Thread by @charliewinter

1. Since #IS issued its #SriLanka claim, there's been lots of discussion on a) whether it inspired/directed the attackers and b) whether it was in response to #Christchurch. These are interesting, important discussions to have, but we mustn't lose sight of the wood for the trees.

2. It is critical that we think about the overarching logic behind this attack, not just what happened and how it happened. I’ll be doing that over the next few tweets.

3. First of all, it is important to state that an attack like this has been coming for a lonnng time and #IS/#IS supporters are certain to have others planned. It was not just a response to #Christchurch (and nor will future attacks be).

4. This attack is part and parcel of #IS's post-protostate strategy. It gave up on the practical reality of its ‘state’ a long time ago, and its recent defeat in #Baghuz matters, but, in the grand scheme of things, could only be a marginal infraction on its global strategy.

5. That is because, between 2013 and 2018, #IS achieved what it needed for post-protostate survival: it established a global brand for itself and, consequently, a global platform to ensure its future. The statehood stuff was, in that sense, an enabler.

6. Since 2017, #IS has been telling us this—i.e., that its #Syria/#Iraq mobilisation was just an opportunity to kick-start something else. Whether or not it thought that at the time, #IS will now do all it can to show that it is can reap post-protostate dividends.

7. It will do/is doing that by: i) untethering its brand from #Syria/#Iraq (a process started in earnest in 2018); ii) re-intensifying ops in W/N/E Africa, AfPak and SE Asia; and iii) deploying terrorism wherever/whenever possible (started years ago; likely to accelerate now).

8. In short, now that #IS has been defeated in #Syria/#Iraq, it will likely become more violent outside of #Syria/#Iraq. In other words, as its core weakens, its peripheries will become more dangerous (and by ‘peripheries’ I mean both its affiliates AND its diffuse networks).

9. The strategic utility of terrorism—whenever, wherever, and however—has never been greater for #IS. It plugs the gap left by its protostate and gives it what it needs to sustain organisational and ideological inertia. It is critical that we take this into account.

10. It’s a grim outlook, but we are likely to see more attempts at attacks more regularly for the foreseeable future. #SriLanka was not a one-off. If anything, it was a test-run.

11. I expand on these ideas (and introduce a few more) in this piece I co-authored with @ajaltamimi. Do check it out if you have a moment.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…