In an attempt to start 2019 in a minimally optimistic way I studiously avoided Bolsonaro’s inauguration and the first acts of his new government. However, it’s probably time for some reflections on where his government – and Brazil – are heading. Brace yourself (/Long thread 😬)
Bolsonaro’s rhetoric throughout his career, during the election campaign and in the first days of his administration have been violent, authoritarian and clearly aimed at silencing vulnerable and minority groups and those who seek to represent their interests
All evidence suggests that he means everything he says. There is, of course, a calculated MO here. He deliberately makes shocking statements that simultaneously excite his small base and generate controversy, feeding a larger culture war that brings many more people to his side
This strategy is no doubt lifted directly from the Trump playbook. But Bolsonaro is not Trump. He’s not a post-modern billionaire celebrity with ADD, he’s a petty functionary with a Cold War ideology and an authoritarian personality
Ie. There may be some showmanship involved, but all evidence suggests we should take him at his word. (Nb. Let's be clear, the “liberal” commentators who have downplayed Bolsonaro’s threat to democracy are accomplices to whatever happens next)
However, B's authoritarian instincts certainly don’t mean he’ll be able to – or even actually need to – dismantle the institutions of Brazilian democracy in pursuit of his project
Although elite actors in and outside the state (the legislature, judiciary, military, financial/industrial/agro capital etc) have largely moved in sync since 2016 there are major differences of interest and some checks and balances within and between them
Bolsonaro (or, if he falls, the factions of the military that he has brought into power) do not currently have the power to collectively subordinate these actors to an explicitly authoritarian government.
This could definitely change with events. Economic deterioration, unrest in the streets, some kind of unexpected event (eg. major clashes with organised crime) could generate support for a coup across elite factions. But we’re nowhere close to that at the moment imo
However, what the liberal commentators misunderstand is that B doesn’t need to shut down the supreme court or suspend elections to comprehensively debase Brazilian democracy. All he needs to do is outsource repression of dissent to mobilised supporters and parastatal actors
I’ve called this the “Colombianisation” of Brazilian politics. It’s the systematic and targeted silencing of leftist leaders through violence and intimidation, fundamentally altering the political balance of power in the country. It’s already well underway
What the election revealed is that Bolsonaro has managed to assemble what Deleuze and Guattari called a “war machine” – a dispersed mass of “nomadic” actors who defy control by the state, but who can act in more or less collective and highly destructive ways.
These might be angry online trolls, young men who beat up protestors and gay people in the streets, or militias who assassinate leftwing politicians. All of these groups existed before, but they were not aligned to a national political project that could guide and protect them
It's hard to say what happens from here. The state of the economy and events could create conditions for a coup within this term. More likely, I think B will govern, & he and his war machine will demoralise the left, within the parameters of an ostensibly democratic state
(What happens if and when B loses popularity or fails to achieve reelection in 2022 is another question. It looks likely that his war machine would not accept electoral defeat. Only the balance of forces if and when this happens will determine the outcome)
In the meantime, expect the living conditions and personal freedoms of low-income, black and indigenous Brazilians, women and LGBT groups to be systematically downgraded. Expect murders committed by police and militias to rise, with no increase in prosecutions.
Expect the assassination of social movement leaders and the imprisonment of leftist politicians on trumped-up charges
These will all be treated as discrete phenomena – as necessary consequences of necessary reforms, or as isolated incidents involving specific individuals. But they are all the intended outcomes of B's political project, clearly understood by those who make up his war machine
The only way the left can prevent this is by creating its own war machine. I’m not talking about violence, I’m talking about a decentralised ecology of grassroots movements acting independently, but with a shared vision and loose but committed affiliation to a political project
The left must cease to be a centralised, institutionalised bloc and become molecular, just as the right has become. It must act in unpredictable ways, make new arguments and build new connections and resonances with ordinary people.
For this reason, although Lula can be part of this movement, he shouldn’t be at its centre. The left needs to stop looking like something familiar and start looking like an alternative again, like something radical enough for the present circumstances
Decision-making and communication on the left need to be redistributed, particularly towards young people. Lower-middle and working-class kids have given B's war machine much of its current dynamism, but their natural place is on the left. They'll come back, if they're allowed to
Effective resistance to B's project will not come from the mainstream media, congress or "adults" in his administration. It also won't come from the PT high command passing down official communiques to be repeated ad nauseum by supporters
It will come from emergent arguments and subjectivities that can proliferate on their own, that make sense to people because it's spoken in their own language. These should be guided by a political project, not controlled by a political party.
Brazil's left cannot go backwards, as much as it might like to. It should make a virtue of that, and embrace the future.
