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1. The security situation brought on by our actions in J&K is unstable.
It is premised on our ability to handle Kashmiris and Pakistan.
What it ignores is the role of local intelligence in insurgencies and the rising ambitions of Al Qaeda and ISIS in South Asia.
It is premised on our ability to handle Kashmiris and Pakistan.
What it ignores is the role of local intelligence in insurgencies and the rising ambitions of Al Qaeda and ISIS in South Asia.
2. Among the points that Amit Shah had in his briefing notes was point 15, "Possibility of violent disobedience amongst sections of uniformed personnel.”
The problem is not just the possibility of violence, but of disobedience.
The problem is not just the possibility of violence, but of disobedience.
3. Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns are won or lost on the back of information.
In one stroke we have eliminated the possibility of willing cooperation by those who oppose militants.
We are left with technical intelligence and bribery/coercion alone now.
In one stroke we have eliminated the possibility of willing cooperation by those who oppose militants.
We are left with technical intelligence and bribery/coercion alone now.
4. We have surrendered a key strategic advantage.
The US - which has much more power and tech capability - has struggled with this in Afghanistan.
Reliant primarily on mukhbirs and SIGINT the greatest military power the world has ever seen has bombed its way to defeat.
The US - which has much more power and tech capability - has struggled with this in Afghanistan.
Reliant primarily on mukhbirs and SIGINT the greatest military power the world has ever seen has bombed its way to defeat.
5. Bear in mind the US ops in Afghanistan began as a legitimate war, and had the backing of almost the whole world and wide sectors of Afghanistan's population (still has, in many parts).
We do not have that advantage, although we have the advantage of home terrain.
We do not have that advantage, although we have the advantage of home terrain.
6. Our successful campaign in Punjab had much to do with large sections of the Punjabi public and police explicitly against militants.
The abuses on all sides did not help, but in the end, enough Punjabis sided against militancy.
Is that even possible in Kashmir now?
The abuses on all sides did not help, but in the end, enough Punjabis sided against militancy.
Is that even possible in Kashmir now?
7. The second factor, external support for militancy, is even more problematic.
For that it is worth looking at Pakistan in Afghanistan, especially the support for Mansour as head of the Taliban.
This is generally only seen as Pakistani betrayal. The role of ISIS is ignored.
For that it is worth looking at Pakistan in Afghanistan, especially the support for Mansour as head of the Taliban.
This is generally only seen as Pakistani betrayal. The role of ISIS is ignored.
8. By backing violent non-state actors Pakistan has released rabid dogs.
It can guide them, but not fully control them, as evidenced by the many horrors - from Lal Masjid to the attack on the Army School in Peshawar.
No excuses for them, but they have limited control.
It can guide them, but not fully control them, as evidenced by the many horrors - from Lal Masjid to the attack on the Army School in Peshawar.
No excuses for them, but they have limited control.
9. This matters because when Pakistan tries to guide them to "peace", it cannot.
The US and Afghanistan pushed Pakistan to do so - and the US and international community have more leverage and power than we ever will - and Pakistan failed.
The US and Afghanistan pushed Pakistan to do so - and the US and international community have more leverage and power than we ever will - and Pakistan failed.
10. Large sections of the Taliban broke away, supposedly the BND - German intelligence - cited something like a quarter joined ISIS.
To rally the rest to his banner Mansour - greenlighted by ISI most likely - attacked Afghan government forces.
To rally the rest to his banner Mansour - greenlighted by ISI most likely - attacked Afghan government forces.
11. Forced between losing its key client in Afghanistan or going along with the US and Afghanistan, Pakistan chose to back Mansour.
It ended badly for everybody, except for the most extreme militants.
It makes little sense to believe we can exert greater pressure.
It ended badly for everybody, except for the most extreme militants.
It makes little sense to believe we can exert greater pressure.
12. It is in the self-interest of groups like AQ and ISIS to stoke conflict, and they are specifically eyeing South Asia as the next frontier: hudson.org/research/15137…
We may be able to pressure Pakistan, even get China on board, but these guys have no such pressure points.
We may be able to pressure Pakistan, even get China on board, but these guys have no such pressure points.
13. AQ and ISIS will be happy to have a war between India and Pakistan, and delighted with the repression and murder of Kashmiris as a boost to their propaganda and recruitment.
It is to them that we have handed the biggest strategic advantage.
It is to them that we have handed the biggest strategic advantage.
14. Our intelligence personnel should have known this - actually do know this - but the decisions are made among the coterie of Doval, Modi, and Shah.
Doval is an old man fighting wars he couldn't really win more than 25 years ago.
Modi and Shah are petty thugs.
Doval is an old man fighting wars he couldn't really win more than 25 years ago.
Modi and Shah are petty thugs.
15. Their auras of "success" have more to do with Jaitley's media management, the elimination of rivals, and the appointing of compromised people in institutions of power rather than any real achievements.
This is the team that has brought us this crisis.
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This is the team that has brought us this crisis.
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