Thread by @tonyingesson

Ok, I'm going to drop Wohl's latest antics, but not before I've analyzed this spectacular failure from a classic Soviet maskirovka perspective. Here we go.

(THREAD)

One of my favorite books on Soviet maskirovka is Ulfving's "Den stora maskeraden" (which is now out of print), so I'm using that as point of departure here, since it uses concise definition/criteria lists which makes discussion easier in a format like this.

Ulfving's interpretation of Soviet maskirovka doctrine, point by point:

1. The deception plan must have a clear purpose, in support of a specific objective (i.e. no deception for its own sake)

In this case, the objective seems clear (discredit Warren).

2. Control must be exercised at the highest possible level, to avoid leaks.

Well, the "highest possible level" in this case isn't really that high... But sure, I guess Wohl is running the show (to the best of his abilities, which however seems to be a limiting factor).

3. Preparations must be thorough, and all deception activities monitored continuously.

Here things start to fall apart. Preparations seem to have been anything but thorough (the public IG account of the BDSM Marine, for example). Monitoring also seems to have been poor.

4. Credibility is absolutely necessary [...].

Normally, in order to maximize credibility, one would choose an idea or prejudice the opponent already has. In this case, it's more of a bizarre fantasy only Wohl et al. seems to harbor.

5. Flood the opponent's sensors with as much info as possible, along with the "normal" degree of contradictions (i.e. perfectly aligned info is suspicious in itself).

We do get quite a bit of contradictions, but I don't think this is what the Soviets intended...

6. Flexibility in execution must be ensured, to adjust the deception as necessary to the reactions of the opponent.

There seems to be zero flexibility in Wohl's case. They just stuck to the original game plan, even when it seemed doomed days before the big reveal.

7. The need to keep the deception plan secret is as great as the need to keep the real plan secret.

The cat was out of the bag in this one from the start, and the real plan painfully obvious to anyone with more cognitive capacity than a garden snail.

8. Timing is important. The opponent must be fed the deception in time to process it, but not have enough time to debunk it before the objective has been achieved.

Timing in this case seems more haphazard than anything. At least they could have waited until the election. Jeez..

That wraps up my analysis of this latest master plan. As you can see, this is _not_ the way to pull off a deception plan. I conclude that the Russians weren't involved in this one, since they should know better.