1. The inter-Korean joint declaration is a momentous event that represents Moon’s vision for peaceful coexistence with North Korea. The full text contains exhilarating possibilities & deep pitfalls. Follow along as I go through it in detail (1/20+). Text: m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/conten…
2. Let’s start at the end, with denuclearization. This simple statement does not expand on previous North Korean declarations. It could have been helpful to give US negotiators a head start with in-principle definitions of “complete" denuclearization,— 
3.—acceptance of an urgent timetable, verification, missile & nuclear test freeze. But DPRK has always insisted on negotiating nuclear issues with the US. Leaving the nuclear issue is preferable to getting boxed in to disadvantageous language that would have to be scrapped later.
4. Still, this language is a clear step back from the 2005 Joint Statement's “verifiable denuclearization… DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and returning to the NPT. state.gov/p/eap/regional…
5. We are not yet back to the 2012 Leap Day agreement: “a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activity at Nyongbyon,” + IAEA monitoring. Less than a month later, DPRK announced an Unha-3 satellite launch, and the deal collapsed.
6. Phased conventional disarmament (§3.2) is a welcome provision. Tension reduction measures and a stand down of offensive forces could decrease the risk of accidents and incentives to move first to war. It will be slow going, but its importance should not be overlooked.
7. The peace treaty section (§3.3) is a significant coup for Kim. During the Obama/Park era, a peace agreement was thought of as a reward for denuclearization, coming at the end of a process. The US had rejected China’s suggestion of parallel denuclearization-peace treaty tracks.
8. Moreover, this formulation puts the two Koreas on a side against the United States. It is a difficult spot for the US. Either accept peace treaty discussions and sacrifice leverage or risk a serious split in a critical alliance. As I told the @WSJ:
9. The proposal for a peace regime is artificially enabled by the format of talks, only possible by bracketing denuclearization. If Trump prefers war to peaceful coexistence with a nuclear DPRK, the peace regime collapses. It is critical that the US+ROK get on the same page.
10. As I said to @CNN, Moon’s vision is “the right vision.” A peace regime would be tenuous, deterrence and containment a constant challenge, but a war would do far more to harm US, South Korean, and Japanese national security.
11. Back! Section 2 deals with tensions reductions measures, a much-needed initiative to keep us from cycling repeatedly back to the precipice of war. It is a hallmark of a strategy to manage a nuclear-armed North Korea and deserves real commitment.
12. In §2.1, a DMZ “peace zone” seems to refer to cessation of loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets. The English text does not imply other changes to DMZ. A minor concession to DPRK, which is more bothered by ROK's loudspeakers (off & on since 8/2015) than the other way around.
13. “All hostile acts” is a potential pitfall. It could lead to ROK reticence to participate in or authorize B-1B flights, amphibious operations in the East or West seas, or other signaling. North Korea could use virtually any exercise as a pretext for scrapping the declaration.
14. Allied exercises had grown increasingly provocative (incl. B-1B flights fas.org/blogs/security…). Moderating these exercises has been for the best. There was little to be gained by antagonizing Pyongyang. cnn.com/2017/10/24/opi…
15. §2.2 is in some ways the most dramatic provision and has been almost totally overlooked. By signing, North Korea tacitly acknowledges the NLL rather than its own MDL.
16. This is a substantial change from two years ago, when the DPRK MoFA told @nknewsorg, “The ‘NLL’ does not hold any ground of international law and it is an illegal line.” More here: nknews.org/2016/06/peace-…. Here is Wikipedia's map:
17. A breakthrough on the NLL question would remove a major pretext for North Korean aggression and provocation. It could pave the way for a drawdown of DPRK hovercraft forces, which had been expanding, and improved stability in the West Sea. beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korean-s…
18. North-South military talks can also substantially help lower the risk of war. DPRK rejected the South’s proposal for these talks 6/2017. nytimes.com/2017/07/17/wor… In 5/2016, the South rejected a similar proposal from the North. reuters.com/article/us-nor… That's real progress.
19. Section 1 of the declaration consists of measures to improve inter-Korean ties. §1.1 is one of the most opaque and sweeping provisions. Does it commit DPRK to honor the 2005 Joint Statement? Which agreements will be covered? Were they specified behind the scenes?
20. §3.3 appears to pave the way for a reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Zone NW of Seoul, which has been closed since 1/2016. No announcement was made along these lines, but the location of the new “liaison office” is probably no accident.
21. Familial reunions are a moral imperative and should inspire all Koreans. It is shameful that the North uses the pain of these families as a bargaining chip.
22. §1.6 is the most shocking. The 2007 declaration is the noonday height of Roh Moo-hyun's sunshine policy: noninterference in DPRK affairs, sweeping economic cooperation, tourism, and more. usip.org/sites/default/…
23. If implemented, it would constitute a dramatic reversal of ROK policy, replacing Blue House assurances that pressure will be maintained. It would require the contravention of many existing sanctions and would cause not just a gap but an outright, gaping fissure with the US.
24. Overall, it is an exhilarating vision of coexistence with North Korea that would make Americans and Koreans safer. But there are severe risks here to the alliance that could reconfigure Northeast Asia. For more on managing a nuclear DPRK, see here: tnsr.org/roundtable/pol…
