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The statement re France refusing to extend deterrence is not what figures in our "6 taboos" piece: best to refer to the original. The credible extension of deterrence implies (1) that the deterree (Russia) believes it to be so; (2) that the deterrer (France) is able+willing 1/2
(3) that the extendee (Germany or EU) wants it and is ready to enable it in terms of mission support. Russia will be deterred only if French array is reconfigured for broadened mission. France dropped a narrowly national definition of vital interests more than 40 years ago. (2/3)
Broadening deterrence should be doable politically (but will imply new costs, possibly forward conventional+nuke deployment, mutual consultation); Germany would have to answer hard burdensharing questions (incl. possible presence of platforms and/or warheads). 3/3 End of thread
