[Thread] 1. I've been trying to figure out the source of MBS's extreme hatred/fear of #JamalKhashoggi. For starters, it's key to note that though JK had a long track record in journalism, he was also a political actor. >
2. He's had close ties to Prince Turki al-Faisal (fmr longtime head of Saudi intelligence, more recently ambo in London & DC) & to other non-MBS royals. It's also no secret he recently had good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, >
3. a historic, transnational organiz'n containing a number of trends. E.g. the MB branches in Egypt & Palestine participated in elections & committed to an electoral process (& both suffered much for that), while that in Syria has been much more committed to violence. >
4. In the past 18 months or so, in addition to picking up the interesting gig as a contributor to @WaPo's Global Opinions, he has reportedly been planning for creation of a pro-democracy movement focused on Saudi Arabia. >
5. So it seems this, based on the broad reach of JK's connections both inside & outside the eponymous "Saudi" royal family, aroused MBS's v. intense ire. Easy to see how MBS wd be spooked to learn of opposition to his already-grisly & maniacal dictatorship from his cousins, >
6. But the combination of intra-family oppositn with extra-family opposition from e.g. pro-MB networks was likely seen by MBS & his enforcers as so incendiary as to justify "extreme measures" such as reportedly were taken. I knew JK just a little.>
7. Back in '05, I was running an international workshop on nonviolence at/with the UN University's (now-defunct) campus in Amman, Jordan. It was a weird experience. But w/ encouragement from the people running that UNU program I went to see then-ambo Turki in his DC office >
8. to see if we could get his approval for some Saudi citizens to attend. (Yes, it was a weird experience, as many UN operations are.) Turki called in his "advisor", JK, to attend that meeting & to my surprise said JK himself wd take part in the 2-day workshop. Not exactly >
9. the kind of "young citizen activist" we'd had in mind, but I'd done enough "Track 2" diplomatic things by then that I thought getting a foot in the KSA door seemed a good thing. JK did come to the workshop & took part in all the exercises etc with good humor. >
10. So of course it's been v. shocking to learn via the Turkish-govt leaks about the unspeakable things MBS's goons reportedly did to Jamal in the consulate. RIP; and my deep condolences to his fiancee & the rest of his family. But again-- WHY this extreme brutality, which now >
11. looks very counter-productive indeed & also (since we have to assume that MBS is not entirely stupid) must have been viewed as very risky indeed when he & his goons were planning it. So why? I think the threat they saw Jamal as posing was not only from the "Al-Saud" cousins >
12. But also from his ties to MB-linked circles given that in many contexts the MB has proven to be effective in building grassroots civilian movements that offer a *modern* form of Islam to Muslims, thus competing directly with his claims to be a "modernizer". Also, the MB >
13. has kept to the very traditional Muslim opposition to any form of (inheritable) monarchy; does not believe in either kings or princes, and promotes traditional Islamic virtues of egalitarianism. I don't know what support the MB has among Saudi citizens. >
14. Maybe it's like the Falun Gong in China: An autocratic government will always fear self-organizing citizen movements. But I do know that very many Saudi citizens are outraged by the profligacy of the royals, the double standards they enjoy; and many Saudis are also >
15. deeply offended by the ease with which so many royals flout the basic tenets of their faith and flaunt their wealth domestically & in international settings. So the constituency for an MB-type movement is almost certainly there, both among Saudi citizens & >
16. among many of their non-Saudi hired hands. If someone cd create an alliance between non-MBS royals v angry at his usurpation of their powers, privileges, boondoggles, & bottom lines and a potential popular movement inside "Saudi" Arabia (aka the Arabian Peninsula), >
17. then that wd be explosively threatening to MBS & justify him & his goons taking great risks. I should note tho tht ever since King Faisal was killed by a nephew (w CIA ties??) in 1975, no Saudi king has *ever* taken on the challenge of governing with any seriousness & hence >
18. for > 40 years, *very* few Saudi princes have received any serious training in the arts of governance or anything else socially useful except libertinism and idleness. So the "bench" of princes capable of envisaging a persuasive alternative to MBS or planning >
19. its implementation is thin, indeed. What does all this mean? Well, clearly, there is a crisis in Saudi-US relations (based as they are primarily on the Saudis giving massive dollops of $$ to US businesses/consultancies/etc.) & this is almost certainly spooking Saudi royals >
20. & the few other members of the country's elite who are worth counting as players, very deeply indeed. MBS has worked hard & fast over the almost 4 years since his Dad became "King", to cut off access to levers of power from being held by anyone else except himself >
21. & that almost certainly also includes his deeply geriatric Dad. But might Dad be able to disavow this son and switch the designation of "Crown Prince" elsewhere? In a crisis like this, he loyalties of the heads of the ctry's various security orgs are crucial. >
22. In this sense, the atmosphere inside Riyadh today is almost certainly Shakespearean: Julius Caesar; Macbeth; Richard II... I wish I had time to write more about this. But stay tuned for lots more news coming out of Riyadh in the coming days & weeks.
