1. What appears to be the tragic, and at best deeply negligent, shootdown of a civilian airliner by Iranian air defense forces, recalls the chilling summer of 2014, when concerns for civilian airline safety in two countries converged.
2. As US Ambassador to Israel, I was consumed that summer with the conflict between Israel & Hamas, including US support for both ceasefire negotiations and Israeli efforts to defend against thousands of rockets launched from Gaza, which also threatened US embassy personnel.
3. With so much incoming rocket fire, including as far north as Tel Aviv and beyond, the FAA began to express concern about the safety of civilian aircraft flying in and out of Ben Gurion Airport (BGA).
4. I tried to understand their precise concern: That airborne planes would be struck by Hamas' incoming rockets? That they'd be struck by Israeli air defense (Iron Dome) missiles? That they'd be struck while on the ground? That runways or airport facilities could be struck?
5. In a mid-July call with senior FAA staff in DC, I expressed my doubts that any of these scenarios could plausibly put aircraft at risk. That assessment was based on what I understood to be the Israeli approach to defend the airport and their airspace.
6. Nevertheless, the FAA's decision was that if a rocket fell within 1-mile of the airport perimeter, they would issue a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) about unsafe conditions at BGA.
7. I insisted that if they felt compelled to take such an action -- which they clearly had the authority to do as a safety-enforcement agency, without political interference -- they must call me first, so at a minimum, we could discuss how to inform the Israelis.
8. Days later, on July 17, returning home late at night after an intense day of local developments, I flipped on the news and struggled to absorb what was being reported: a Malaysian Airlines civilian airliner (MH-17) had been shot down over Ukraine. WTF??
9. In addition to the unimaginable tragedy for the victims and their families, and the culpability of Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists, the event caused FAA's caution about civilian aircraft flying in combat zones to spike.
10. Five days later, on July 22, a Hamas rocket that was not intercepted by Iron Dome landed in the town of Yehud, just to the north of BGA. According to satellite data, its distance from the airport fence was 1.02 miles.
11. When the FAA called to inform me of the forthcoming NOTAM, I told them I respected their authority to do so, but questioned why it was necessary since the distance was over a mile. Too close a call, they felt. But no question, the MH-17 event weighed heavily on their minds.
12. Some felt the FAA NOTAM was a decision imposed by the Obama Administration to pressure Israel on the tactics of its operation in Gaza.
13. That was total BS. In fact, there was a clear policy of non-interference in an FAA safety decision. Had there been political pressure, the decision would have gone the other way.
14. The Israelis reacted strongly, as I knew they would. Shutting down foreign civilian air traffic to BGA threatened to cut Israel off from the world economically (although El Al was still flying), handing Hamas a major, undeserved, victory.
15. It was the closest Israel came that summer to invading Gaza to stop the rockets. We supported Israel's right of self-defense, but wanted to avoid a ground invasion that would produce far more casualties on both sides. The Israelis wanted to avoid that as well.
16. The Israelis felt great confidence that they had a system of air traffic control integration with air force and air defense commands to ensure that civilian planes would not be in the vicinity of incoming rockets or outgoing missiles.
17. In fact, I believed they did. I had spent dozens of hours with Israeli air defense commanders and had gained an understanding of their doctrine and tactics using Iron Dome to defend against Hamas rockets. But the FAA had never been exposed to that information.
18. The NOTAM set off a frantic process. I arranged for the Israelis to explain to the FAA, with technical specificity, how they controlled Israeli airspace & integrated air defense procedures to ensure civilian aircraft were safe, and their ability to adjust as new data came in.
19. There were some linguistic, cultural and bureaucratic hurdles to overcome to enable Israeli security types and FAA officials to get on the same page. I worked to smooth those channels, so that we could focus on the main problem, which was technical.
20. It was all new to the FAA. No country had an effective, deployed, active rocket-and-missile-defense system like Iron Dome, then only three years in the field, so there was no previous example on which to base the analysis.
21. The FAA had to learn the Israeli techniques from scratch. (Details are too complicated and classified to explain here.) Once they did, they were satisfied, and the NOTAM was lifted, 36 hours after it was imposed.
22. Though the incident was frustrating, I respected both the FAA's and the Israelis' seriousness and commitment, each in their own way, to the safety of the flying public. The FAA and their Israeli counterparts maintained excellent relations during and after the event.
23. My heart breaks for the passengers on the plane shot down over Iran, and for their families. End.
