1/ A Persian autumn of discontent? Some thoughts on the latest #IranProtests [Thread]
2/ On Fri, the Iranian govt raised gasoline prices by 300%, sparking widespread demonstrations. Even going by govt estimates, these protests have been significant in scale, scope and impact: More than a dozen killed, 150+ banks/shops attacked, >1000 arrested & internet shutdown
3/ These at minimum most serious protests since 2017/18. At the time, we warned that “if Iranian leaders fail to recognize that the status quo has become untenable and major reforms are unavoidable, they are only buying time until the next uprising”. bit.ly/2CRUh9d
4/ Since then Iran’s economic picture has darkened considerably under weight of US sanctions. Tehran may have felt that the worst of the damage was behind it as adjusted to shock of ban on oil sales, but cumulative impact is still substantial.
5/ There’s a valid economic case for raising gas prices. Subsidizing them is costly to the government and also incentivizes smuggling. According to OilMin Zanganeh, the move frees up $2.5b that will be allocated to direct handouts.
6/ But Rouhani admin has played a bad hand poorly, rolling out this decision with no warning amid unrest over similar frustrations in Iraq & Lebanon. Timing could be based on economic considerations, but politics may also have a role.
7/ I have a hard time believing someone with @HassanRouhani 's security background couldn't foresee the consequences. So possible that he was trying to twist deep state's arm into talks w/US. It's also possible that hardliners hoped this would discredit Rouhani ahead of 2020 elex
8/ While protests, especially after fuel price hikes, are not new in Iran, the speed with which the leadership brought down its iron first indicates that it sees itself under siege (not just internally, but also regionally) & so it will brook no dissent.
9/ More broadly, protests could lead both IRI & US to dig in: Tehran by seeing concessions as tantamount to weakness and Washington by taking unrest as evidence max pressure policy could undermine or perhaps even collapse Iranian government.
wsj.com/articles/upris…
wsj.com/articles/upris…
10/10 This is also probably not good news for Iraq and Lebanon, as the same logic applies there: compromising under pressure is bound to increase, not alleviate, pressure. All of this means that the prospects for deescalation, while more critical, are even dimmer now than before.
