1- Five days after the first spark, it’s obvious that while protest are spreading, they’re becoming more violent and this could be seen in the videos shared on social media. In accordance, the government is still caught by surprise
2- Pres. Rouhani knows well that his government was the target of the first demos organized by his principalist opponents, later the protest went out of control and the whole establishment became the target, he’s now expected to defend the whole system
3- we have to take into consideration that there are lobbies functioning within the IRI that previously clashed over who is going to be the president and how the country would be ran, and are currently battling to impose their choice for SL’s succession
4- Rouhani is currently one of the strongest candidate for the position if it becomes vacant. Yet, given Ay. Khamenei’s latest visit to Kermanshah, his latest activities, all suggest he’s in good health and the succession battle might take years to start.
5- Rouhani’s rivals want him away from the race, but the situation rather than being a threat to him could end up as an opportunity to prove himself as “the” candidate for the role. Another issue is that the other camp doesn’t really have a strong name.
6- I’ve been visiting Iran for years, lived there several times, and as an outsider I was able to spot gradual changes taking place in the country during these years. From social freedoms to religious practices even to how people are developing their food behavior.
7- Wrt to Hijab 🧕, women could be seen in cars without veil, even in restaurants some didn’t care much to wear it as before, this came in accordance with SL’s positive comments on non-Hijabi women, Qassem Suleimani did the same al-monitor.com/pulse/en/origi…
8- and recently the Police in Tehran said women will no longer be arrested for not wearing a hijab. nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworl…
9- In politics, the reformist and moderate camp are almost in full control of the country’s day to day politics, they won the general election, secured a second term for Rouhani, and won the local elections in main cities.
10- recently, Ali Shamkhani, Iran’s National Security Council secretary, told reporters that conditions of reformist leaders house arrest are to be eased.
11- This is to say, some of what the reformist wanted to get in2009 in the streets, they succeeded in getting it through the polls. Part of the reform camp regards itself once again as part of the regime, and this prompts them to distance themselves from the events
12- another issue worth mentioning is that Iran’s political landscape was in the middle of a grand transition, radicals on both sides of the political arena were losing ground for moderates. The radical conservative camp is sidelined and so the radical greens
13- this was itself an act of preparing the ground for any future change on the higher levels. 80 million Iranians are set to cross together such a bridge, and they won’t be able to cross it radically, they needed pragmatists.
14- the blend bringing together Larijani, Rouhani, Zarif, Aref, and many others was seen as appropriate for the time, yet people wanted them to provide better life, hence create jobs, develop the economy. They thought JCPOA will help achieve that
15- JCPOA setbacks, high expectations not met, continuous threats by Trump to void the deal, the common feeling within some Iranians that their money is being spent regionally while they need it, corruption, wide gaps between rich and poor, all created a case
16- the case for protest was available , the accelerators were those who wanted Rouhani slashed away, and when things went out of control, regional and international powers opposed to Iran’s policies made sure to provide the protesters with the needed media support
17- In the Gulf, for example, the exaggeration reached a point were the regime is collapsing and army officers defecting (Fmr Dubai prosecutor Dhahi Khalfan) or Ay. Khamenei’s son fleeing (Hamsayeh show on Saudi TV)
18- while foreign media were covering the events in accordance with their political agendas, official Iranian media failed in engaging with people at any level, and by limiting access to social media the government lost an important channel to reach people
19- now that the situation is still developing, the absence of clear leadership for the protesters, the contradicting slogans raised (monarchy, republic, MKO,) the high stakes (regime change), the government’s response, all are issues to be taken into consideration
20- such a situation puts Iran in front of different scenarios that need to be studied each alone. I’m not good at forecasting.
Thanks for your time.