Thread by @ProfPaulPoast

Motivated by this point from @ProfTalmadge, it's worth reviewing what we know about aerial bombing.

What say the data?

[THREAD]

https://twitter.com/ProfTalmadge/status/1139537613860290566

Pape's @CornellPress book, "Bombing to Win" set the stage for quantitatively evaluating bombing campaigns

books.google.com/books?id=xHZnT…

Pape provided a list!! Based on his reading of each case, the outcome of aerial bombing is a mixed bag: i.e. lots of "success" and "failures" in the "outcome" column.

For Pape, bombing alone doesn't really work. You need to complement the air bombing with ground forces. He refers to this as a "denial" strategy, specifically targeting military assets before rolling in troops.

The first Persian Gulf War is a key example:

Following the publication of "Bombing to Win", @SecStudies_Jrnl in 1997 published a symposium on the book.

In particular, Barry Watts of @northropgrumman wrote a piece where the title speaks for itself

tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

Watts essentially disagrees with how Pape coded some of the cases. Watt's main point is that recoding just a few cases will alter Pape's findings: strategic bombing works!

Needless to say, Pape counters -- or, more precisely, "strikes back" 🤦‍♂️

tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

Subsequent scholars continued the quantitative exploration of air power's effectiveness: was denial (e.g. close air support) or punishment (e.g. strategic bombing) the better strategy?

@mchorowitz & Reiter use multivariate analysis on the cases coded by Pape.

journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

They also included some new cases, such as the @NATO 1999 Kosovo campaign:

https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1113758443561717761

Their findings largely support Pape's findings (as you can see by the "LOTS OF STARS" and positive sign on the "denial" variable's coefficient)

While these studies looked as "success/failure", @lady_professor took the research a step further by looking at the duration of air campaigns.

journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

Adding new cases to the air campaign data and applying a hazard model, @lady_professor finds that democratic targets and denial strategies will SHORTEN a campaign (i.e. the positive coefficient means increasing the probability of ENDING the campaign)

@carlammm in @II_journal extended @lady_professor's analysis by considering how the use of ground troops modifies the duration of air campaigns. The short answer depends on the type of campaign -- selective targeting or less-discriminate targeting

tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

This table shows how @carlammm categorizes the campaign types

When selective, ground troops lead to longer campaigns (i.e. the planes are largely used for close-air support).

When less selective, ground troops end the campaign sooner (e.g., the WWII strategic bombing of Germany only ended when ground troops *finally* entered Germany)

Rather than focusing on air power DURING WAR, Abigail Post looks at whether and how the threat of air campaigns influences crisis bargaining short of war (you know, like what's happening right now b/w 🇺🇸& 🇮🇷)

journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

The data for crisis bargaining are drawn from Seschser's "Militarized Compellent Threats" database:

journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

What she finds is not encouraging.

Naval and land mobilizations during crisis bargaining seem effective at compelling compliance. Air mobilizations (such as deployment of air assets)? Not so much (i.e. NO STARS on the coefficient)

Most recently, @lady_professor & @carlammm in CMPS sought to reset the debate by collecting new data on all air campaigns in history.

journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

Using the new data, they confirm that punishment strategies don't really work.

To conclude?

First, Pape's original finding -- say NO to STRATEGIC BOMBING -- seems to hold up well.

Second, airpower alone won't do much. It needs to be coupled with ground troops. THAT is probably not a palpable option for resolving the current 🇺🇸v🇮🇷 crisis!

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