2020/04/dont-f… . . .
2️⃣📚To better understand Turkey’s historical and structural competition with Russia, please read (it’s easy and reasonable: Wikipedia!): en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_o… . . .
This week’s violence & protests in East #Tajikistan is happening because of existing & new social-economic, geo-political & historical dynamics.
[18-points🧵]
⏩ Historical context
⏩ Protest
⏩ Remittences & COVID
⏩ Geo-Afghanistan
⏩ Local expert & voices to follow
👇⬇️
Historical context: Tajikistan’s 🇹🇯 civil war lasted from 1992 until 1997. The Lali Badakhshan party (part of United Tajik Opposition) represented an important element of the East Tajikistan faction from the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region(GBOA) located in the Pamir area . . .
The GBOA in Eastern Tajikistan borders Afghanistan to the South, China to the East and Kyrgyzstan to the North and has long been supporting the rights and representation of ethnic minorities (Pamiris) in the country . . .
1️⃣ KRG @masrour_barzani met @RTErdogan this weekend to discuss 🇹🇷’s military operation and gas exportation (🇮🇶>🇹🇷&🇪🇺)
Yesterday Barzani visited London. He seeks purchasing guarantees, investment & reassurances against Iran 🇮🇷/PKK, as both are against the exportation of Iraq gas.
2️⃣ The 🇹🇷 operation aims to eliminate PKK strongholds, incl. training camps and ammunition/storage facilities in Zap, Avasin, Metina & Basyan. KRG Peshmerga support it and 🇹🇷 uses drones, land-to-air and limited ground troops. For the moment, it’s not engaging Sinjar nor Kandil.