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The #Spitzenkandidat process is in its death throes, after the other big groups in the European Parliament declined to endorse the EPP's Manfred Weber, & leaders at last week's #EUCO European Council (apart from Merkel) discarded it.
This is a Good Thing. 1/20
The #Spitzenkandidat process is in its death throes, after the other big groups in the European Parliament declined to endorse the EPP's Manfred Weber, & leaders at last week's #EUCO European Council (apart from Merkel) discarded it.
This is a Good Thing. 1/20
The Spitzenkandidaten idea was: voters elect President of European Commission by proxy, with European Parliament a sort of electoral college counting the votes for pan-EU political parties; this would democratise the system and bring voters closer to EU's leadership. 2/20
In fact, it hasn't worked out like that. Here's why. 3/20
The first problem is: Spitzenkandidaten don't reflect the reality of how the EU is governed. When you have a consensual system which requires building grand coalitions at every stage, it is misleading to anoint one medium-sized faction as holding the mandate of the people. 4/20
The big gulf is between those who want the EU system to work and those who don't. Obviously the latter won't do the Spitzenkandidat process, which thus becomes a beauty contest among the faithful (a useful profile-raising platform), without much policy difference on offer. 6/20
Part of the problem: European Parliament groupthink sees the Council as the enemy; the Spitzenkandidat process is a tactic in the strategic turf war. But both Parliament *and* Council are democratically elected, and voters don't really care about their squabbles. 7/20
To appeal to voters, MEPs need to show how they differ from the *Commission*. That would be a strategic shift for the new Parliament. 8/20
Another part of this problem: President of Commission needs to derive authority from both Council and Parliament. Spitzenkandidat process removes agency from Council. It also outsources Parliament's decision to those in the largest parties who choose the Spitzenkandidaten. 9/20
It's not clear to me (having attended it) that the EPP Assembly meeting in Helsinki last November has greater moral legitimacy than 28 democratically elected governments to choose Europe's future leadership. 10/20
Another problem is that the sheer *length* of Spitzenkandidat campaigning is a disincentive to qualified candidates who already have jobs in *national* rather than EU politics, ie serving heads of state or government, or senior ministers. 11/20
Significant that all major Spitzenkandaten so far were either EU officials or no longer in government. In 2019, EPP chose between Weber MEP and Stubb, ex-PM and VP of the EIB; PES chose between two serving Commissioners, Timmermans and Šefčovič. (Greens & ECR chose MEPs.) 12/20
In 2014, EPP chose between ex-PM Juncker and former commissioner/minister Barnier; PES crowned Schulz, an MEP, without opposition; ALDE chose between serving commissioner Rehn and MEP/ex-PM Verhofstadt. 13/20
No prime minister (or minister) could have governed credibly at home for the last six months, while at the same time publicly campaigning for a new job. Only now that the Spitzenkandidat process is dying are we seeing some of the real heavyweight names being mentioned. 14/20
A third problem is that it hasn't worked. EPP, PES and ALDE all lost vote share in 2014, despite having high-profile Spitzenkandidaten. In 2019 EPP and PES, once more with Spitzenkandidaten, lost vote share again, while liberals chose no Spitzenkandidat and *gained* votes. 15/20
Obviously there are other factors! (And also admittedly overall voter turnout increased 2014-19; and Greens with two Spitzenkandidaten both times, saw slight drop in vote in 2014, but increase in 2019.) 16/20
But if Spitzenkandidaten were supposed to improve voter engagement, it's not at all clear that the process passes that test - or perhaps, not at all clear that the "right' voters are being engaged, as vote for anti-system parties significantly increased in 2014 *and* 2019. 17/20
It's a rebuff for the constructivist theory that if you build EU institutions, they will automatically and inevitably be filled with power and authority. Spitzenkandidaten have failed that test. 18/20
Transnational lists, of course, would be a very different matter. That would mean MEPs elected from an EU-wide constituency on EU-wide votes. The process would be very challenging legally/technically, but it would be a clear pan-European electoral mandate. 19/20
The question for all politicians in all elections is "What difference does it make for *me* if *I* vote for *you*?" New European Parliament needs to answer that question. 20/20 ENDS
