Yesterday, "the Good ISIS" released a new report on Iran’s nuclear program, using evidence from the Israeli-seized “Atomic Archive” in Tehran to cast doubt on Iran’s intentions: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… But the major points are not new and reinforce the case for JCPOA. 1/9
The ISIS report strangely frames its analysis around the 2007 NIE which judged that Iran had ended its nuclear weapons work in 2003. If this is your prior, then it would be important to learn that Iran continued nuclear weapons work after that date. But we already knew that. 2/9
In 2010, Obama administration officials, as well as US allies, concluded that work on nuclear weapons had indeed continued, albeit “on a smaller scale.” Indeed, this was part of the logic for ratcheting up the sanctions which ultimately led to JCPOA. nytimes.com/2010/01/03/wor… 3/9
Likewise, as the ISIS report itself notes, in 2011 the IAEA determined that “some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.” 4/9
As a result, while there are some interesting new details that came out of the “Atomic Archive,” such as Iran’s purported plan to develop five nuclear devices, etc, we already knew the most important point: that Iran continued some nuclear weapons-related work post-2003. 5/9
What the ISIS report does *not* provide is evidence that Iran has an active nuclear weapons program today, which would be an obvious violation of the JCPOA that would call for major enforcement action. 6/9
It bears repeating that the entire reason the JCPOA exists is because Iran was previously *known* to have a nuclear weapons program and that the deal remains the best available option for preventing Iran from getting the bomb. 7/9
The agreement has dramatically scaled back Iran’s program, extended its breakout time, and greatly increased international oversight. It also provides a process for snapping back sanctions in the case of a violation, which US could have used had it stayed in the deal. 8/9
Making a major issue out of *past* nuclear weapons work—which again, was already largely known to the US and IAEA—is a stalking horse for efforts to kill the JCPOA and return to “maximum pressure” on Iran. 9/9
