Thread by @nwbrux

This is a thread about how Leavers are wrong about EU perceptions of the UK position on “No Deal”, ie leaving the EU without an agreement, and about EU27 perceptions of the UK debate as it is now. 1/20

Leavers are wrong to suggest that the UK should have been more assertive about the chance of choosing No Deal as an option, in order to get a better negotiation outcome. 2/20

The fact is that for the EU, when Boris Johnson and David Davis were appointed to government in 2016, it very quickly became clear that No Deal was a real possibility, since both were visibly unserious about negotiating. 3/20

Davis said repeatedly (and continues to say) that it is fine not to negotiate with Commission, because big EU member states will always cave at the last moment. (There is little historical evidence to support this.) And the rest of Europe took note when he said this. 4/20

Johnson’s repeated rudeness to and about Europeans, for which he appeared to have licence from his boss, further diminished confidence in the UK as a serious negotiating partner. 5/20

EU27 did not (and do not) want No Deal outcome, but accepted early on that it must necessarily be factored into forward planning, because it was clearly a real if undesirable potential outcome due to British lack of seriousness in negotiations. 6/20

True, UK govt never talked up No Deal in negotiations, let alone make it any kind of threat, but this was wise; EU was well aware of No Deal prospect but also needed to know that UK negotiators were serious about avoiding it, otherwise why bother talking to them at all? 7/20

As time went on and Robbins/May took charge, perceptions of UK seriousness improved, but it was late coming. (Reminder - UK decided its negotiating position Jul 2018, A YEAR AFTER negotiations STARTED in 2017; EU decided a year BEFORE.) 8/20

HOWEVER. Leavers do have a point, and Remainers are wrong, about the unhelpful effect of repeated Parliamentary votes rejecting No Deal (in absence of positive vote for current proposal, or for something else). 9/20

As @DavidAllenGreen likes to remind us, UK leaves EU with or without a deal on 29 March, whether or not it is ready, no matter how many time Commons rejects “No Deal” in the meantime, unless Parliament votes FOR something else. 10/20

(And if that’s change of departure date, it needs EU27 agreement, and see below for my reservations about how easy that would be.) 11/20

For EU27 (and I suspect for UK and international business actors) it would be much more helpful to see UK Parliament vote FOR something. Repeated rejections of various options add to perception of UK system unable to make any positive choices. 12/20

EU27 in general wants decent solution for Brexit, but goodwill towards UK has been pretty much used up. This did not happen solely on May’s watch. 13/20

Cameron calling referendum, losing it and then resigning PMship when it was lost is still seen (fairly or unfairly) as incomprehensible lack of leadership by EU27. They feel UK casually discarded significant EU efforts that had gone into negotiating Cameron’s deal. 14/20

May got special EU summit called to approve her deal, and then was unable to carry her own party, and finally reneged on it by supporting Brady amendment. EU27 collectively unimpressed, and won’t invest more energy than absolutely necessary into finding new answers. 15/20

On backstop, Ireland completely outmanoeuvred UK early on; while Boris was making rude remarks about foreigners, Irish were busy convincing rest of EU that protecting openness of @BorderIrish from unreliable Brits is vital EU27 interest. Not without reason. 16/20

UK internal concerns on backstop, which emerged twelve months after UK govt agreed to it, are therefore perceived as looking for ways to wriggle out of commitments on Ireland, either now or in a few years time. 17/20

EU27 feel they leaned a lot towards UK on backstop and (as with Cameron negotiations leading to referendum outcome) now that flexibility is being repaid with rudeness and hostility. 18/20

From EU27 perspective, good close future relationship with UK is very desirable, but UK needs first to demonstrate reliability on commitments on payments, citizens’ rights and Irish border, all three of which look shaky just now. 19/20

MPs (and UK govt) should concentrate on how to encourage EU27 to invest effort in negotiating with UK for another couple of months, if that proves necessary. Mood in Brussels now is that despite best efforts, no-deal outcome is most likely outcome; in that case, why wait? 20/20