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Relations between Uganda & Rwanda continue to deteriorate, which increases regional instability & could create security issues on ground in DRC Ebola-affected areas. “Kagame tells Jean Afrique that he foiled a terror attack from Uganda and Iran.” 1/ regionweek.com/kagame-tells-j…
In early March, Rwanda (R) closed the busiest border w/ UG, affecting trade between these countries & the region. Kagame accused UG of unlawful detainment & torture of R citizens, w/ a list of 20 submitted, & he refuses to open the border until they are returned. 2/
UG denies unlawful detention & torture & says those in detainment were accused of abduction charges. Kagame then strongly cautioned its citizens not to travel to UG bc it wasn’t safe. 3/
Kagame sent security forces to block anyone trying to cross border. In late March, a pregnant women was apparently chased, per Red Cross allegedly by R security, & died immediately once she crossed border. Ebola checkpoints are set up at border points. 3/ 
R Sec forces are now blocking footpaths where folks sneak across the porous border covertly. Then Kagame gives a very bizarre interview w/ Jean Afrique where he claims Museveni offered help to individuals & groups trying to attack & destabilize Rwanda. 4/
Kagame claims a Ugandan & an Iranian planned to exit f/ UG to attack Rwanda, & individuals f/ DRC, Burundi, South Africa, Canada, & Europe were implicated. 🤷🏼♀️ Museveni says that Rwanda is getting to “strike first,” while Kagame obviously thinks UG is. 5/
Museveni has accused Rwanda of training a militia to attack UG. While an all-our war is unlikely, the situation is very complicated by each country’s support of different militia groups in eastern DRC, many (& most problematic) w/ roots in the 94 genocide. 6/
In Dec 2018, DRC sent 2 top commandos in the FDLR (a militia composed of former Hutus who perpetrated the genocide) back to Uganda. 😳 Museveni was shocked bc DRC wasn’t very subtle here about UG support of this group. UG then sent them to Rwanda. 7/
The DRC UN Ambassador reported to UN Security Council that UG is one of the main sponsors of another anti-Rwandan group, P5, which poses “‘a great danger that could plunge DRC into yet another armed conflict.’” A UN report names Burundi as a weapons supplier to P5. 8/
UN report also named South Africa, New Zealand, China & others of supplying Burundi (a country now under a regime after pres violently orchestrated to extend his term in 2015 then aligned himself more w/ anti-Rwandan militias, also a country who experienced the 94 genocide). 9/
As the 25th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide is on 7 April 2019, tensions are high right now between UG & Rwanda & to a lesser amount in Ebola-affected areas. The militias shift f/ mostly ADF & Mai Mai around Beni/Butembo to Mai Mai & predominately anti-Rwandan around Goma.10/
There were some horribly brutal attacks in Jan-Feb by FDLR in the Masisi area in North Kivu. Somewhere between 11-20+ ran into river & drowned themselves rather than face the attacks. 2 police were beheaded. actualite.cd/2019/02/16/rdc… 30 were hospitalized for shock. 11/
Important not to demonize Hutus as tens of thousands were massacred by Tutsi militias & during the 1st Congo War (1996-7), where UG & Rwanda invaded to flush out Hutu genocidaires & 2nd Congo War (1998-2003), which started by UG & Rwanda invading DRC again for same reason. 12/
The First Congo War brought Kabila’s father to power (who was murdered in 2001, leaving the presidency to his son who was then elected twice) & the prime minster was President Tshisekedi’s father. The history of DRC is very complex. Moving on. 13/
Eastern DRC is v distrustful of both Rwanda & UG after the wars. The Kivu Conflict, which is still ongoing, started in 2004 when FDLR genocidaires & other Hutu extremists began to fight FARDC. CNDP, backed by Rwanda, rose up in 2006 to protect the Tutsis & fought FARDC also. 14/
In 2009, CNDP signed a peace agreement w/ DRC gov, became a political party, & split into 2 factions. After the joint mil offensive by Rwanda & DRC same year, the CNDP no longer existed. Most were reintegrated into DRC armed forces w/ some joining militias. 15/
In 2012, the M23 rebel group formed among mostly former CNDP members who defected f/ FARDC & turned against the gov. The UN found that M23 was backed by Rwandan gov, but UG was also accused. In 2013, US cut mil aid to Rwanda for child soldiers in M23. 16/
Rwanda is believed to have stopped giving any or much support to M23 after that. A peace agreement between DRC gov & M23 in 2013, and a regional agreement between 11 countries who agreed not to support armed groups in DRC was also signed this year. It didn’t hold. 17/
A demobilization, disarmament, repatriation, reintegration, & resettlement agreement (DDRRR) was launched in 2015. Even as late as last month, both M23 & FDLR are voluntarily being repatriated. dppa.un.org/en/security-co… 18/
Demobilization efforts aimed at armed groups continue but tend to fail bc even after sensitization, communities continue to keep a reserve of combatants so that they won’t be dominated. Great piece on that 👉🏾blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/20… 19/
The problems w/ armed groups in eastern DRC, considered by many to to be the most destabilizing force in the region, will continue so long as other countries & their leaders continue to finance them for mining interests, revenge related to the 94 genocide, or other reasons. 20/
Absent authority that’s capable of isolating & resolving hyper-local tensions & conflict, these things fester until they explode. The Ebola outbreak will not be resolved without an understanding of the nuances of local tensions & conflicts and the ability to resolve it. 21/
The unacknowledged mineral trade worth billions of dollars must be stopped bc no peace will come to eastern DRC & region until it’s done. There’s a fierce competition for land & mines between armed groups which causes attacks on communities & can exploit ethnic tensions. 22/
Tshisekedi recently stated that armed groups don’t stand for any ideology, & their actions are motivated by petty business interests (though he did state that the social context brought them to this point). He’s pushing for demobilization & reintegration programs (which is good).
In North Kivu, Hutus & anti-Rwandan militias are the majority. Anti-Rwandan & anti-Ugandan resentment runs deep there. Many don’t trust the new pres bc of perceived Kabila, Rwanda, &/or UG ties. Beni/Butembo were disenfranchised, & this likely would have given Fayulu the win. 24/
Now to end this complicated, long ass thread w/ good news. Maybe you’ve noticed the Beni area is calmer. ADF wants to sign a peace agreement w/ FARDC & has returned at least 36 hostages as a show of faith. Smiling. End/ afriqueinfomagazine.net/nord-kivu-adf-…
Need to emphasize something here to avoid confusion. The majority of Hutu have nothing to do with armed groups. Most of the violence in Ebola-affected areas is not coming f/ them. Also important to note that when armed groups attack, a mixture of several armed groups is the norm
The reason I concentrated on Tutsi & Hutu armed groups so much here is to explain what’s helping to fuel tensions between Rwanda & UG, how other countries are exploiting these tensions & how this impacts Ebola-affected areas as outbreak moves south to more areas w/ these probs.
*and the ability to resolve or work around them.
