1. Much discussion at J Street and among Democratic presidential candidates about US assistance to Israel. Some basic facts, and some thoughts in this thread:
2. The US has provided Israel with military assistance for decades, based on a bipartisan belief in the importance of ensuring Israel's ability to defend itself against a wide range of threats. It reflects both a moral commitment between allies and a shared strategic interest.
3. The current assistance package is based on the 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 2016 by the Obama Administration and the Netanyahu government. It took effect in Fiscal Year 2019 (starting 10/1/18), so we are now early in the second year.
4. The MOU provides $3.3 billion annually in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), enabling Israel to purchase military equipment (more on whose equipment below). And additional $500 million is provided annually for joint missile defense programs (Iron Dome, David's Sling, Arrow 3).
5. That brings the total to $3.8 billion a year for 10 years, or $38 billion. It's generous on behalf of the American taxpayers. It's also not altruism, because it serves US interests to ensure Israel can deter &defend against threats from Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, Hamas, ISIS,etc.
6. All of those actors also threaten US interests, so Israel's capabilities serve their interests & ours. And the assistance relationship is part of a broader security partnership in which the US has access to Israeli intel, joint training, & technology. Benefits flow both ways.
7. Much of the assistance dollars flow back to the US economy, by funding Israeli purchases of major US-origin military systems like F-15s, F-16s, F-35s, helicopters and other air platforms, munitions, etc. Many US jobs are supported by the program.
8. For years, Israel has had a unique provision in its FMF program, enabling it to spend 26 percent of its aid package in Israel, buying Israeli manufactured equipment. This helped achieve a joint US-Israel goal of building up a mature Israeli defense industry.
9. The 2016 MOU gradually phases out that provision from 26% to zero over the 10 years. The logic is that the Israeli industry is now mature (even competing with the US in some markets), so the program can be treated like other FMF programs, with $$ flowing to US firms/jobs.
10. While Obama had significant differences with various Israeli policies on settlement expansion, lack of progress on 2 states, etc., he did not seek to condition the aid in the MOU on those issue. Why not?
11. First, he saw benefit to US interests in our closest regional ally being able to deter/defend against a wide range of threats having nothing to do with the Palestinians. Iran, Hezbollah, ISIS, etc. would all threaten Israel with or without a 2 state solution.
12. Second, he understood Isr bears responsibility for the stalemate, but not solely. Pals also bear responsibility (Hamas terror/rockets/tunnels,PA incitement/legitimization of violence/rejection of Israel as a Jewish state). Israel couldn't end the conflict tomorrow on its own.
13. Nothing has changed about that logic. The MOU represents a US commitment, as well as a self-interest. Those who advocate withholding or conditioning security assistance need to bear that in mind. The US needs to keep its commitments.
14. At the same time, it is absolutely true that the US has a profound interest in achieving an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a 2SS. It's how Israel's Jewish & democratic future is secured. It's how the occupation ends & Palestinians achieve their legitimate rights.
15. And it's how the US is able to sustain its values-based partnership with Israel over time. We therefore have the right to expect, at a minimum, Israel to make efforts to keep the 2SS alive, and certainly not take actions, like annexation, that will kill it.
16. Countries have a right to expect that allies take their interests into account. So it's unrealistic for Israel, a close US ally which benefits from the partnership, as we do, to expect that we won't raise our concerns, or even look for ways to use leverage if they're ignored.
17. To date, no candidate has called for cutting US assistance. Some have hinted at conditioning it. More realistically, some have said US aid cannot support annexation of the West Bank. Of course it should not, and as currently structured, could not.
18. It's not anti-Israel to say that the US can't support actions by Israel that harm our interests -- including, fundamentally, our ability to sustain the partnership we have built and both benefit from.
19. Israelis should also be realistic about attitudes in US society and look beyond the current MOU and aid debate. Our relationship is based on interests and values. It won't be sustainable as it has been if the common democratic values are put a risk by the demise of the 2SS.
20. Whenever the new Israeli government is formed, clarity that annexation is off the table and 2SS remains the objective (even while acknowledging the requirement for better Palestinian leadership), with policies to match, will help reset this debate. End.
