#EleccionesBo2019
With reports from the OAS, European Union both out, and critiques offered by CEPR, it's time to see what we know about election integrity, bias, irregularity, and fraud.
With reports from the OAS, European Union both out, and critiques offered by CEPR, it's time to see what we know about election integrity, bias, irregularity, and fraud.
Like all those in this debate, my prior perspective shapes my standard of proof.
I see the Bolivian electoral process as distinctly transparent, but also its officials as often partisan (the latter is often true globally and in many places elec officials must be bipartisan).
I see the Bolivian electoral process as distinctly transparent, but also its officials as often partisan (the latter is often true globally and in many places elec officials must be bipartisan).
My goal has been to understand what is going on, rather than to accuse or defend one side, so I've adopted an informal preponderance of the evidence standard in my judgments, and tried to state any leaps of logic that build on known facts.
I have watched commentary on Bolivia spiral into two incompatible camps who speak from two different sets of "facts" and abhor this process. I think it's our job as researchers to accurately describe a single reality, not act as lawyers or propagandists who further the split.
The questions of "was it fraud?" and "was it a coup?" are logically independent. It's possible to conclude #FueFraude and #FueGolpe.
The position of the post-election opposition movement surfaced in the cabildo's prior to the election. They simultaneously vowed to defend the results of 2016 (no Evo candidacy) and to vigorously mobilize to defend their (2019) votes from fraud.
As the EU Report notes, concern with fraud was a majority view among Bolivians, according to polls before the election.
Let me define the four terms roughly; Electoral Integrity requires a nonpolitical, tamper-proof electoral process. This is what a skeptical public needs to accept the result of a closely contested election.
Electoral irregularities are deviations from integrity, places where bias or fraud could leak in and alter the process.
Bias in decisionmaking can alter the outcome, especially when there are partisans making decisions inside the electoral process. (and all electoral counts involve hundreds if not thousands of human decisions to address errors, ambiguities, and rule violations)
Finally fraud is a deliberate, partisan effort to change the vote count and the will of the voters. It is a subset of irregularities, but the boundaries aren't the same for all observers.
On October 21, with the TREP count stopped, the OAS (and if I recall correctly the EU) questioned the stoppage as a threat to electoral integrity that might raise suspicions of fraud. The OAS issued a further statement after it resumed, which became the target of CEPR's ire.
These statements did not, as CEPR claimed, originate the fraud narrative. They acknowledged widespread Bolivian fears and a critical movement.
The OAS and the EU (as the latter's report makes clear) were hoping to reverse the stoppage, and quickly. The EU Report argues that the TREP should have been released progressively so as to maximize transparency and public confidence.
In forming a formal audit team, the OAS worked with the Morales government on the task of certifying the election.
Despite some perceptions, this was not a "fraud inquiry." Instead the standard was electoral integrity/certifying the election.
Despite some perceptions, this was not a "fraud inquiry." Instead the standard was electoral integrity/certifying the election.
In both their November and December reports, the OAS audit operated on the standard that if the scale of irregularities was greater than the margin of avoiding a second round, they could not certify the election.
The OAS used cautious language in October and November, and a literal color code system in its December report to separate levels of certainty about its different statements.
CEPR has been essentially a critic of the OAS's role as enabler of "the fraud narrative." This may be both a poor read of the OAS's literal words and an accurate understanding of how Bolivians have interpreted the OAS report.
The OAS's most certain conclusion are failures in electoral integrity and electoral irregularities.
It referred the deliberate failures (including around the undisclosed server) for criminal prosecution.
It referred the deliberate failures (including around the undisclosed server) for criminal prosecution.
The OAS classed its statistical projections at a lower level of certainty. The final count results were "highly improbable" and suggested manipulation.
CEPR, which has acted as defense lawyer on the charge of fraud, has tended to dismiss all the failures of integrity and irregularities as irrelevant to the main question.
But the audit's main question was certifying the election or not.
But the audit's main question was certifying the election or not.
In addition, the OAS (election observer team) had an additional source of information not discussed in the OAS (audit team) report: its own independent rapid count. The EU Report brings this to light.
So, while CEPR has been arguing that statistical evidence internal to the TREP was insufficient to show fraud, the OAS and two other independent rapid count samples all pointed to a miscount as well.
Beyond the realm of statistics, there is the question of whether the various failures in integrity and irregularities in counting were the product of partisan intervention and bias. Both the OAS and EU concluded: sometimes yes.
Now is the latter case "fraud"? "bias"? "Unconscious errors"? It depends on the observer and the particular acts. But any could invalidate the election.
My personal view is that deliberate partisan interference in the process is prima facie evidence of fraud.
And the confirmed interference was extreme: overruling the TSE president to shut down the TREP.
And the confirmed interference was extreme: overruling the TSE president to shut down the TREP.
