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1. With @EUCouncil #GAC finally debating #Article7 procedure about democratic backsliding in Hungary, time for thread about my forthcoming @jepp_journal article on why EU tolerates autocratic member states: "The European Union's Authoritarian Equilibrium" papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
2. Building on my earlier work & drawing on literature on 'subnational authoritarianism', the new paper explores why the EU, which professes a commitment to liberal democracy, has allowed some member governments to backslide toward competitive authoritarianism.
3. I argue EU has become trapped in an “authoritarian equilibrium” underpinned by 3 factors. 1st, (as I've written before) EU’s half-baked system of party politics & ingrained reluctance to interfere in domestic politics of members shield national autocrats from EU intervention
4. Second, funding & investment from the EU helps sustain these regimes. Third, free movement of people in EU facilitates the exit of dissatisfied citizens, which depletes opposition and generates remittances, thereby helping these regimes endure.
5. I emphasize that while these dynamics can help autocratic states survive in any federal system, more fully developed ones have capacity to eventually steer autocratic states back to democracy. By contrast, EU's half-baked institutions appear to be stuck in an autocracy trap.
6. 1st pillar of the authoritarian equilibrium is EU's 'partial politicization'. Half-baked EU partisan politics provide Europarties ample incentives to protect pet autocrats, but since voter awareness of Europarties is so low, there are no reputational costs to doing so
7. On top of half-baked Europarty politics, the intergovt character of EU decision-making & enduring power of sovereignty norms which discourage interference in domestic affairs also help protect autocrats
8. I summarize how the politics of authoritarian protection has helped Orbán survive and thrive (especially with the help of @EPP ) in this passage. 
9. 2nd pillar of the authoritarian equilibrium is funding & investment from EU. As I say, "Ironically, while the EU has spent large sums promoting democracy in candidate states and in countries around the world, today it is a major funder of democratic backsliding by EU members"
10. The problem is that EU hands out huge sums to these regimes, while generally leaving oversight & prosecution of abuse of that expenditure to those governments. So, EU funds act like a 'resource curse' (h/t Carlos Gervasoni) helping autocrats fund their clientelistic regimes
11. On top of EU funds, there is investment. Being an EU member helps backsliders attract FDI (as I explore in another paper with Julia Gray & Terence Teo), so investment keeps flowing. As I often say, Hungary isn't just an autocracy, it is an Audi-ocracy sustained by German FDI
12. Finally the 3rd pillar of the authoritarian equilibrium is emigration (you read that right emigration, not immigration). As Hirschman taught us long ago, emigration can serve as a political pressure release valve for autocrats, as potential opponents choose exit over voice
13. Hungarians have been leaving in droves since Orbaán took office. The increase in emigration from Hungary since Orbaán took office (up 186%) was more than double the increase in emigration from any other EU member state in that period:
14. Those leaving are disproportionately young & better educated, as recent @TheEconomist article emphasized economist.com/briefing/2019/…. Their demographic profile means that they would have disproportionately tended to support the opposition.
15. The emigration of so many likely Fidesz opponents drains ranks of potential opposition. Orbán then makes it very hard for them to vote once they are out of country, effectively disenfranchising them.
16. Meanwhile, since member states control citizenship policy, he can enfranchise ethnic Hungarians from neighboring non-EU states, who then become loyal Fidesz voters, thus further tipping the balance in his favor
17. To make it even sweeter for him, emigrants send home remittances which help prop up Hungarian economy. Also as @CatherineDVries and others show, remittances tend to increase the recipients' support for the incumbent regime, further bolstering support for him in Hungary.
18. Taken together these factors explain why the EU can be a hospitable environment for autocrats. Literature on subnational authoritarianism by people like Gibson, Giraudy, @robmickey, @DavidAlexBatema & others reminds us that these regimes can last for decades
19. Think of US where authoritarian enclaves in the South lasted for nearly a century. Bad news for EU. Also, as @DavidAlexBatema et al (press.princeton.edu/titles/11340.h…) note, autocrats will try to infiltrate federal-level institutions to spread their policies.
20. So Orban isn't content to just have allies in @EPP & @EUCouncil protect his regime from interference. He wants to reshape EU by putting his minions on committees in @Europarl_EN & in powerful @EU_Commission positions- as I discuss in @monkeycageblog:
21. I paint a bleak picture. Any bright side? Well, EU at least sets lower bound- keeping soft authoritarian regimes like Orbán's from becoming coercive dictatorships like fascist or communist regimes of past, or like Putin's. If you set a low bar, you can see that as progress.
22. Again, you can read the paper here: poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?I… & final version will be out in a special issue of @jepp_journal in a few months.
23 Thanks to my RAs Phil Olson & Sanjana Chandra & to colleagues who gave me feedback/ideas, ie @ProfPech K. Scheppele @BardPetra @halmai_gabor Z. Enyedi @alemannoEU @AndrasBozoki1 @ZgutEdit @dziblatt @bartbonikowski @akreppel N. Jabko & more who I'll thank in acknowledgments END
