Russo-Ukrainian War: The World Blood Pump
Gradually, and then Suddenly
#Thread
by @witte_sergei
#NATORussiawar #Ukraine
/1
Since #Russia’s surprise decision to voluntarily withdraw from west bank #Kherson in the first week of November, there has been little in the way of dramatic changes to the frontlines in #Ukraine.
#NATORussiawar
/2
In part, this reflects the predictable late autumn weather in Eastern Europe, which leaves battlefields waterlogged and clogged with mud and greatly inhibits mobility.
/3
For hundreds of years, November has been a bad month for attempting to move armies any sort of significant distance, and like clockwork we started to see videos of vehicles stuck in the mud in #Ukraine.
/4
The return of static positional warfare, however, also reflects the synergistic effect of increasing #Ukrainian exhaustion along with a #Russian commitment to patiently attriting and denuding #Ukraine’s remaining combat capability.
/5
They have found an ideal place to achieve this in the #Donbas.
It has gradually become apparent that #Russia is committed to a positional attritional war, as this maximizes the asymmetry of their advantage in ranged fires.
/6
There is an ongoing degradation of #Ukraine warmaking ability which is allowing #Russia to patiently maintain the current tempo, while it organizes its newly mobilized forces for offensive action in the coming year, setting the stage for cascading and unsustainable Ukr losses.
/7
In Ernest Hemingway’s novel, The Sun Also Rises, a formerly wealthy, now down on his luck character is asked how he went bankrupt. “Two ways”, he replies, “gradually and then suddenly.” Someday we may ask how #Ukraine lost the war and receive much the same answer.
/8
Verdun Redux
It is safe to say that #western regime media has set a very low standard for reporting on the war in #Ukraine, given the extent to which the mainstream narrative is disconnected from reality.
#NATORussiawar
/9
Even given these low standards, the way the ongoing battle in #Bakhmut is being presented to the population is truly ludicrous. The Bakhmut axis is being spun to western audiences as a perfect synthesis of all the tropes of #Russian failure ...
/10
...in a nutshell, #Russia is suffering horrible casualties as it struggles to capture a small town with negligible operational importance. #British officials, in particular, have been highly vocal in recent weeks insisting that #Bakhmut has little to no operational value.
/11
The truth is the literal opposite of this story: #Bakhmut is an operationally critical keystone position in the Ukrainian defense, and #Russia has transformed it into a death pit which compels the #Ukrainians to sacrifice exorbitant numbers of men ...
/12
... in order to hold the position as long as possible. In fact, the insistence that #Bakhmut is not operationally significant is mildly insulting to the audience, both because a quick glance at a map clearly shows it at the heart of the regional road network, and because...
/13
... #Ukraine has thrown a huge number of units into the front there.
Let’s take a step back and consider #Bakhmut in the context of Ukraine’s overall position in the east.
/14
#Ukraine began the war with four operable defensive lines in the #Donbas, built up over the last 8 years both as part and parcel of the simmering war with the #LNR and #DNR, but also in preparation for potential war with #Russia.
/15
These lines are structured around urban agglomerations with road and rail links between each other, and can be roughly enumerated as follows:
#NATORussiawar #Donbass
by @witte_sergei
/16
The #Donbas is a particularly accommodating place to construct formidable defenses. It is highly urbanized and industrial (#Donetsk was the most urban oblast in #Ukraine prior to 2014, with over 90% of the population living in urban areas) ...
/17
... with cities and towns dominated by the typically robust Soviet buildings, along with prolific industrial complexes.
/18
#Ukraine has spent much of the last decade improving these positions, and the frontline settlements are riddled with trenches and firing positions that are clearly visible on satellite imagery. A recent video from the #Avdiivka axis demonstrates the extent of fortifications.
/19
So, let’s review the state of these defensive belts. The first belt, which ran roughly from #Severodonetsk and #Lysychansk to #Popasna, was broken in the summer by #Russian forces.
/20
#Russia achieved a major breakthrough at #Popasna and was able to begin the full rollup of this line, with #Lysychansk falling at the beginning of July.
#NATORussiawar
by @witte_sergei
/21
At this point, the frontline sits directly on what I have labeled as the 2nd and 3rd #Ukrainian defensive belts, and both of these belts are now heavily bleeding.
by @witte_sergei
/22
The capture of #Soledar by #WagnerPMC forces has severed the connection between #Bakhmut and #Siversk, while around #Donetsk, the heavily fortified suburb of #Marinka has been almost completely cleared of Ukrainian troops ...
/23
... and the infamous keystone #Ukrainian position in #Avdiivka (the place from which they shell Donetsk city’s civilian population) is being flanked from both directions.
The frontline around Avdiivka (map courtesy of MilitaryLand)
by @witte_sergei
/24
These positions are absolutely critical for #Ukraine to hold. The loss of #Bakhmut will mean the collapse of the last defensive line standing in the way of #Slavyansk and #Kramatorsk ...
/25
, which means #Ukraine’s eastern position will rapidly contract to its fourth (and weakest) defensive belt.
The #Slavyansk agglomeration is a far worse position for Ukraine to defend than the other belts, for several reasons.
/26
First and foremost, as the belt farthest to the west (and thus the farthest from the February 2022 start lines), it is the least improved and least fortified of the belts.
/27
Secondly, lots of the, shall we just say “good stuff” around #Slavyansk is to the east of the city, including both the dominating high ground and the major highways.
/28
All this to say, #Ukraine has been very anxious to hold the #Bakhmut line, as this is a vastly preferable position to hold, and accordingly they have been pouring units into the sector.
/29
The absurd levels of #Ukrainian force commitment in this area have been well noted, but just as a quick refresher, publicly available Ukrainian sources locate at least 34 brigade or equivalent units that have been deployed in the #Bakhmut area.
/20
Many of these were deployed months ago and are already shattered, but over the full span of the ongoing battle this represents an astonishing commitment.
#NATORussiawar #Bakhmut #Artyomovsk
by @witte_sergei
/31
#Russian forces, primarily #WagnerPMC and #LNR units, have been slowly but surely collapsing this #Ukrainian stronghold by making liberal use of artillery.
/32
In November, now former #Zelensky advisor Oleksiy #Arestovych admitted that #Russian artillery on the #Bakhmut axis enjoyed roughly a 9 to 1 tube advantage, which is turning Bakhmut into a death pit.
/33
The battle is being presented in the west as one where #Russians - usually stereotyped as convict soldiers employed by #WagnerPMC - launch frontal assaults on #Ukrainian defenses and take horrible casualties attempting to overwhelm the defense with pure numbers.
/34
The opposite is much closer to the truth.#Russia is moving slowly because it irons out #Ukrainian defenses with artillery, then pushes forward cautiously into these pulverized defenses.
/35
#Ukraine, meanwhile, continues to funnel units in to more or less refill the trenches with fresh defenders. A Wall Street Journal piece about the battle, while trying to present a story of #Russian incompetence ...
/36
...accidentally included an admission from a #Ukrainian commander on the ground who said: “So far, the exchange rate of trading our lives for theirs favors the #Russians. If this goes on like this, we could run out.”
/37
The comparisons have been liberally made (and I cannot take credit for them) to one of the most infamous battles of World War One - the bloody catastrophe at Verdun.
/38
While it does not do to exaggerate the predictive value of military history (in the sense that a thorough knowledge of the first world war does not allow one to predict events in #Ukraine) ...
/39
I am, however, a great fan of history as analogy, and the #German scheme at Verdun is a useful analogy for what’s happening in #Bakhmut.
by @witte_sergei
/40
The Battle of #Verdun was conceived by the #German high command as a way to cripple the #French army by drawing them into a preconfigured meatgrinder.
/41
The notion was to attack and seize crucial defensive high ground - ground so important that #France would be forced to counterattack and attempt to recapture it.
/42
The #Germans hoped that #France would commit their strategic reserves to this counterattack so that they could be destroyed. While #Verdun failed to completely sap French combat power, it did become one of the most bloody battles in world history.
/43
A German coin commemorating the battle depicted a skeleton pumping blood out of the earth - a chilling but apt visual metaphor.
“The World Blood Pump” - commemorating the meatgrinder at Verdun
by @witte_sergei
/44
Something similar has indeed occurred in #Bakhmut, in the sense that #Russia is pressing on one of the most sensitive points on the front line, drawing #Ukrainian units in to be killed.
/45
A few months ago, on the heels of #Russia’s withdrawal from west bank #Kherson, the #Ukrainians talked ecstatically of continuing their offensive efforts with a strike southward in #Zaparozhia to cut the land bridge to #Crimea ...
/46
... along with continued efforts to break through into northern #Lugansk. Instead, forces from both of these axes have been redirected to #Bakhmut, to the point where this axis is actively draining #Ukrainian combat strength in other areas.
/47
#Ukrainian sources, previously full of optimism, now unequivocally agree that there will be no Ukrainian offensives in the near future. As we speak, Ukraine continues to funnel forces into the #Bakhmut axis.
/48
At the present moment, #Ukraine’s position around #Bakhmut has badly deteriorated, with #Russian forces (largely #WagnerPMC infantry supported by Russian army artillery) making substantial progress on both of the city’s flanks.
/49
On the northern flank, the capture of #Soledar pushed #Russian lines to within spitting distance of the north-south highways ...
/50
... while the near simultaneous capture of #Klishchiivka on the southern flank has propelled the frontlines to the dootstep of Chasiv Yar (firmly in #Bakhmut’s operational rear).
/51
The contact line around #Bakhmut, Jauary 20, 2023 (Map and article by @witte_sergei )
/52
The #Ukrainians are not presently encircled, but the continued creep of #Russian positions ever closer to the remaining highways is easily discernable. Currently, Russian forces have positions within two miles of all the remaining highways.
/53
Even more importantly, #Russia now controls the high ground to both the north and south of #Bakhmut (the city itself sits in a depression surrounded by hills) giving Russia fire control over much of the battle space.
/54
I* am currently anticipating that #Russia will clear the #Bakhmut-#Siversk defensive line by late March. Meanwhile, the denuding of #Ukrainian forces on other axes raises the prospect of decisive Russian offensives elsewhere.
*by @witte_sergei
/55
At the moment, the front roughly consists of four main axes (the plural of axis, not the bladed implement), with substantial agglomerations of #Ukrainian troops.
/56
These consist, from south to north, of the #Zaporozhia, #Donetsk, #Bakhmut, and #Svatove Axes (see map below). The effort to reinforce the Bakhmut sector has noticeably diluted #Ukranian strength on these other sectors.
/57
On the #Zaporozhye front, for example, there are potentially as few as five #Ukrainian brigades on the line at the moment.
/58
At the moment, the majority of #Russian combat power is uncommitted, and both western and #Ukrainian sources are (belatedly) becoming increasingly alarmed about the prospect for a Russian offensive in the coming weeks.
/59
Currently, the entire #Ukrainian position in the east is vulnerable because it is, in effect, an enormous salient, vulnerable to attack from three directions.
/60
Two operational depth objectives in particular have the potential to shatter #Ukrainian logistics and sustainment. These are, respectively, #Izyum in the north and #Pavlograd in the South.
by @witte_sergei
/61
A #Russian thrust down the west bank of the Oskil river towards #Izyum would simultaneously threaten to cut off and destroy the #Ukrainian grouping on the #Svatove axis (S on the map) and sever the vital M03 highway from #Kharkov.
/62
Reaching #Pavlograd, on the other hand, would completely isolate the #Ukrainian forces around #Donetsk and sever much of Ukraine’s transit across the #Dnieper.
/62
Both #Izyum and #Pavlograd are roughly 70 miles from the start lines of a prospective #Russian offensive, and thus offer a very tempting combination - being both operationally significant and in relatively manageable reach.
/63
Beginning yesterday, we started to see #Russian advances on the #Zaporozhye axis. While these consist, at the moment, mainly of reconnaissance in force pushing into the “grey zone” (that ambiguous interstitial frontage) ...
/64
#Russian MoD did claim several settlements taken, which could presage a genuine offensive push in this direction. The key tell would be a Russian assault on Orikhiv, which is a large town with a genuine #Ukrainian garrison in it.
/65
A #Russian attack here would indicate that something more than a probing attack is underway.
It is difficult sometimes to parse out the difference between what we predict will happen and what we want to happen.
/66
This, certainly, is what I would choose if I was in charge of #Russian planning - a drive south along the west bank of the Oskil river on the #Kupyansk-#Izyum axis, and a simultanious attack northward past #Zaporozhia towards #Pavlograd.
/67
In this case, I* believe simply screening #Zaporozhye in the short term is preferable to getting bogged down in an urban battle there.
Whether #Russia will actually attempt this, we do not know.
*by @witte_sergei
/68
#Russian operational security is much better than either #Ukraine’s or their proxy forces (#WagnerPMC and the #LNR/#DNR Milita), so we know significantly less about Russia’s deployments than we do about Ukraine’s.
/69
Regardless, we know that #Russia enjoys a strong preponderance of combat power right know, and there are juicy operational targets within range.
/70
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