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And so it was, some ~16 hours later. Analysis from:
@38NorthNK: 38north.org/2019/03/sohae0…
@CSISKoreaChair: beyondparallel.csis.org/hanoi-summit-r…
Conclusions of both: LPE test stand superstructure reconstituted; launch pad rail-mounted staging building also reconstituted.
#NorthKorea
@38NorthNK: 38north.org/2019/03/sohae0…
@CSISKoreaChair: beyondparallel.csis.org/hanoi-summit-r…
Conclusions of both: LPE test stand superstructure reconstituted; launch pad rail-mounted staging building also reconstituted.
#NorthKorea
I’ve just filed a long piece on this for @nknewsorg, but some quick thoughts here. BLUF (since this is what most people care about): I *don’t* see this as an imminent sign of an SLV or ICBM launch. (No ICBMs have launched out of Sohae in the past.)
More: I see this as in the same genre as last November’s “ultramodern tactical weapon” test—a reminder of when times were worse and what stands to be lost if the process collapses.
But the Sohae Satellite Launching Center (SSLC) is different as a signal in a big way: OSINT North Korea nerds gawk at this sight weekly, if not daily. In this case, NIS tipped off the OSINT crowd, who were able to immediately and publicly verify it. That matters.
Also, timing matters: this dovetails with the narrative around the Hanoi outcome (bad summit, bad post-summit news), but the imagery tells a story that this took place amid the Biegun-Kim Hyok Chol working-level talks in the weeks leading up to Hanoi.
The big difference, IMO, is that this catalyzes Moon Jae-in to take his “mediator” role with even more urgency: reconstitution of the LPE and the launch pad structure runs contrary to an agreed provision of the Sept. 19, 2018, Pyongyang Declaration.
It’s possible that North Korea has made its mind up on replaying Leap Day Redux and announcing a new satellite launch, but I’m doubtful given the post-summit reaction. Choe Son Hui warned of KJU’s waning “will” and KJU himself warned the US not to test his “patience” on Jan 1.
Apart from violating UNSCRs (which Kim has obviously shown no problem with), North Korea’s unilateral moratorium only applies to ICBMs. Other missiles could be tested without violating the moratorium (though Trump likely doesn’t appreciate the distinction.)
The missiles have taken on a low profile amid the diplomacy and the “completion” of the deterrent in November 2017—remember the September parade? That same parade, however, featured a float with a space launch vehicle displayed.
We also have some evidence that North Korea has a new satellite launch vehicle—possibly based on the Hwasong-14/Hwasong-15—in the works behind the scenes. thediplomat.com/2018/01/why-no…
FWIW, “signaling” is real messy business and usually fails to work in the way the signaler would like. The November 2018 weapons test didn’t seem to work at all outside giving DPRK-watchers something to talk about.
Erratum in thread above: I misremembered the space-themed parade float. It did •not• display a launcher. As usual, @Joshua_Pollack has the receipts.
