We will be live tweeting the presentations from @MChalmers_RUSI, Professor John Louth and Professor Peter Roberts debating the Modernising Defence Programme. Thread below.
@MChalmers_RUSI at @RUSI_org: If we have learnt no other lesson from MDP, it’s that you should not start a defence review without a viable exit strategy - a credible means of bringing it to an end 
@MChalmers_RUSI at @RUSI_org: After twelve years between 1998 and 2010 where we did not have enough defence reveries, we may now be in danger of having too many... even if the MDP concludes soon, Defence may find itself pitched into another alongside the 2019 spending review.
@MChalmers_RUSI at @RUSI_org: The reputational costs of this long uncertainty in British Defence may be hard to measure, but one only has to look at Defence Secretary Mattis’ recent letter to know that they are considerable.
@MChalmers_RUSI at @RUSI_org: France is better at managing the reputation of their armed forces, despite not getting 2% of GDP for defence until 2024. We could learn from them.
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: Even the future force structures of the United States are unaffordable. This is not a unique problem. But in the UK we have three frontline commands planning force structures to fight three different types of futures wars they would like to fight.
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: Each single service chief has made statements in the past year about the changing nature of the world and the threats we face. Yet none can answer the question of how they want to fundamentally change their force structures to meet these changes.
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: We in the UK need some intellectual honesty and curiosity. We need to properly discuss whether a four-square division is the right answer, whether a carrier strike group is the right answer, whether an 8+2 squadron mix is the right answer.
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: Whether in terms of people or platforms, there is a huge demand for and dependence on access to data in volumes which are currently unfunded.
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: What to expect from MDP; A rebaselining of Joint Force 2025, maybe some new force structures such as a new equivalent to the Joint Harrier Force for the F-35. But at some point Defence will have to stop buying what it is now and take risks.
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: The @BritishArmy is ahead of the other services in re-imagining core force structures in terms of future concepts. Not in the equipment programme yet but conceptually they are in a good place.
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: The offerings from Joint Forces Command and the @RoyalAirForce must now incorporate space and possibly ballistic missile defence but fitting these into the budget available without significant other losses is nearly impossible
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: Theatre entry capability may simply go. The capabilities required against the latest threats may simply becoming unaffordable. The military and politicians are not talking the same language here where it matters.
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: Major capability announcements may come out, buzzwords will no doubt abound. But major announcements on F-35 numbers, readiness levels, training and exercises are unlikely to feature.
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: We may see an emphasis on regaining a leading ASW role with new P-8 MPAs and Type 26 but these are the same scarce assets are being counted on for myriad other roles around the world...
Prof Peter Roberts at @RUSI_org: I’m not sure at the moment whether MDP yet takes into account realistically enough the way in which future soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen will pay the price in future wars if we get it wrong.
Prof John Louth at @RUSI_org: The sources of the MDP were SDSR 2015 coupled with a new Secretary of State in 2017. SDSR 2015 was clear on a sustained, funded plan for 138 F-35s, 2 carriers, 4 deterrent subs, Typhoon extended to 2040, 50,000 deployable force with two brigades...
Prof John Louth at @RUSI_org: The confidence of SDSR 2015 now seems like a distant dream. In retrospect, it was hubris, a sham - especially the promise that it was sustainable funded and accurately costed.
With the defence budget we have, and the threats we face, the ‘answer’ from 2015 is unaffordable. If something is unaffordable, we need a higher budget, or less programme.
Prof John Louth at @RUSI_org: with shortfalls in the 2015 equipment plan, an ambition for a new defence space programme, beefed up offensive cyber, BMD for the UK, and as yet unfound historically promised ‘efficiency savings’ add up to a £45.5Bn EP shortfall over the next decade.
Prof John Louth at @RUSI_org: If Russia is the clear and present danger to @NATO as @GavinWilliamson has stated, how do we deter? We know from the opening of the Soviet archives post Cold War the NATO readiness, preparation and lethality were critical.
Prof John Louth at @RUSI_org: ..and yet we know that typical NATO tactical evaluations in central Germany during the late Cold War planned for 100,000s of casualties before victory or nuclear war. We don’t plan this way now, and training an exercise budgets are raided for savings
Prof John Louth at @RUSI_org: an uplift to 2.5% of GDP for Defence would certainly help. Even half of this (£4.5bn p/a) would buy out most of the shortfalls are shopping list items I mentioned. It is not the whole answer but an uplift is required. Hope is NOT a strategy.
We are now moving to the discussion which is off the record as per the RUSI rule.
